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Abstract: The concept of coherence has long been thought to provide answers 
to a number of classical philosophical questions in metaphysics, epistemology 
and elsewhere. In recent decades, the promise of coherence has drawn the 
attention of many in legal theory, where coherence has since been employed 
for a number of different reasons. Among the many claims made for coherence 
in law and legal reasoning, some have argued that coherence plays a central 
role in the process of legal proof, justifying beliefs about unperceived past 
events. This claim constitutes the primary subject of this thesis. Focusing on the 
influential coherence-based theories of justification presented by Laurence 
BonJour, Neil MacCormick and Amalia Amaya, I argue that the use of 
coherence in the process of legal proof has been overestimated. Highlighting a 
number of conceptual and epistemological problems for coherence theories of 
justification, I suggest that coherence provides too weak a test to deliver 
justificatory force in the acceptance of beliefs about unperceived past events. In 
light of these findings, I tentatively propose a new, more limited role for 
coherence in the context of discovery and theory-formulation, where coherence 
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‘Coherence is in vogue.’1 The opening to Joseph Raz’s ‘The Relevance of 
Coherence’ remains, more than 20 years after its initial publication, an accurate 
portrayal of the philosophical climate. Throughout much of the last century, 
philosophers have grappled with the idea that the notion of coherence, of 
“hanging together”, provides the answer to a number of classical philosophical 
questions. In metaphysics, for example, the opinion that a proposition is true if 
and only if that proposition fits within a coherent system of propositions rose to 
prominence in philosophical thought at the turn of the 20th century, before going 
out of fashion more suddenly than it came in.2 Coherence has long been ‘a 
major player’ in epistemology too,3 where many have argued that coherence 
plays a critical role in the acquisition of knowledge, forming the decisive criterion 
in the justification of empirical beliefs.4 
 
More recently, the allure of coherence has caught the attention of thinkers from 
a wide range of subjects, including aesthetics,5 ethics6 and, indeed, law, where 
the notion of coherence has been sought, employed and endorsed by many of 


























































1 Joseph Raz, ‘The Relevance of Coherence’ in Boston University Law Review, Vol. 72, No. 2 
(1992), pp. 273-321, 273. 
2 See, for example: F.H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (London: Clarendon-Oxford 
University Press, 1914), 202-218; Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought Vol. II (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1939), 212-303; A.C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (London: 
Metheun, 3rd edn, 1961) 195-261; and, Nicolas Rescher, The Coherence Theory of Truth 
(London: Clarendon-Oxford University Press, 1973). For a recent defence, see: James O. 
Young, ‘A Defence of the Coherence Theory of Truth’ in Journal of Philosophical Research, Vol. 
26, (2001), pp. 89-101. 
3 Keith Lehrer, ‘Coherentism’ in Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup (eds), A 
Companion to Epistemology (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2nd edn, 2010), 278. 
4 For an overview, see: ibid. 
5 See, for example: Karl Aschenbrenner, The Concept of Coherence in Art (Dordrecht: D. 
Reidel, 1985). 
6 See, for example: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, rev edn, 
1999). 
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In law, coherence has been invoked within a number of different areas for a 
number of reasons. Most notably, it has been suggested, roughly speaking, that 
the coherence of a legal system represents a normative ideal, like justice;7 that 
individual judicial decisions are justified if (and, perhaps, only if) they cohere 
with the wider legal system, its principles and/or political morality;8 and that 
coherence plays a significant role in the process of legal fact-finding, solving the 
longstanding “problem of proof”.9 Unsurprisingly, the vast range of subjects that 
coherence occupies within legal philosophy leaves any meaningful analysis of 
coherence in law far beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus, the investigation 
presented here focuses on the role of coherence in just one of these arenas: 
the process of legal proof, where the application of coherence maintains a close 
connection to its epistemological forerunner. 
 
II. The Problem of Proof 
In recent decades, the emergence of the so-called “new evidence scholarship”10 
has seen a shift in the focus of legal evidence scholarship away from the mere 
analysis of black-letter legal rules, in search of a better understanding of how 
evidence is, and ought to be, used in the process of legal proof. At the centre of 
this venture lies a fundamental question, with its roots deep in epistemology, 
that underpins the entire debate: on what basis are legal fact-finders justified in 
accepting one theory of a case,11 among competing alternative theories, as 

























































7 Notable examples include: Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal 
Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), esp. ch 10; Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
(Oxford: Hart, 1998), esp. ch 6-7; and, Aleksander Peczenik, On Law and Reason (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2nd edn, 2008), esp. ch 4. 
8 ibid. See also: Barbara Baum Levenbrook, ‘The Role of Coherence in Legal Reasoning’ in 
Law and Philosophy, Vol. 3 (1984), pp. 355-374; and, Raz, (n 1). For at least some (see, for 
example: MacCormick, (n 7), 203) it seems that the arguments that decisions ought to cohere 
with prior law, principles and/or morality and that systemic coherence represents a normative 
ideal are mutually supporting. It is important to remember, however, that the two claims, though 
often interrelated, are distinct, as Moral Soriano points out. See: Leanor Moral Soriano, ‘A 
Modest Notion of Coherence in Legal Reasoning. A Model for the European Court of Justice’ in 
Ratio Juris, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2003), pp. 296-323. 
9 See: Section II. 
10 This phrase is Lempert’s. See: Richard Lempert, ‘The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing 
the Process of Proof’ in Boston University Law Review, Vol. 66 (1986), pp.439-477. For a brief 
overview of the new evidence scholarship and its origins, see: John Jackson and Sean Doran, 
‘Evidence’ in Dennis Patterson (ed), A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 
(Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2nd edn, 2010), 182ff. 
11 That is, a hypothesis about the disputed facts of a case. 
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legal theorists have drawn extensively on epistemological literature, which has 
long sought to answer the more general question as to how empirical beliefs 
might be justified.12 
 
The influence of epistemological thought in this new evidence scholarship has 
led contemporary legal evidence scholars to develop two distinct schools of 
thought. The conventional view, atomism, is built upon the premise that the 
relative probability of evidentiary hypotheses can be assessed by combining the 
probability of each theory’s constituent parts, often relying on mathematical 
(particularly Bayesian) theories of probability.13 Conversely, holism presents the 
alternative view that evidence is to be understood as a whole, where theories of 
a case are understood as stories, and the plausibility of each theory depends 
on the holistic analysis of the story it tells.14 The popularity of the holistic 
approach, encouraged in part by its psychological plausibility, 15  has led a 
number of legal theorists to consider the grounds on which such holistic 
evaluations ought to be made. For example, Michael Pardo and Ronald Allen, 
perhaps the most prominent advocates of holism in legal evidence, suggest that 


























































12 This is unsurprising, perhaps, since legal proof is arguably ‘an epistemic endeavor’ after all; 
Michael S. Pardo, ‘The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof’ in Legal Theory, Vol. 16 (2010), pp. 
37-57, 37. The overlap between epistemology and legal evidence can be seen, for example, in 
a special issue of the journal Episteme (Vol. 5, Issue 3 (2008)) dedicated to the interaction of 
epistemology and legal philosophy. 
13 The classical account of atomism presented by J.H. Wigmore relies on the attachment of 
“fuzzy probabilities” to individual propositions; see, for example: John H. Wigmore, ‘The 
Problem of Proof’ in Illinois Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1913), pp. 105-131; and, Terence 
Anderson, David Schum and William Twining, Analysis of Evidence (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2nd edn, 2005), 260-261. By contrast, Bayesian approaches attach a 
numerical probability to each individual component of a hypothesis, multiplying the resulting 
probabilities to determine the probability that the hypothesis, as a whole, is true; see, for 
example: Michael O. Finkelstein and William B. Fairley, ‘A Bayesian Approach to Identification 
Evidence’ in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 3 (1970), pp. 489-517. cf Laurence H. Tribe, 
‘Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process’ in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 
84, No. 6 (1971), pp.1329-1393. 
14 The inception of the recent drive towards evidentiary holism in law is generally attributed to 
the work of Ronald Allen. See, for example: Ronald J. Allen, ‘Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of 
Evidence’ in Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (1994), pp. 604-640. 
15 See, for example: Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, ‘The Story Model for Juror Decision 
Making’ in Reid Hastie (ed), Inside the Juror: The Psychology of Decision Making (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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evidence by reference to a number of criteria, including consistency, simplicity, 
consilience, coherence, and so on.16 
 
Yet, some have argued that one of these criteria in particular ought to play a 
more central role in the process of legal proof: coherence.17 Coherence theories 
of legal proof, much like their epistemological counterparts, contend that a legal 
fact-finder’s acceptance of a given hypothesis as true depends predominantly, if 
not entirely, on the coherence of its parts. Of those advocating coherence-
based accounts of legal proof, two particular legal theorists stand out in both 
significance and aptitude. 
 
The first, Neil MacCormick, is among the most renowned figures in 20th century 
legal theory. His Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory,18 developed in the recent 
Rhetoric and the Rule of Law,19 represents one of the earliest and, indeed, most 
sophisticated arguments that coherence is of value in law, and his distinction 
between “normative” and “narrative” coherence remains a key feature in legal 
coherence theory today. 20  Thus, MacCormick’s thought provides the most 
developed classical account of coherence in law.  
 
By contrast, Amalia Amaya is an emerging young scholar whose recent, and 


























































16 Michael S. Pardo and Ronald Allen, ‘Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation’ in Law and 
Philosophy, Vol. 27 (2008), pp. 223-268, 229-230. 
17 See, for example: Neil MacCormick, ‘The Coherence of a Case and the Reasonableness of 
Doubt’ in The Liverpool Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1980), pp. 45-50; Bernard S. Jackson, Law, 
Fact and Narrative Coherence (Roby, UK: Deborah Charles, 1988); J.M. Balkin, ‘Understanding 
Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence’ in Yale Law 
Journal, Vol. 103, No. 1 (1993), pp. 105-176; Paul Thagard, ‘Causal Inference in Legal Decision 
Making: Explanatory vs. Bayesian Networks’ in Applied Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 18 (2004), pp. 
231-249; and, Amalia Amaya, ‘Coherence, Evidence, and Legal Proof’ in Legal Theory, Vol. 19 
(2013), pp. 1-43. 
18 Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, rev 
edn, 1994). 
19 MacCormick, (n 7). 
20  See: Neil MacCormick, ‘Coherence in Legal Justification’ in Aleksander Peczenik, Lars 
Lindahl and Bert Van Roermund (eds), Theory of Legal Science (Dodrecht: D. Reidel, 1984) 
[republished with changes in Werner Krawietz et al. (eds), Theorie der Normen (Berlin: Duncker 
and Humblot, 1984)]. 
21 Amaya’s first monograph on coherence in law, The Tapestry of Reason: An Inquiry into the 
Nature of Coherence and its Role in Legal Argument, is due with Hart Publishing in December 
2014.  
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theorists.22  Her work also typifies a shift that has recently taken place in 
research on coherence in law, which seeks to utilise the formal tools developed 
in epistemology, cognitive science and artificial intelligence to inform our 
understanding of the nature of coherence and its role in legal reasoning and 
justification.23 
 
And so, in this thesis I present a close examination of the thought of both 
MacCormick and Amaya, which together represent two distinct approaches to 
the role of coherence in the process of legal proof. 24 Though not exhaustive, 
this focus allows the requisite space in which to develop and present an in-
depth analysis of each theory in turn, exposing a number of fundamental issues 
that are indicative of the wider problems facing a coherence-based account of 
legal fact-finding. Yet, the ramifications of the criticisms presented here reach 
far beyond the context of legal proof. I suggest that many of the challenges for 
coherence in legal fact-finding stem, in fact, from its use in the context of 
epistemic justification, while an investigation into the meaning of coherence 
reveals a number of conceptual issues which plague the coherentist literature 
more generally. 
 
III. The Structure of the Thesis 
The central question under consideration here is whether the respective 
theories of MacCormick and Amaya are successful in presenting an adequate 
coherence-based theory of justification that provides legal fact-finders with 
some non-arbitrary reason to accept one theory of a case, among competing 
alternative theories, as true. My investigation begins, however, not in law, but in 
epistemology. The problem of legal proof is derived from a more general 

























































22 See, for example, articles by Manuel Atienza, Juliano Maranhão, Cristina Redondo, Aldo 
Schiavello, Guillermo Lariguet and Claudio Michelon published in Discussiones, Vol. 10 (2011), 
and Amaya’s reply in the same volume (in Spanish). 
23  See: Amalia Amaya, ‘Formal Models of Coherence in Legal Epistemology’ in Artificial 
Intelligence and Law, Vol. 15 (2007), pp. 429-447, 437. This shift can also be seen in the 
forming of a workshop on “Artificial Intelligence, Coherence and Judicial Reasoning” held at the 
biannual International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law in 2011 and 2013, as well 
as the publication of Michał Araszkiewicz and Jaromír Šavelka (eds), Coherence: Insights from 
Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013). 
24 Indeed, Amaya’s reliance on the work of Paul Thagard provides the opportunity to consider, 
albeit more briefly, a third major figure in the literature on coherence in legal fact-finding. 
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be adequately justified to constitute knowledge, and, as I have explained, the 
suggestion that coherence represents the solution finds its origins in 
epistemology, too. For these reasons, I begin, in Chapter 2, by examining 
epistemic coherentism, before turning to its counterpart in the context of legal 
proof. 
 
Coherence plays a major role in epistemology, where the belief that coherence 
represents the crucial ingredient in epistemic justification is one of the most 
popular views in contemporary theories of knowledge. The reader will, I 
suspect, be unsurprised to learn that the epistemological literature is so vast as 
to warrant its own separate investigation, such that any general overview 
provided in just one chapter (or, indeed, even in an entire thesis of this length) 
would prove too superficial to constitute a meaningful exhibition of its many 
forms and variations. I propose, therefore, to focus, once again, on a particular 
version of coherentism that best exemplifies the merits and demerits of the 
more general position, viz. Laurence BonJour’s The Structure of Empirical 
Knowledge.25  
 
BonJour’s well-known monograph is arguably the single most significant 
contribution to the pursuit of an adequate coherence theory of epistemic 
justification. Some 30 years after its initial publication, The Structure of 
Empirical Knowledge remains one of the clearest explications of epistemic 
coherentism available and a common starting point for discussions of 
coherence in epistemology and elsewhere. 
 
My aim in analysing BonJour’s coherentism is a relatively modest one. Indeed, 
such is the sophistication and complexity of BonJour’s coherentism that a 
comprehensive account of his theory, and his later rejection of it, would extend 
far beyond my present project. Instead, the analysis afforded in Chapter 2 
introduces the reader to the wide range of problems that confront the use of 
coherence in justification of beliefs. In short, I argue: BonJour’s theory fails to 

























































25  Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1985). 
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presenting the erroneous view that the concept of coherence is somehow tied 
to beliefs and exists as a matter of degree; that it is unable to establish an 
effective method by which one can choose non-arbitrarily between competing 
beliefs; and that BonJour fails to provide sufficient evidence in support of his 
claim that adherence to coherentist standards is at least likely to lead to the 
acceptance of true beliefs and the rejection of false ones. These criticisms form 
the position from which I examine the role of coherence in the justification of 
beliefs about past facts in the legal context. 
 
In Chapter 3, I consider MacCormick’s widely discussed account of coherence 
in legal reasoning, focusing on “narrative coherence”, which he argues is ‘our 
only basis for upholding conclusions, opinions, or indeed verdicts about matters 
of past fact.’26 Following a clear outline of MacCormick’s position, intended to 
avoid any misconceptions or misrepresentations that may exist throughout the 
literature, I argue that MacCormick’s solution to the problem of proof falls victim 
to many of the problems that are found in BonJour’s theory of epistemic 
justification. Like BonJour, MacCormick commits a number of conceptual 
mistakes, leading to a conception of coherence that fails to make sense, and 
his theory of narrative coherence proves unfit to deliver justificatory force. In 
light of these findings, I present a novel constructive interpretation of 
MacComick’s account, suggesting that his narrative coherence could be of use 
outside the context of evidentiary justification and may be better placed in the 
process of discovery. 
 
I turn, in Chapter 4, to Amaya’s recent theory of legal justification by “optimal 
coherence”. Amaya contends that a belief about the law or facts under dispute 
is justified if and only if it is coherent and is such that an epistemically 
responsible actor would accept it as justified in like circumstances.27 Modifying 
Paul Thagard’s conception of coherence as constraint satisfaction, Amaya 
suggests that the kind of coherence that is relevant to the process of legal 

























































26 MacCormick, (n 7), 224. 
27 Amalia Amaya, ‘Legal Justification by Optimal Coherence’ in Ratio Juris, Vol. 24, No. 3 
(2011), pp. 304-329, 306. 
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coherence, each made up of a set of principles or constraints. She argues that 
a legal fact-finder is justified in accepting as true the theory of the case that is 
best on a test on factual coherence, where he fulfils the epistemic duties and 
displays the intellectual virtues required by the context. However, I contend that 
Amaya’s attempt to set out a clear description of coherence leads to the 
endless proliferation of “kinds” of coherence, losing sight of the concept of 
coherence itself. I further argue that her account of inference to the best 
explanation becomes severely restricted once coherence is correctly 
understood as an absolute concept,28 while her responsibility-supplement is too 
vague to provide any meaningful support.  
 
On the basis of these problems, I conclude in Chapter 5 by tentatively 
suggesting that coherence theories of legal fact-finding, in their current state, 
are unfit for purpose and that the role of coherence in the process of legal proof 
appears to have been overestimated. I propose, however, that there may be 
hope for coherence yet. The arguments presented in this thesis provide the 
space in which to develop a clearer, more accurate account of what coherence 
amounts to, as well as uncovering a potential role for coherence in the context 



























































28 That is, that coherence is not a matter of degree.  
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Laurence BonJour’s The Structure of Empirical Knowledge,1 first published in 
1985, represents one of the most influential works, perhaps the most influential 
work, on coherence and coherentism in contemporary epistemology. Following 
a thorough attack on foundationalist theories of epistemic justification, BonJour 
sets out a coherentist account of justification, arguing that an individual is 
epistemically justified in accepting a system of beliefs as true where that system 
forms a coherent whole. However, it should be noted from the outset that 
BonJour’s view has changed dramatically since the publication of his 1985 
monograph. In recent years, BonJour has come to reject coherentism, which he 
now considers a ‘thoroughly untenable’2 project that is ‘doomed to failure’,3 
advocating a form of internalist foundationalism instead.4 
 
Despite his radical change of opinion, this chapter focuses on BonJour’s The 
Structure of Empirical Knowledge for two reasons. First, BonJour’s earlier work 
remains a common starting point for coherence-based theories of justification in 
epistemology, law and elsewhere, with many supporters of coherentism 
appearing to overlook the defection of their most famous former ally. Second, 
and more significantly, the examination of BonJour’s work presented here 
reveals a number of basic problems surrounding the use of coherence in the 
epistemic justification of empirical beliefs. In particular, I argue that coherentism 
is troubled by the obscurity of the concept of coherence, its apparent inability to 

























































1  Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1985) (“SEK” hereinafter). 
2 Laurence BonJour, ‘The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism’ in John Greco and 
Ernest Sosa (eds),The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 130. 
3 Laurence BonJour, ‘Self-Profile’ in Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup (eds), A 
Companion to Epistemology (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2nd edn, 2010), 115. 
4 See, generally: Part I of Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2003). 
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failure to show that coherentism is truth-conducive. Yet, these problems (and 
variations of them) are not limited to BonJour’s theory or even epistemic 
coherentism more generally, but rather extend to the use of coherence in law 
and elsewhere. Thus, the primary purpose of this chapter is to introduce the 
concept of coherence, its use in the justification of beliefs and the problems this 
gives rise to. These problems then form the basis of much of the critique that 
follows in the remainder of the thesis. 
 
I. A Coherentist Theory of Empirical Knowledge  
In The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, BonJour attempts to establish a 
philosophical account of empirical knowledge5 that is able to overcome the 
classical problem of epistemic regress, outlined below. Whether he succeeds in 
so doing is, however, of little significance to the objectives of the present thesis. 
For this reason, I will offer little more than a superficial overview of the regress 
problem and its potential solutions here, in order to contextualise BonJour’s 
theory, before turning to the more pertinent matter of the theory itself. 
 
Adopting the classical tripartite view of knowledge as justified true belief,6 
BonJour asserts that for a person A to know that P, where P is a proposition or 
set of propositions, the following three conditions must be satisfied: 
(1) A must believe confidently that P, 
(2) P must be true, and 
(3) A’s belief that P must be adequately justified.7 
 
BonJour’s primary aim in The Structure of Empirical Knowledge concerns 
condition (3): the basis on which a belief (like A’s belief that P) is adequately 
justified. For A to be justified in his belief that P, there must be a sufficiently 

























































5 That is, knowledge concerning a posteriori beliefs held on the basis of some sensory or 
perceptual experience, rather than a priori beliefs justified by pure reason. 
6 Though this classical account of knowledge is problematised by Gettier’s famous critique of 
knowledge as justified true belief, BonJour ignores these problems, as will I, on the basis that 
‘their exact bearing on the issues which will be discussed is obscure’ and ‘because there is 
quite enough to do without them’ (SEK, 5). See: Edmund L. Gettier, ‘Is Justified True Belief 
Knowledge?’ in Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 6 (1963), pp. 121-123. 
7 SEK, 4. 
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of reasons why A believes that P, and the adequacy of any given reason will 
depend on the context. In the context of knowledge, BonJour explains that the 
sort of justification required is epistemic justification, 8  which, reflecting the 
implicit rationale of knowledge,9 is essentially related to the cognitive goal of 
truth, meaning that A’s belief that P is epistemically justified where he has good 
reason to think that P is true.10 
 
Typically, the justification of a belief like P is derived from some further, 
epistemically justified, belief or set of beliefs; for example, it might be that a 
person A is justified in believing P because Q. BonJour calls this form of 
justification inferential justification, since A’s belief that P is justified because it is 
inferred from Q,11 where A has reason to believe that P is true or probably true 
if Q is true or probably true. It follows, of course, that the justification of A’s 
belief that P also rests on there being some good reason for A to believe that Q. 
Perhaps A believes Q (and, therefore, P) because R, but then A must also have 
some good reason to believe R. The problem is that this question appears to go 
on indefinitely, since each belief must be justified by reference to some further 
premise-belief, which in turn depends on yet another premise-belief. Without 
resort to the sceptical view that the purported justification of all knowledge rests 
on some epistemically unjustifiable beliefs,12 or the implausible possibility that 
the regress continues ad infinitum,13 this problem of regress gives rise to two 
possibilities. 
 
The first is that of foundationalism. The foundationalist response to the problem 
of regress, roughly speaking, is that the regress ends with some basic empirical 

























































8 SEK, 5. 
9 SEK, 7. 
10 SEK, 8. 
11 See: SEK, 18-19. 
12 SEK, 22. BonJour contends that this sceptical view can be reasonably set aside until all other 
possibilities are shown to have failed (SEK, 87).  
13 BonJour suggests that since nobody could ever possess an infinite number of beliefs, this 
alternative could never ‘represent an accurate account of how the empirical knowledge of 
ordinary, finite knowers is actually justified’ (SEK, 24). For a defence of infinitism, see: Peter D. 
Klein, ‘Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons’ in Philosophical Perspectives, 
Vol. 13 (1999), pp. 297-325; and, ‘Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning’ in 
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 134, No. 1 (2007), pp. 1-17. 
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other beliefs are built. Foundationalism, however, faces an immediate and 
damning problem, for there appears to be no epistemically justified basis on 
which to establish these basic, foundational beliefs. 14  ‘Foundationalism’, it 
seems, ‘is thus a dead end.’15 
 
The second possibility comes from coherentism. Coherentism suggests that the 
regress circles back upon itself, such that the justification of beliefs within the 
system comes from the system’s internal coherence. Ostensibly, the coherentist 
view is also problematic, failing to end the infinite regress in question and 
resorting to a seemingly vicious circularity. The problem is that under the 
coherentist approach the epistemic justification of a belief depends on its own 
prior epistemic justification;16 for example, A may believe that P because Q, that 
Q because R, and that R because P, thus seeming to believe P because he 
believes P. BonJour’s response to this problem is to reconsider the common 
assumption that inferential justification proceeds in this linear fashion. He 
argues that, in fact, ‘inferential justification, despite its linear appearance, is 
essentially systematic or holistic in character: beliefs are justified by being 
inferentially related to other beliefs in the overall context of a coherent 
system.’17 Drawing a distinction between the “local” justification of ‘a single 
empirical belief or small set of such beliefs’ within the context of a presumed 
justified system and the “global” justification of that entire system,18 BonJour 
explains that despite the linear appearance of justification at the local level, the 
inferential justification of beliefs at the global level is a matter of nonlinear 
reciprocal support.19 
 
On BonJour’s account, then, the claim that coherentist justification is viciously 
circular is misplaced ‘because it is not genuinely a circle: the justification of a 


























































14 For BonJour’s critique of attempts to overcome this problem, see: ‘Externalist Version of 
Foundationalism’ and ‘The Doctrine of the Empirically Given’, ch 3-4 in SEK. 
15 SEK, 84. cf BonJour and Sosa, (n 4). 
16 See: SEK, 24. 
17 SEK, 90. 
18 SEK, 91. 
19 ibid. 
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coherence.’20 Thus, where an overall system of beliefs is epistemically justified 
and internally coherent, a particular belief P is justified ‘by virtue of its 
membership in the system.’21 
 
II. The Concept of Coherence 
An initial obstacle for BonJour’s coherence theory of justification stems from the 
‘obscurity’ of its central concept: coherence.22 For, despite its “immanence in all 
our thinking”,23 those employing the concept of coherence in philosophy, law 
and elsewhere have been unable to agree upon what “coherence” actually 
amounts to, such that it has become commonplace throughout the literature for 
proponents and opponents alike to begin with some introductory remark as to 
its being ‘an inherently elusive and slippery concept’.24 Indeed, as Erik Olsson 
observes, ‘it has become a standard objection to coherence theories that their 
advocates fail to provide a detailed account of the central notion’.25 The problem 
is that coherence seems to be so complex a notion that a fully adequate 
explication extends beyond the scope of any work of manageable length;26 the 
objection is that ‘there is little point in talking at length about coherence without 
a somewhat clearer idea of what is involved.’27 
 
Thus, building on his intuition that ‘coherence is a matter of how well a body of 
beliefs “hangs together”: how well its component beliefs fit together, agree or 
dovetail with each other, so as to produce an organized, tightly structured 
system of beliefs’,28 BonJour sets out five conditions for coherence. His ‘state of 
the art’29 coherence criteria suggest that: 


























































20 SEK, 92 [original emphasis]. 
21 ibid. 
22 SEK, 93. 
23 See: A.C. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey (London: Metheun, 3rd edn, 1961), 231; quoted 
in SEK, 94. 
24 Stefano Bertea, ‘The Arguments from Coherence: Analysis and Evaluation’ in Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2005), pp. 369-391, 371. 
25 Erik J. Olsson, Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification (Oxford: Clarendon-
Oxford University Press, 2005), 13. 
26 SEK, 93. 
27 SEK, 94. 
28 SEK, 93. 
29 Olsson, (n 25), 14. 
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(ii) a system of beliefs is coherent in proportion to its degree of probabilistic 
consistency; 
(iii) the coherence of a system of beliefs is increased by the presence of 
inferential connections between its component beliefs and increased in 
proportion to the number and strength of such connections; 
(iv) the coherence of a system of beliefs is diminished to the extent to which 
it is divided into subsystems of beliefs which are relatively unconnected 
to each other by inferential connections; and, 
(v) the coherence of a system of beliefs is decreased in proportion to the 
presence of unexplained anomalies in the believed content of the 
system.30 
 
Though accepting that this remains ‘a long way from being as definitive as 
desirable’, BonJour submits that his criteria present an account of the concept 
that ‘is nonetheless clear enough to make it reasonable to use it’.31 However, 
BonJour’s coherence criteria have attracted criticism.  Marshall Swain, for 
example, has expressed his disappointment at BonJour’s ‘lack of detail’,32 while 
Olsson takes issue with the criteria and the relationship between them.33  
 
A yet more fundamental and significant criticism is made by Stephen Pethick, 
who observes that the intuition on which BonJour’s criteria are based leads to 
the absurd suggestion that coherence has to do with ‘how well a body of beliefs 
“hangs together”.’34 BonJour’s intuition is plainly mistaken, since it cannot be 
said that the coherence of a story, a sentence, or a painting depends in any 
way on how well a body of beliefs hangs together. Rather, BonJour’s intuition 
leads him to elucidate what the coherence of a body of beliefs might look like, 
not coherence itself. Pethick contends that many of the problems surrounding 
the meaning of coherence arise from this very mistake, that is, he claims that 

























































30 See: SEK, 95-99. 
31 SEK, 101. 
32 Marshall Swain, ‘BonJour’s Coherence Theory of Justification’ in John W. Bender (ed), The 
Current State of the Coherence Theory (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 116. 
33 Olsson, (n 25), 15. 
34 Stephen Pethick, ‘On the Entanglement of Coherence’ in Ratio Juris, Vol. 27, Issue 1 (2014), 
pp. 116-137, 121. 
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to a striking methodological oversight that is prevalent throughout the literature, 
viz. the repeated conflation of the concept’s intension and extension.35 In short, 
Pethick suggests that writers in philosophy, linguistics, legal theory and 
elsewhere ‘have happened universally to misidentify characteristics of objects 
of which coherence may be predicated as characteristics of coherence itself’,36 
as BonJour does here.  Thus, 
in articulating coherence, C, theorists all happen to have in 
mind some x that instantiates it, and then draw on features of 
Cx in their attempt to determine C, causing the inadvertent 
imputation to C of characteristics possessed otherwise by the x 
in question.37 
 
This conceptual mistake, made by BonJour and others, leads to the conclusion,  
that there is a single true coherence, in virtue of which other 
accounts or uses of coherence must be mistaken; or that there 
must be kinds or types or concepts of coherence; or that there 
are so many different ‘coherences’ that the prospect of 
conceptual definition is ruled out altogether.38 
 
It is unsurprising, then, that the notion of coherence seems too obscure a 
concept to explicate in any work of manageable length, or any work 
whatsoever. Yet, Pethick’s criticism provides the opportunity to do just that. 
Once the view that there are kinds of coherence or coherences is rejected, 
space remains in which it is possible to develop an adequately clear but also 
suitably general account of coherence’s intension, which is broad enough to 
encapsulate its wide-ranging extension. In the remainder of this section, I will 
consider three commonly cited candidates for such an account: hanging 
together; sticking together; and, fitting together. Exploring the ordinary language 
use of each, I argue that the third is best placed to describe the concept of 




























































35 As Pethick observes (ibid, 118 fn2), the same point is made by Susan Haack in relation to 
“truth”. See: Susan Haack, ‘The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth’ in Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, Vol. 32 (2008), pp. 20-35. 
36 Pethick, ibid, 118. 
37 ibid, 119. 
38 ibid [original emphasis]. 
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II.1 Coherence as “Hanging Together” 
Perhaps the most common description of coherence, which can be seen in 
BonJour’s opening intuition, is that it amounts to “hanging together”. Thus 
understood, a belief P coheres with a belief Q if they “hang together”, while a 
given sentence is coherent if its parts “hang together”, and so on. It seems, 
then, that BonJour’s intuition may present a viable elucidation of coherence, 
once the delimiting reference to ‘a body of beliefs’ is removed. 
 
The next question, of course, is what it means to hang together, and it is here 
that the conception of coherence as hanging together comes unstuck. The 
problem is that the term “hangs together” is simply synonymous with “coherent” 
and, when broken into its constituent parts, hanging together proves unable to 
capture the sense of coherence. For, though coherence is generally accepted 
to be a symmetrical relation (i.e. hanging together),39 there is no obvious way in 
which the notion of hanging, far-reaching as it is, describes the relation in 
question. Thus, while coherence as hanging together is certainly free from the 
conflation between intension and extension that Pethick picks out, it fails to take 
us any closer towards a clear account of what coherence’s intension is. 
 
II.2 Coherence as “Sticking Together” 
Conversely, Pethick presents the rather less common view that coherence ‘just 
happens (has just happened) to mean “sticking together”’.40 Once again, the 
conception of coherence as “sticking together” looks suitably general to 
encompass the wide variety of objects to which coherence is predicated. As 
Pethick explains, under this conception, coherence remains sticking together 
irrespective of the objects in question and, indeed, in both one-place or multi-
place use; ‘[h]ow, or in consequence of what, some thing or some things “stick 
together” is then answered by the nature of, or particular relation between, the 


























































39 As Rescher remarks, ‘all coherence must be coherence with something.’ Nicholas Rescher, 
The Coherence Theory of Truth (London: Clarendon-Oxford University Press, 1973), 32 
[original emphasis]. 
40 Pethick, (n 34), 130. 
41 ibid [original emphasis]. 
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At first glance, Pethick’s conception of coherence is clearer than that 
considered above. Yet, on closer examination, Pethick’s use of “sticking 
together” is also problematic, depicting a relation which is in some respects too 
strong and in others too weak to describe that of coherence. Among its many 
senses, the only sense of the verb “stick” (that is, to stick or be stuck) which 
emerges as a plausible explanation of how sticking plays a role in coherence is 
that to stick is to adhere or cling to something, as in “the poster sticks to the 
wall”. Thus, it could be said that a story is coherent where its parts adhere or 
cling together, or that plan A coheres with plan B where plan A clings together 
with plan B.42 
 
The first problem to arise under this conception of coherence concerns the 
strength of the relation in question, since sticking together denotes a relation far 
stronger than that of coherence. Consider, for example, the following coherent 
set S1 of beliefs: 
(A) The coffee machine is missing from the common room. 
(B) Luke was seen carrying the coffee machine away. 
(C) Luke is known to be a thief. 
(D) Luke has taken the coffee machine. 
 
On Pethick’s account, the set is coherent because its constituent parts (A) to 
(D) “stick together”. Suppose, then, that for some reason one of these beliefs, 
say (C), must be rejected (perhaps some new evidence shows it to be false), 
leaving the (still coherent) set S2 [(A), (B), (D)].	
   Where such coherence is 
understood in terms of “sticking”, the rejection of (C) seems to require the 
rejection of those other beliefs to which it is stuck – precisely because they are 
stuck together. The problem, then, is that the notion of sticking is too strong, 
denoting a permanence that is not found in the concept of coherence. Indeed, it 
could be argued that the link between sticking and sticking permanently 
presented here is mistaken. Indeed, if I say that I am stuck with my homework 
or stuck in traffic on the motorway I do not mean to suggest that I will be stuck 
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and can be quickly dismissed, for the sense of sticking in play here is not one of 
adherence or clinging, but rather of being unable to move or progress. It might 
be suggested, too, that to observe that the poster is stuck to the wall is not to 
suggest that it cannot be removed, but the point is that the poster must be 
forced away from the wall – probably taking some of the wallpaper with it. 
 
On the other hand, the conception of coherence as sticking together seems too 
weak to capture the concept of coherence, since any objects can be forced to 
stick together. Consider the sentence: “Wins lucky pony child”. The sentence is 
clearly incoherent, a mere selection of random words placed in a random order. 
But so long as those words are forced together into the sentence above, one 
might say they are stuck together. Plainly, the notion of coherence requires 
more than the mere sticking together of random objects. Rather, those objects 
must fit together in some way to form a composite whole, as in the potential 
newspaper headline: “Lucky child wins pony.” 
 
For these reasons, the conception of coherence as “sticking together” also fails 
to adequately describe the concept of coherence. 
 
II.3 Coherence as “Fitting Together” 
The final and, I argue, most plausible candidate for a clear, general account of 
coherence is that of “fitting together”. Alongside the unhelpful description of 
coherence as “hanging together”, one of our most basic intuitions about 
coherence seems to be that it amounts to “fitting together”. Though the opinion 
that coherence is a matter of fitting together is implicit throughout much of the 

























































43 For some examples of (casual) descriptions of coherence as “fit” or “fitting together”, see: 
SEK, 93; Amalia Amaya, ‘Coherence, Evidence, and Legal Proof’ in Legal Theory, Vol. 19, 
Issue 1 (2013), pp. 1-43, 12; Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann, ‘Solving the Riddle of 
Coherence’ in Mind, Vol. 112 (2003), pp. 601-633, 601; Wojciech Cyrul, ‘Consistency and 
Coherence in the “Hypertext” of Law: A Textological Approach’ in Michał Araszkiewicz and 
Jaromír Šavelka (eds), Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial 
Intelligence (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 173; Igor Douven and Wouter Meijs, ‘Measuring 
Coherence’ in Synthese, Vol. 156, No. 3 (2007), pp. 405-425, 405; Marcello Guarimi, ‘Case 
Classification, Similarities, Spaces of Reasons, and Coherences’ in Michał Araszkiewicz and 
Jaromír Šavelka (eds), Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial 
Intelligence (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 194, 199; Daniel H. Glass, ‘Coherence Measure and 
Inference to the Best Explanation’ in Synthese, Vol. 157 (2007), pp. 275-296, 282; Joseph Raz, 
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The term “fit” has almost as many senses as “sticking”. Though many can be 
ignored in this context,44 the notion to which I appeal, fitting together, must be 
quickly distinguished from that of fitting within (e.g. “the car fits in the space”, or 
“the elephant doesn’t fit in the room”), for though both are commonly substituted 
for the broader notion of “fit”, it is important to stress that only the former is able 
to portray the concept of coherence. The fundamental difference between fitting 
within and together is that the former describes a relation between two objects 
in which one is able to occupy the other, while the latter describes the reciprocal 
relation of matching or agreement. This difference can be seen most simply in 
the example of an inset puzzle,45 like that shown below, in which the task is to 
place a cut-out shape into the corresponding space. 
 
In the puzzle above, it is possible to place any one of the shapes (Shape A, B, 
C or D) into Space A, since all of the shapes are small enough to fit within the 
space available. Plainly, however, only one shape (Shape A) can be 
meaningfully described as coherent with Space A, since it is only Shape A that 
fits together with the space. 
 
The usefulness of coherence as fitting together can be seen by revisiting the 
example considered above. First, I imagined a coherent set of beliefs (A) to (D) 
regarding the disappearance of the coffee machine. I then supposed that belief 



































































































































































‘On the Relevance of Coherence’ in Boston University Law Review, Vol. 72, No. 2 (1992), pp. 
273-321; and, Timoji Shogenji, ‘The Role of Coherence in Epistemic Justification’ in 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 79, No. 1 (2001), pp. 90-106, 95. 
44 It is obvious, I suspect, that a number of senses of “fit” are plainly of little relation to the notion 
sought here (e.g. to be suitable for a specific purpose, to install or fix something into place, etc.). 
45  As Juan Manuel Pérez Bermejo observes, puzzles (particularly jigsaw and crossword 
puzzles) are a common metaphor for coherence. See: Juan Manuel Pérez Bermejo, 
‘Coherence: An Outline in Six Metaphors and Four Rules’ in Michał Araszkiewicz and Jaromír 
Šavelka (eds), Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 98-99. 
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(D)]. However, the removal of (C) proved problematic under Pethick’s account 
of coherence as sticking together, since the rejection of (C) appears to entail the 
rejection of those beliefs to which it is stuck, too. Conversely, where coherence 
is understood as the (weaker) relation of fitting together, (C) can be simply 
removed without need to disrupt the remaining, and otherwise coherent, beliefs 
in the set. 
 
My claim, then, is that this intuitive conception of coherence as fitting together 
represents a clear, useful and accurate account of the concept of coherence. In 
other words, coherence, properly understood, is a matter of fitting together, 
matching or agreement. 
 
A similar, though, I think, distinguishable, idea is presented in Erik Olsson’s 
epistemological writing. In a paper entitled ‘Cohering With’,46 Olsson contends 
that coherence is a matter of “fitting coherently together”, such that ‘the 
statement “A coheres with B” expresses that A somehow fits coherently 
together with B.’47 Thus, on Olsson’s account, ‘“cohering with” is a species of 
“fitting with”’.48 Yet, by describing coherence as a mere species of fitting with, 
Olsson says little about coherence itself. The problem is seen most clearly in 
Olsson’s general account of fitting statements: 
(F) A fits together with B in virtue of a given property if and only if combining 
A with B yields an object with that property. 
 
Thus, A and B fit coherently together where [A plus B] is coherent. But, as 
Pethick observes, the notion of coherence in Olsson’s example might easily be 
replaced by any number of different notions, for example: 
A is [beautiful] with B expresses that A somehow fits 



























































46 Erik J. Olsson, ‘Cohering With’ in Erkenntnis, Vol. 50 (1999), pp. 273-291. 
47 ibid, 275. 
48 ibid, 276. 
49 Stephen Pethick, ‘Coherence: The Phantom Presence’, presented at the Artificial Intelligence, 
Coherence and Judicial Reasoning workshop at The Fourteenth International Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence and Law (Rome, 10 June 2013), 3. 
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The result is that Olsson’s analysis, in fact, says very little about coherence (or 
cohering with) at all. Rather, Olsson’s analysis amounts to no more than a 
discussion of the preposition “-with”.50 The same cannot be said, however, for 
the conception of coherence as simply fitting together. The key distinction 
between the conception of coherence presented here and that in Olsson’s 
account is a simple one: coherence is not a species of fitting together, as 
Olsson suggests; coherence is fitting together. 
 
III. Three Standard Objections 
Notwithstanding the apparent difficulty surrounding the concept of coherence, 
BonJour acknowledges that his coherentism faces three further challenges, 
common to coherence theories of epistemic justification. First, coherence 
theories face the so-called “isolation” or “input objection”. The objection is that if 
the internal relations of a system of beliefs provide the sole basis of its 
epistemic justification, it would seem that justification is wholly detached from 
the world.51 The second objection against coherentism concerns the possibility 
that there might be two or more alternative coherent systems available. Where 
this is the case, the problem is that coherentism appears to provide no 
epistemically non-arbitrary reason to select any one coherent system as true or 
most probably true.52 Third, if BonJour’s coherence theory is to amount to a 
theory of epistemic justification, it must be shown that the coherence of a given 
set of beliefs can in some way establish that those beliefs are probably true.53 
 
Though at first glance almost trivially simple, if left unanswered these objections 
threaten to devastate any prospect of a successful coherence theory of 
epistemic justification. The effects of these problems also spill over into 
coherentist accounts of legal proof, threatening to undermine attempts to 
establish a non-arbitrary basis on which legal fact-finders ought to select a 



























































50 ibid, 4. 
51 See: SEK, 108. 
52 See: SEK, 107-108. 
53 See: SEK, 108-109. 
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In the sections that follow, I consider each of these problems in turn, examining 
BonJour’s proposed solutions. In an attempt to circumvent the input objection, 
BonJour introduces a further element of his coherentism: the Observation 
Requirement. This requirement then forms the basis of his response to the 
problem of alternative coherent systems and seems to provide the necessary 
connection between coherence and truth. 
 
IV. The Input Objection 
As has been explained, BonJour contends that epistemic justification depends 
upon the internal relations between beliefs within a system of beliefs, whereby 
an individual is epistemically justified in accepting a system of beliefs as true 
where those beliefs constitute a coherent set. The input objection is that, where 
truth is understood in terms of correspondence with reality, the isolation of 
coherentism leads to the absurd result that one might hold epistemically 
justified beliefs about a reality that has no input in the course of justification. 
One might, for example, be justified in accepting that a well-written fiction novel 
or even a dream presents a true account of real-world events.54 
 
BonJour’s response to the input objection is that epistemic justification requires 
observational input, suggesting that the necessary connection between 
coherentist epistemic justification and reality is made through the formation of 
non-inferential observational beliefs. Yet, this reliance on justified beliefs 
appears to cut against the grain of coherentism. As was observed at section I, 
the fundamental distinction between foundationalism and coherentism rests on 
the former’s acceptance of some basic, non-inferentially justified belief; thus, 
BonJour’s reliance on non-inferential observational beliefs appears to transform 
his account into a version of foundationalism. BonJour contends, however, that 
the inclusion of these observational beliefs in his theory rests on an important 
distinction between how a belief is arrived at, and how it comes to be 


























































54 These examples are Amaya’s and Olsson’s, respectively. See: Amaya, (n 43), 36; and, Erik J. 
Olsson, ‘Coherentism’ in Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard (eds), The Routledge 
Companion to Epistemology (Oxford: Routledge, 2011), 261. 
55 SEK, 112. 
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a belief might occur to a person in some noninferential way 
which would confer on it no special justificatory status (for 
instance, as a spontaneous hunch) and only subsequently be 
seen to cohere with the rest of the system of beliefs in a way 
which would yield justification.56 
 
In a case of this sort, the epistemic justification of the belief remains inferential, 
and thus consistent with coherentism’s fundamental premise, since the non-
inferential origin of that belief is irrelevant to its being justified. BonJour provides 
the following example: 
As I sit at my desk (or so I believe), I come to have the belief, 
among very many others, that there is a red book on the desk 
[…] of a certain approximate size, of an approximately 
rectangular shape, which is a fairly specific shade of red, and 
so on.57 
 
The belief that the red book sits on the table before BonJour is wholly non-
inferential, that is, BonJour’s beliefs about the book do not rest on some further 
premise-belief. ‘Rather’, he continues, ‘it simply occurs to me, “strikes me,” in a 
manner which is both involuntary and quite coercive; such a belief is, I will say, 
cognitively spontaneous.’ 58  How, then, is a spontaneous belief like that in 
question epistemically justified within a coherentist theory of knowledge? 
BonJour suggests that the epistemic justification of his belief about the red book 
rests on three premises. First, BonJour’s spontaneous belief is ‘of a certain, 
reasonably definite kind K1’;59 in this case K1 represents “apparently visual” 
beliefs.60 Second, the conditions in which his observation takes place are of a 
sort C1: ‘the lighting is good, I am reasonably close to the apparent location of 
the object,’61 and so on. And third, ‘it is a true law of nature’ that his cognitively 
spontaneous beliefs of the kind K1 in the conditions C1 are ‘highly reliable, that 




























































56 SEK, 113. 
57 SEK, 117. 
58 Ibid [original emphasis]. 
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Thus, the justification of cognitively spontaneous beliefs takes the following 
general form: 
(1) I have a cognitively spontaneous belief that P which is of kind K. 
(2) Conditions C obtain. 
(3) Cognitively spontaneous beliefs of kind K in conditions C are very likely 
to be true. 
Therefore, my belief that P is very likely to be true. 
Therefore, (probably) P.63 
 
However, the third premise in BonJour’s justificatory process, above, is 
problematic. Indeed, BonJour suggests that the belief that spontaneous beliefs 
of a specific kind in certain conditions are very likely to be true is justified 
empirically.64 Thus, BonJour’s belief about the red book before him is very likely 
to be true because usually when he forms a spontaneous belief of the 
apparently visual kind and the lighting is good, etc., it is true. The problem is 
that BonJour’s belief in premise (3) is open to an infinite regress of the kind his 
coherentism purports to address. Suppose that BonJour believes the third 
premise because he correctly believed there to be a blue book on the table on 
the previous occasion, and the time before that he correctly believed there to be 
a green book on the table. The problem is that BonJour has no basis on which 
to accept his beliefs about the blue and green books as (probably) true in the 
first place. It seems, then, that the epistemic justification of his present belief 
about the red book before is based solely on these unconfirmed earlier beliefs. 
 
Nonetheless, BonJour argues that through the justification of such 
observational beliefs his coherentist theory of empirical knowledge is able to 
overcome the input objection, connecting the theoretical justification of beliefs to 
the extra-theoretic world. BonJour further contends that such input is not merely 
a possibility under the coherentist scheme, but rather represents a requirement 
of a truth-conducive theory of epistemic justification,65 and explains that the 

























































63 SEK, 123. 
64 See: SEK, 124-126. 
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any claim in the system which is not justified a priori should in 
principle be capable of being observationally checked, either 
directly or indirectly, and thereby either confirmed or refuted.66 
 
This Observation Requirement, for BonJour, provides the solution to all three of 
the standard objections under consideration here. 
 
V. Choosing Between Coherent Systems 
The second challenge for BonJour’s coherentism concerns the possibility that 
there may exist two or more equally coherent but mutually incompatible 
systems of beliefs. The objection is that, in cases of this kind, coherentism fails 
to offer any epistemically justifiable basis on which to accept one of these 
systems as true, rejecting the other(s) as false. 
 
BonJour argues that this objection all but disappears once the Observation 
Requirement is included in the coherentist account. He contends that while 
coherentism may provide no solution to the problem in instances where there 
are multiple competing, coherent systems of beliefs at a given time, the most 
that can be reasonably expected from a theory of epistemic justification ‘is that 
it make it possible for such ties to be broken in the long run.’67 In the long run, 
BonJour’s Observation Requirement does just that, since any epistemically 
unjustified system of beliefs will eventually come undone when subjected to the 
mandatory observational check.68 
 
However, a variant of this objection proves more problematic for coherentism, 
for the problem of coherence-ties is amplified at the local level of justification, 
that is, where a single empirical belief or small set of beliefs is considered within 
a putatively justified system of beliefs. Indeed, at this level, BonJour’s 
observational check may prove sufficient to determine the comparative 
acceptability of competing beliefs in some instances. For example, I may 
believe that the water falling outside my window is simply rain, or that it is 
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these beliefs cohere with my (putatively justified) wider system of beliefs, a 
simple observational check (i.e. going outside to take a look) will likely refute the 
coherence of one, or perhaps both, of the beliefs in question, thereby providing 
some epistemically justifiable reason to choose one over the other, or to reject 
both. 
 
There are a number of examples, however, where such an observational check 
provides little or no assistance in the settling of such a tie. Consider, for 
example, that I enter a room and see the body of a man, Adam, who appears to 
have just died from a stab wound. I then see Eve, alone, standing placidly 
beside his corpse, her clothes covered in what seems to be Adam’s blood. It 
strikes me that Eve has stabbed and killed Adam and this third belief stands 
alongside my beliefs that Adam was stabbed to death and that Eve stands 
bloodstained beside him, completing a coherent set S3 of beliefs: 
(1) Adam has just died from a stab wound. 
(2) Eve stands placidly beside Adam’s corpse and her clothes are covered 
with his blood. 
(3) Eve killed Adam by wounding. 
 
The propositions in set S3 fit together because (1) and (2) provide evidence to 
support my belief that (3), while proposition (3) reciprocates that support by 
providing an explanation for both (1) and (2). Meanwhile, S3 coheres with my 
wider system of beliefs, in which I believe that stabbings take place at close-
range, the victim’s blood will often be found on the stabber’s clothes, and so on. 
 
But, of course, I might just as easily have formed any number of other beliefs 
which contradict (3); for example, I could replace (3) with the following 
proposition, (4), to form the set S4: 
(4) Eve found Adam mortally wounded and made an unsuccessful attempt 
to help him survive. 
 
In set S4, the propositions (1) and (2) support my belief that (4) in the same way 
that they supported (3), while (4) reciprocates that support by providing an 
explanation for both (1) and (2). Once again, set S4 coheres with my wider 
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system of beliefs, in which I believe that a stab victim’s blood will often be found 
on the clothes of those attempting to rescue him and that the shock of 
witnessing death often leads people to appear placid and emotionless. In this 
example, BonJour’s Observation Requirement is unable to help me in the 
selection of S3 over S4 or vice versa. In this example, propositions (3) and (4) 
simply cannot be observationally checked, unless some further evidence comes 
to light. 
 
Of course, it may be argued that such coherence-ties are unlikely, and that in 
the long run BonJour’s coherentism will lead to the acceptance of epistemically 
justified beliefs. But even if coherence does generally lead to the acceptance of 
epistemically justified beliefs in the long run, such long run success would be 
purely coincidental. Events of this second kind form the subject matter of the 
present thesis, because the supposed facts in legal cases are presented to 
legal fact-finders some time after the event. In these cases, the legal fact-finder 
cannot check the probable truth of any possible belief through direct 
observation. Instead, she must rely on the indirect observation of events 
through evidence, witness testimony, etc., which may, in many cases, provide 
some non-arbitrary reason to accept one proposed belief over another – 
troublingly, in some cases it does not. 
 
VI. Coherence and Truth 
The third and final objection to coherentism to be considered here concerns the 
relationship between coherence and truth. A fundamental feature of knowledge 
and epistemic justification is its appeal to truth. Thus, the adequacy of 
BonJour’s coherence theory of epistemic justification rests on the argument that 
it is truth-conducive, that is, that adherence to the standards of justification it 
endorses is at least likely to lead to the acceptance of true beliefs and the 
rejection of false ones.69 
 
Once again, BonJour’s response rests on the Observation Requirement 

























































69 See: SEK, 157. 
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A system of beliefs which (a) remains coherent (and stable) 
over the long run and (b) continues to satisfy the Observation 
Requirement is likely, to a degree which is proportional to the 
degree of coherence (and stability) and the longness of the run, 
to correspond closely to independent reality.70 
 
BonJour does not suggest that a system of beliefs can be accepted as true on 
the basis that it is coherent at a given moment, but rather contends that, other 
things being equal,71 ‘adhering to coherentist standards over the long run is 
likely eventually to yield beliefs which correspond to reality’.72 Such long run 
success then provides epistemic justification for the acceptance of a coherent 
system of beliefs as true at a given moment, too. 
 
The question of whether coherentist standards do, in fact, yield true beliefs is 
perhaps the most complex and controversial question surrounding coherence in 
epistemology. In an article that prompted the so-called “Analysis debate”,73 
Peter Klein and Ted Warfield argue that increased coherence does not 
necessarily increase the likelihood of truth on the simple basis that while the 
addition of a proposition to a set of incoherent propositions may render that set 
coherent, the likelihood of truth is decreased. 74  Using the example of a 
detective who believes that a murder was committed by a Mr Dunnit,75 Klein 
and Warfield show that the addition of further information to a set of beliefs 
reduces the likelihood of its being true, despite increasing its coherence, since 
informational content and probability have an inverse relationship.76 
 
Luc Bovens and Erik Olsson have convincingly argued that this is not 

























































70 SEK, 171. 
71 This ostensibly minor condition, to which BonJour refers in passing (SEK, 170), proves 
significant in Bovens and Olsson’s analysis of coherentism, discussed below. 
72 SEK, 169. 
73 For a brief summary of the debate, see: Erik J. Olsson, ‘Coherentist Theories of Epistemic 
Justification’ in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (First published November 2003; 
substantive revision November 2012) <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/> 
accessed 15 July 2014. 
74 Peter Klein and Ted A. Warfield, ‘What Price Coherence?’ in Analysis, Vol. 54, No. 3 (1994), 
pp. 129-132, esp. 130-131. 
75 ibid, 130-131. 
76 Thus, despite common belief, a conjunction is less probable than one of its conjuncts. See: 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: Conjunction 
Fallacy in Probability Judgment’ in Psychological Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (1983), pp. 293-315. 
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example fails to take account of other factors that affect the probability that a 
belief or set of beliefs is true; for, indeed, the likelihood of a belief being true 
also depends, for example, on the reliability of the process through which it was 
acquired.77 Thus, the decrease in probability seen in the expansion of a set’s 
informational content may be counteracted by an increase in the reliability of its 
source(s) or, perhaps, the introduction of further supporting evidence.78 
 
This leads Bovens and Olsson to suggest, mirroring BonJour’s fleeting 
reference,79 that a higher level of coherence may increase the likelihood of truth 
ceteris paribus, that is, more coherence increases the likelihood of truth if and 
only if the beliefs under consideration remain equally independent and 
reliable.80 Thus, it seems, ‘the likelihood that a system of beliefs corresponds to 
reality varies in proportion to its degree of coherence […] other things being 
equal.’81 
 
VI.1 Degrees of Coherence 
BonJour’s argument for the truth-conduciveness of coherence gives rise to a 
further conceptual problem that subsists throughout much of the coherentist 
literature. BonJour contends that a system of beliefs is likely, to a degree 
proportionate to its degree of coherence, to be true, suggesting that ‘coherence 
is obviously, on any reasonable view, a matter of degree’.82 Yet, this seemingly 
basic claim demands further consideration. 
 
BonJour’s commitment to degrees of coherence rests implicitly on a 
fundamental, though often overlooked, distinction between two kinds of 


























































77 Luc Bovens and Erik J. Olsson, ‘Believing More, Risking Less: On Coherence, Truth and 
Non-Trivial Extensions’ in Erkenntnis, Vol. 57 (2002), pp. 137-150, 147. 
78 See: Olsson, (n 25), 107-109. 
79 See: text to n 71. 
80 Bovens and Olsson, (n 77), 147. 
81 SEK, 170 [emphasis added]. 
82 ibid. 
83 The argument raised here is based on Peter Unger’s distinction between “relative” or “degree” 
terms and “absolute” or “limited” terms, read through Susan Haack’s partial adoption of it in 
relation to truth (discussed below). On Unger’s distinction, see: Peter Unger, Ignorance (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1975), 47-91; and, Susan Haack, ‘Is Truth Flat or Bumpy?’ in D. H. 
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those concepts (e.g. fast and quiet) that exist as a matter of degree; thus, 
relative concepts may be predicated to a greater or lesser extent in any given 
object or objects. Absolute concepts, on the other hand, (e.g. silence and 
consistency) are bivalent. Concepts of this second kind cannot exist to a degree 
– they cannot be more or less present in or between a given object or objects, 
they simply are or are not. 
 
Consider, for example, the relative notion of tallness, that is, of being tall. 
Tallness, being of greater than average height, might be used as a one- or 
multi-place predicate. As a one-place predicate, one might say that a man, 
John, with a height of six feet, is tall, because six feet is greater than the 
average height for a man, or person more generally; conversely, another man, 
Peter, with a height of seven feet, might be described as very tall, since Peter’s 
height is much greater than that of the average man. In multi-place use, one 
could compare the heights of John and Peter with each other, observing that 
Peter is taller (i.e. more tall) than John, or that Peter is the tallest (the most tall) 
member of a group. Thus, “tall” is relative, existing as a matter of degree. 
 
In contrast, absolute concepts are somewhat less flexible. Susan Haack’s 
discussion of truth provides a helpful example. Responding to Lotfi Zadeh’s 
contention that human reasoning utilises approximate reasoning, including 
fuzzy truth-values,84 Haack argues that “truth” is an absolute concept in this 
way.85 Though we may speak in ordinary conversation of a given proposition 
being, for example, very true (as we do with relative concepts like tall), our use 
of such adverbial modifiers differs between absolute and relative concepts, for 
‘this means, not that the statement is true to a high degree, but that it is not only 




































































































































































Mellor (ed), Prospects for Pragmatism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), esp. 5-
7. 
84 See: Lotfi A. Zadeh, ‘Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning’ in Synthese, Vol. 30 (1975), 
pp. 407-428, esp. 407. 
85 See: Haack, (n 83); and, (n 35), esp. 27-29. Haack first rejects degrees of truth in a brief 
postscript to ‘Logic and Logics’, ch 9 in Susan Haack, Philosophy of Logics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), 168-169. 
86 Haack, (n 35), 27. 
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Similarly, Haack observes that, ‘[s]ome truths are vague, in various ways and in 
varying degrees.’87 Yet, that there are varying degrees of vagueness does not 
mean that the degree of truth also varies. Consider, for example, that a man 
named Paul is riding a unicycle and wearing a bowler hat. In these 
circumstances, both of the following statements are true: 
(i) A man is riding a unicycle. 
(ii) A man named Paul is riding a unicycle and wearing a bowler hat.  
 
However, neither of these statements is truer than the other. Indeed, though (ii) 
describes the situation better than (i), this is not because (ii) is truer than (i), but 
simply because (ii) provides a fuller (i.e. closer to complete),88 more specific89 
description of the situation. Both statements would, however, be truer than the 
(false) statement: 
(iii) A woman named Maria is riding a bicycle and wearing a baseball cap. 
 
As a multi-place predicate, the use of absolute concepts like truth is, therefore, 
limited. One might say that a true proposition is truer than a false proposition, 
just as one might describe a tall person as taller than a short one, and one false 
proposition might be closer to truth than another. However, unlike the relative 
concept tall, it cannot be said that a true proposition is truer than another true 
proposition, or that a false proposition is truer than another false proposition. 
 
This, I suggest, is the case for coherence, too. I have argued, at II.3 above, that 
coherence, properly understood, amounts to “fitting together”. Thus, an object is 
coherent (in one-place use) where its constituent parts fit together, just as an 
object coheres with (two-place) another object where those two objects fit 

























































87 ibid, 25. 
88 “Completeness” is also an absolute concept. For example: two people, A and B, run in a 
100m race. If A runs 120m and B runs just 100m, it cannot be said that A has completed the 
race more than B; both have simply completed the race. Similarly, if A runs 50m and B runs 
80m, B has not completed the race more than A; neither have completed the race, B is merely 
closer to completing the race. I am grateful to Stephen Pethick for this example. 
89 “Specificity” is relative; I could continue to provide increasingly specific accounts of the event, 
just as I could provide a less specific account. Consider, for example: “A man named Paul…”, 
“A 35-year-old man named Paul…”, “A 35-and-one-half-year-old man named Paul…”, etc. cf “A 
person is cycling.” 
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words, I offer the “unreasonable” view that coherence cannot be understood on 
a spectrum which moves from the incoherent, through to the slightly coherent, 
and all the way to the very coherent. Rather, I contend that some thing or set of 
things is either coherent simpliciter, or it is not coherent. That is not to say that 
an incoherent thing or set of things cannot almost cohere; indeed it can, and 
one thing or set of things may be closer to (and contrarily further from) 
coherence than another. Similarly, such an understanding does not preclude 
the prospect of one set being coherent in more ways than another. 
 
Consider, for example, four sets of wooden pieces cut into various shapes, like 
a jigsaw puzzle, where each set can be accurately described as follows: 
Set A: A few of the pieces fit together. 
Set B: Most of the pieces fit together. 
Set C: All of the pieces fit together, while each piece is painted with a random 
picture. 
Set D: All of the pieces fit together, while small pictures on each piece fit 
together to form a larger picture. 
 
Sets A and B are not coherent, though set B is closer to coherence than A, 
since a larger proportion of its pieces fit together. Both sets C and D are 
coherent. It is clear that set D is coherent in more ways than C, because both 
the pieces and the pictures on the pieces in set D fit together while only the 
former can be said of C. But it does not follow that D is more coherent than C, 
unless the question concerns the coherence of each as a picture. 
 
VI.2 Coherence: A Necessary (but not sufficient) 
Criterion of Justified Belief 
If correct, the argument that coherence is not a matter of degree has a severe 
impact on the role of coherence in the justification of beliefs. As the foregoing 
discussion has shown, BonJour’s account of epistemic justification rests on the 
premise that the likelihood of a system of beliefs being true is proportionate to 
its degree of coherence, other things being equal. Thus, if coherence is 
understood as an absolute concept, the coherentist position must be altered to 
the following claim: a coherent system of beliefs is more likely to be true than an 
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incoherent system of beliefs, other things being equal. This simpler claim is 
intuitively plausible, presenting coherence as a minimal requirement of 
epistemic justification. Yet, this modest claim does little to resolve the 
philosophical problem under consideration, for coherence alone proves too 
weak a test to deliver probable truths and fails to provide any method through 
which to select one proposition from two or more coherent candidates. Thus, if 
coherence provides a necessary, but not sufficient, criterion in the epistemically 
justified acceptance of a belief or set of beliefs, it remains to be seen which 
other factors must also be considered. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Coherentism, the view that a belief or set of beliefs is justified by virtue of its 
coherence, is a popular theory of epistemic justification. This chapter has 
examined one of the most influential accounts of coherentism in contemporary 
epistemology: Laurence BonJour’s The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. 
BonJour contends that an individual is epistemically justified in accepting a 
system of beliefs as true where that system forms a coherent whole, arguing 
that a coherent belief-system is likely, to an extent proportionate to the level and 
duration of its coherence, to be true. However, the close examination presented 
above has revealed a number of problems for BonJour’s theory, and 
coherentism more generally. 
 
First, I have argued that coherentism faces a number of conceptual problems. 
An initial conceptual problem concerns the apparent obscurity of the concept of 
coherence itself, which troubles both proponents and opponents of coherentism 
alike. In his attempt to overcome this problem, BonJour commits a 
methodological mistake (highlighted in the recent work of Stephen Pethick), 
conflating the concept’s intension and extension, and mistakenly assigning the 
characteristics of some coherent objects to the concept of coherence itself. 
Relieved of this error, I have suggested that the literature presents three initially 
plausible descriptions of coherence: hanging together, sticking together, and 
fitting together. The first two, however, have been shown to be inadequate in 
describing the notion of coherence in our thinking; thus, I have argued that 
coherence, properly understood, is a matter of fitting together, that is, of 
 Chapter 2: BonJour’s Coherence Theory  
 34 
matching or agreement. Further conceptual problems arise from BonJour’s 
assertion that ‘coherence is obviously, on any reasonable view, a matter of 
degree’.90 Applying Peter Unger’s distinction between absolute and relative 
concepts, I have argued that, contrary to popular belief, coherence is an 
absolute concept, offering the “unreasonable” view that coherence is not a 
matter of degree and that some thing or set of things is either coherent 
simpliciter, or it is not coherent. 
 
Second, I have suggested that BonJour’s coherentism faces a number of 
epistemic problems. I have argued that BonJour fails to provide any non-
arbitrary basis on which to select one belief or small set of beliefs to accept as 
true where two or more incompatible alternatives exist within a putatively 
justified system of beliefs. At this local level of epistemic justification, BonJour’s 
reliance on observation provides no support, for, in many instances, such an 
observational check is simply unavailable to the epistemic actor. A more 
fundamental problem concerns BonJour’s claim that coherence implies 
probable truth. Drawing on the arguments of Luc Bovens and Erik Olsson, I 
have argued that coherence, properly understood as simply fitting together, 
appears to provide a necessary but not sufficient condition for probable truth 
and, therefore, epistemically justified belief. 
 
In the chapters that follow, I turn to consider the application of coherence and 
coherentism within the context of law, in the attempts of both Neil MacCormick 
and Amalia Amaya to solve the “problem of proof” in legal fact-finding. As I will 
demonstrate, however, the importation of coherence into legal theory brings 
with it many of the problems that plague its epistemological use, and the 



























































90 SEK, 170. 
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In a series of works since the late-1970s, Neil MacCormick presents a theory of 
law and legal reasoning that holds coherence at its centre, drawing a distinction 
between two discrete tests for coherence in law: normative and narrative 
coherence. In this chapter I examine the latter of these tests, “narrative 
coherence”, which MacCormick argues provides the solution to the problem of 
proof, justifying beliefs about unperceived past facts in law. 
 
As well as being one of the most eminent thinkers in contemporary legal theory, 
MacCormick has been perhaps the most significant figure in the advancement 
of coherence in law, and his work is the subject of a vast secondary literature. 
His early work in legal philosophy represents one of the earliest arguments for a 
coherence-based theory of law and legal reasoning, while his distinction 
between normative and narrative coherence has been widely acclaimed and 
accepted throughout the literature on coherence in law. An early-advocate for 
the use of coherence in the process of legal proof, MacCormick’s account of 
coherence exemplifies the characteristics of an established legal coherentist 
literature in which he has long played a leading role. 
 
Narrative coherence has played a relatively minor, though increasingly 
significant, role in much of MacCormick’s work on legal reasoning. Indeed, in 
1978, in his Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, MacCormick offered little more 
than ‘a few brief and sketchy remarks on the subject’,1 suggesting that, ‘the only 
type of test which we have available to us for verifying contested assertions 
about the past is this test of “coherence”.’2 Shortly after, MacCormick built on 

























































1 Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, rev 
edn, 1994), 88; see: 86-93. 
2 ibid, 90. 
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and the Reasonableness of Doubt’ in 1980,3 just six pages long. Later, in his 
1984 paper entitled ‘Coherence in Legal Justification’,4 in which MacCormick 
first set out the distinction between his two tests for coherence, his discussion of 
narrative coherence forms less than five of seventeen pages. 
 
In MacCormick’s final major contribution to the study of legal reasoning, 
Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (2005),5  narrative coherence plays a more 
significant role. MacCormick dedicates two chapters to the discussion of 
coherence, which features heavily throughout. 6  In chapter 10, ‘Coherence, 
Principles, and Analogies’,7 MacCormick discusses the meaning of coherence, 
before setting out his account of normative coherence. In chapter 11, ‘Legal 
Narratives’,8 MacCormick seeks to solve the ‘fundamentally important’ problem 
of proof, arguing that narrative coherence is ‘essential to the process of proving 
what was done or what happened’.9 
 
In the interests of clarity, and to avoid any mistakes that may have been made 
throughout the extensive secondary literature, this chapter begins with a 
relatively lengthy explanation of MacCormick’s position. Having clearly 
established MacCormick’s view, I examine his claim that narrative coherence 
plays a central role in legal fact-finding, focusing on Rhetoric and the Rule of 



























































3 Neil MacCormick, ‘The Coherence of a Case and the Reasonableness of Doubt’ in The 
Liverpool Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1980), pp. 45-50. 
4 Neil MacCormick, ‘Coherence in Legal Justification’ in Aleksander Peczenik, Lars Lindahl and 
Bert Van Roermund (eds), Theory of Legal Science (Dodrecht: D. Reidel, 1984) [republished 
with changes in Werner Krawietz et al. (eds), Theorie der Normen (Berlin: Duncker and 
Humblot, 1984)]. 
5 Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) (“Rhetoric” hereinafter). 
6 The importance of coherence in MacCormick’s legal theory is also observed by Twining, who 
suggests that MacCormick might have explored the notions of coherence and narrative further 
were he still alive. See: William Twining, ‘Donald Neil MacCormick’ in Ron Johnston (ed), 
Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the British Academy, XI (Oxford: Oxford University Press for 
the British Academy, 2012), 460. 
7 Rhetoric, 189-213. 
8 Rhetoric, 214-236. ‘Legal Narratives’ is based on a paper entitled ‘Time, Narratives, and Law’, 
presented at a Nordic symposium held at Sandbjerg Gods, Denmark (May 1994) and published 
in Jes Bjarup and Mogens Blegvad (eds), Time, Law and Society (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1995). 
9 Rhetoric, 214. 
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The criticisms presented here can be suitably divided into two categories. The 
first is conceptual; suggesting that MacCormick’s division of coherence into 
normative and narrative coherence arises from a methodological mistake that 
also gives rise to his erroneous description of coherence as “making sense”, 
and arguing that his position suffers from the misguided view that coherence 
exists as a matter of degree. The second is epistemic; contending that 
MacCormick’s claim that narrative coherence justifies beliefs about past facts is 
unfounded, affording too weak a test to provide epistemic or prudential 
justification. Following its failure in the justification of beliefs, I present the novel 
view that narrative coherence may be better placed in the more limited context 
of discovery and theory-formulation. 
 
I. Coherence in Rhetoric and the Rule of Law 
In Rhetoric and the Rule of Law, Neil MacCormick builds on much of this earlier 
work (most notably Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory)10 in an attempt to set 
out a theory of legal argumentation through which to distinguish good 
arguments from bad, reconciling “the arguable character of law” and the legal 
certainty that the Rule of Law demands.11 
  
MacCormick asserts that legal rules (set out in statutes, judicial precedents, 
etc.) take the form of universals, and the application of legal rules involves the 
“selection” of particulars that instantiate those universal rules.12 He suggests 
that legal reasoning takes a syllogistic form, where the application of legal rules 
to individual cases takes the standard form: 
If operative fact (OF) then normative consequence (NC). 
Operative fact, 
Therefore, normative consequence.13 
 
‘All you have to do’, then, ‘in any case is establish that the fact situation OF 

























































10 MacCormick describes Rhetoric as a revision of his position in Legal Reasoning and Legal 
Theory (see: Rhetoric, 1) and a response to the debates that it provoked (Rhetoric, v). 
11 See, generally: ‘The Rule of Law and the Arguable Character of Law’, ch 2 in Rhetoric. 
12 Rhetoric, 36. 
13 See, generally: ‘On the Legal Syllogism’ and ‘Defending Deductivism’, ch 3-4 in Rhetoric. 
14 Rhetoric, 32. 
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legal rules in a given case is rarely this straightforward. Legal rules often involve 
a number of operative facts, including qualifications and exceptions,15  and 
“problem cases” may arise where the identification and interpretation of the 
operative facts in question is unclear.16 
 
In these problem cases ‘the scope of the syllogism is restricted’17 by problems 
of interpretation, qualification, classification or evaluation, relevancy and proof.18 
MacCormick argues that these problems can be overcome through a 
combination of “the three Cs”:19 consistency, coherence and consequences. A 
judicial decision, he argues, is justified where it is consistent (that is, free from 
contradiction) 20  and coherent (“makes sense”) 21  with existing, validly 
established rules and principles of law, and (should the tests of consistency and 
coherence leave the case open) rests on consequentialist reasoning 22 
grounded in “The Law’s Values”.23 
 
Of these “three Cs”, the concept of coherence appears to hold a special place 
in MacCormick’s theory. He suggests, as the following sections demonstrate, 
that coherence represents ‘a desirable feature of a system of law’,24 as well as 
forming a fundamental criterion of the soundness of reasoning in relation to the 
justification of legal rulings and findings of fact.25 It seems, then, that coherence 

























































15 Thus, the syllogism is altered, e.g. “if OF, therefore NC, unless x, y and/or z.” See: Rhetoric, 
91-95. 
16 MacCormick adopts the terminology of “clear cases” and “problem cases” instead of Ronald 
Dworkin’s “easy cases” and “hard cases” (see: ‘Hard Cases’, ch 4 in his Taking Rights Seriously 
(London: Duckworth, 1977)) on the basis that many “easy cases” (in which there is little difficulty 
in the application of the universal law to the particular case) are hugely complex. See: Rhetoric, 
51. 
17 Neil MacCormick, ‘MacCormick on MacCormick’ in Agustín José Menédez and John Erik 
Fossum (eds), Law and Democracy in Neil MacCormick’s Legal and Political Theory (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2011), 21. 
18 Rhetoric, 51. 
19 This expression is Siltala’s. He describes MacCormick’s approach as the ‘Theory of the Three 
C’s in Legal Reasoning’. See: Raimo Siltala, Law, Truth, and Reason: A Treatise on Legal 
Argumentation (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 249-251. 
20 Rhetoric, 190. 
21 ibid. 
22 Rhetoric, 104. 
23 See: Rhetoric, 114-120. This puts MacCormick in ‘something like the same camp as Ronald 
Dworkin after all’ (Rhetoric, 120). 
24 Rhetoric, 203. 
25 Rhetoric, 189. 
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II. Normative and Narrative Coherence 
MacCormick suggests that ‘there are two distinct sorts of test for coherence’ in 
legal justification: normative and narrative coherence.26 Normative coherence 
‘has to do with the justification of legal rulings or normative propositions more 
generally in the context of a legal system conceived as a normative order.’27 
Narrative coherence, on the other hand, ‘has to do with the justification of 
findings of fact and the drawing of reasonable inferences from evidence.’28 That 
is, normative coherence is relevant to matters of law, while narrative coherence 
has to do with matters of fact. 
 
Though the primary focus of this chapter concerns the role of narrative 
coherence in the process of legal proof, it is worth briefly considering 
MacCormick’s explication of normative coherence, in order to better understand 
the nature of the distinction that he draws between the two. And so, this section 
outlines each of MacCormick’s coherence tests in turn, beginning with his 
account of normative coherence in ‘Coherence, Principles, and Analogies.' 
 
II.1 Normative Coherence 
After supposedly “settling preliminaries” like the meaning of coherence, 
MacCormick begins his explication of normative coherence with a section 
inaptly entitled ‘The meaning of coherence’. There, he imagines a statute which 
sets out ‘different speed limits for different cars according to the colour they 
were painted.’29 Of this imaginary law and others like it,30 MacCormick remarks: 
Do such laws fail to make sense? And if they so fail, why do 
they so fail? My answer is that they fail to make sense if there is 






























































29 Rhetoric, 190-191. 
30 MacCormick draws on the real-life example of an Italian law that set different speed limits for 
different types of car, which he suggests works ‘more or less to the same effect’ as his 
imaginary statute (Rhetoric, 191; see: Ruggero J. Aldisert, ‘[Review:] Legal Reasoning and 
Legal Theory’ in Duquesne Law Review, Vol. 21 (1982), pp. 383-398, 395). In fact, this law is 
plainly distinguishable from MacCormick’s statute since the size of a car’s engine (unlike its 
colour) is not simply a matter of taste, but rather affects its performance, arguably providing 
good reason (see: text to n 32) to impose varying limits. 
31 Rhetoric, 191. 
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MacCormick suggests that,  
there are three ends which statutes limiting driving speeds may 
promote, all of which we may suppose to be of serious social 
value: the safety of road users; economy in the use of fuel; and 
prevention of excessive wear and tear of road surfaces.32 
 
Where these values are the only relevant values and where the colour of cars is 
simply a matter of taste, there can be no value-based justification of the varying 
speed limits imposed, and, moreover, it would be unfair to enforce such a law 
ex post facto against those people who chose the colour of their car before 
notice of the law was provided.33 Thus, MacCormick’s imaginary statute fails to 
make sense and is, therefore, incoherent. 
 
MacCormick observes, however, that ‘[i]t is doubtless possible to imagine 
circumstances in which the colour laws would be coherent.’34 He suggests that 
if, for example, all cars were painted or repainted in accordance to weight and 
fuel consumption, or to determine each driver’s level of experience, the laws 
could turn out to be coherent after all. Yet, in the absence of some such 
circumstances, MacCormick’s statute remains incoherent. 
 
MacCormick takes this example to have sufficiently illustrated that ‘at least one 
aspect of normative coherence is a matter of the common subservience by a 
set of laws to a relevant value or values’ and that another ‘involves an absence 
of avoidable conflict with other relevant values’, like justice,35 and principles 
providing ‘broad guidance about the pursuit of value in a context of rule-
regulated activity.’36 MacCormick suggests that, for these values and principles, 
‘to be coherent requires that in their totality they can be conceived as 
expressing a satisfactory form of life.’37 Thus, for MacCormick,  
the coherence of norms (considered as some kind of a set) is a 
matter of their ‘making sense’ by being rationally related as a 
set, instrumentally or intrinsically, to the realization of some 




























































35 Rhetoric, 192. 
36 Rhetoric, 193. 
37 ibid. 
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fulfilling some more or less clearly articulated common principle 
or principles.38 
 
This neat summary is, however, problematic. Indeed, MacCormick suggests 
that the coherence of a set of norms is a matter of their being rationally related 
as a set to the realisation of some common value(s) or principle(s). Yet, surely, 
the coherence of a set of norms is a matter of the norms within that set having a 
rational relation of coherence with one another. Though this relation may arise 
in some cases as a result of subservience to some common value(s), it does 
not arise as a result of the set being related to the realisation of such values.  
That is to say, any coherence relation between a set of norms and some 
external set, say, a set of values, is a matter of its being coherent with that set. 
In contrast to the passage quoted, this external relation of coherence says 
nothing of the internal coherence of the set of norms in question.39 
 
Nonetheless, MacCormick provides four reasons to ascribe normative 
coherence justificatory force.40 First, ‘it is agreeable to a certain conception of 
rationality in practical life, that which requires both universality and the greatest 
possible degree of generality in practical principles’. Second, since laws must 
be detailed, such detailed rules will be ‘arbitrary if they are not also instances of 
more general rules, fewer in number than the number of detailed rules, and 
more general in their terms’. Third, ‘since few people can know much of the 
detail of the law, they are more likely to find it intelligible in its effects and 
predictable in its application if it does instantiate a reasonably small range of 
general principles that can be regarded as part of the common sense of the 
community’. And, finally, since a legal order represents an ‘ideal order’ in that it 
‘is taken to set a pattern at least for aspiration in the actual conduct of affairs’, ‘it 
seems not enough that is should constitute merely an aggregate of non-




























































39 To be clear: the internal/external distinction drawn here is between coherence in one-place 
use (i.e. of being coherent, as in “the set of norms is coherent”) and two-place use (i.e. cohering 
with, as in “the set of norms coheres with the set of values”). 
40 See: Rhetoric, 201-202. 
Chapter 3: MacCormick on Narrative Coherence 
	
   42 
Despite acknowledging that ‘[c]oherence as a purely internal value of the law 
[…] is not enough in itself to guarantee justice’,41 MacCormick maintains that 
arguments from coherence remain ‘justifying reasons’ on the basis that 
‘coherent law is preferable to incoherent’.42 For MacCormick, the coherence of 
a decision with pre-existing law, principles and values does not render that 
decision deductively derivable. Rather, coherence establishes “weak 
derivability”, representing ‘a desirable ideal feature of a system of law’ and a 
minimal requirement in any given ruling or decision.43 
 
II.2 Narrative Coherence 
In ‘Legal Narratives’, MacCormick ‘deals with some of the matters that arise 
under the “problem of proof”.’44 In an attempt to determine ‘how it is possible to 
establish true or at least acceptable accounts of past events’,45 he provides an 
account of narratives and their central role in making our world intelligible, 
before proceeding to argue that ‘a certain conception of coherence is essential 
to proving what was done or what happened, namely “narrative coherence”.’46 
 
MacCormick begins the chapter with a lengthy discussion of time, activity and 
narratives, 47  the full details of which have little bearing on the present 
discussion. In short, he suggests that events can only be understood in “real” 
time (that is, past, present, future) to the extent that they are understood in 
“analytical time” (before-simultaneously-after). Thus, the present “now” is 
necessarily embedded in the larger project of analytical time.48 MacCormick 
explains that narratives, be they fictional novels or true histories, are located in 
analytical time (‘they have a beginning, a middle, and an end’),49 and that the 
role of the narrator is to make her narrative intelligible, utilising ‘principles of 

























































41 The different forms of racial prejudice pursued under the Nazi regime and South African 
apartheid, for example, were coherent in this way, despite being unjust (Rhetoric, 202). 
42 Rhetoric, 203. 
43 ibid. 
44 Rhetoric, 214. 
45 ibid. 
46 ibid. 
47 See: Rhetoric, 214-219. 
48 Rhetoric, 215. 
49 Rhetoric, 216. 
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events, and of ordering.’50 For MacCormick, the last of these stands out in 
importance, underpinning our understanding of the world around us. He 
observes: 
always a key element in intelligibility is temporal ordering. 
Always, we want to know why things happened as they did, and 
at least a part of the answer to the ‘Why?’ question is a causal 
explanation. Causes cannot succeed effects, so we need to 
know, within the given framework of explanation, which events 
were earlier, which later, which simultaneous.51 
      
Legal practice presents a paradigmatic example of the role narratives play in 
human understanding. As MacCormick explains, a legal case, read after the 
event, represents a kind of story or narrative, 52  which encapsulates and 
depends upon further narratives.53 For those involved, the task is to determine 
what that narrative – “the story” – is to be.54 In court, opposing parties utilise the 
narrative accounts provided by witnesses to present their own narrative; the 
lawyer for one party presents a narrative of how events took place, highlighting 
the evidence that favours her client, while her opponent presents an alternative 
account that favours his own. For the legal fact-finder, these narrative accounts 
provide the only basis on which many operative facts can be determined; after 
all, ‘[c]ourts of law can never enter into the raw history of facts and events they 
decide upon’.55  The task for legal fact-finders, then, is to settle upon the 
narrative that is to be accepted; the challenge is how to select the one that 
represents a true or at least acceptable account of the events in question. 
  
MacCormick observes that the partiality of the legal process (particularly clear in 
adversarial systems), in which each lawyer presents a story that suits her own 
client, often leads to the “cynical” view that, 
the law has nothing really to do with truth, only with a 
competitive system of technical proof. It can lead to acceptance 


























































50 Rhetoric, 216-217. 
51 Rhetoric, 217. 
52 Rhetoric, 219. 
53 Rhetoric, 220. 
54 Rhetoric, 221. 
55 ibid. 
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people chosen at random to decide who has hired the better 
lawyer.’56 
 
He suggests, however, that we must be careful to avoid a form of scepticism 
‘that is self-defeating if taken in an absolute sense.’57 Once we accept the 
truisms that ‘not all memories are false’, ‘not all records are misleading’, and 
‘not all statements are dishonest or insincere’,58 the adversarial legal process 
emerges as a ‘highly effective […] instrument for systematic critical testing of 
evidence.’59 
 
Alongside these truisms, MacCormick asserts that fact-finders must rely on ‘two 
vital principles of explanation and understanding’:60 the principle of universal 
causation, ‘according to which all that happens is prima facie capable of being 
explained in terms of some cause occurring not later than the event to be 
explained’; and the principle of rational motivation, which stipulates that ‘[i]f an 
event is explicable in terms of a rational decision to bring it about, there is no 
need to explain that decision in terms of causes rather than in terms of 
reasons.’61 These basic explanatory principles, ‘together with an ever-growing 
body of scientific theories which in a way count as specialist elaborations of the 
basic principle, make our world an intelligible world for us.’62 In illustration of 




























































56 Rhetoric, 221-222. 




61 ibid. These basic principles echo the relations of contiguity and priority in time in Hume’s 
conception of causation as ‘some relation among objects’ [original emphasis]. Perhaps, 
MacCormick intends narrative coherence to constitute the third, and most problematic, of 
Hume’s relations: the necessary connection between those objects. See: David Hume, A 
Treatise of Human Nature (first published 1748, L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch (eds), 
Oxford: Clarendon-Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 1978), esp. 75 [book I, section III, part II]); 
and, Harold Noonan, Hume on Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1999), 99-102. 
62 Rhetoric, 225. 
63 R v Smith [1914-15] All ER Rep 262 (“Smith” hereinafter). 
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In 1915, Mr George Joseph Smith was tried at the Old Bailey and, following a 
three-week trial, found guilty of the murder of his wife, Bessie Munday (M).64 
MacCormick adopts the short summary of the facts provided in the headnote of 
Mr Smith’s appeal, which, he says, ‘is sufficient for our purpose’: 
The appellant was indicted for the murder of M. who had been 
discovered dead in her bath after having gone through a 
ceremony of marriage with him. At the trial evidence was given 
that subsequently to the death of M. two other women had died 
in their baths in similar circumstances after having gone through 
marriage ceremonies with the appellant. Evidence was also 
given of a consultation between the appellant and a solicitor 
concerning, inter alia, the effect in law of a voluntary settlement 
made by M., and whether the trustees could buy an annuity 
without M’s permission.65 
 
Mr Smith appealed to the Court of Appeal on the grounds that evidence 
regarding the deaths of the two other women, Alice Burnham (B) and Margaret 
Lotty (L), and Mr Smith’s privileged talks with his solicitor was wrongfully 
admitted, and that the judge erred in presenting a new theory to the jury in 
summing up.66  Giving the lead judgment, Lord Reading CJ dismissed the 
appeal; Mr Smith was hanged. 
 
‘But why was this evidence so damaging?’67 MacCormick reasonably asserts 
that Mr Smith’s lawyers sought the exclusion of evidence about his wives’ 
deaths and his talks with his solicitor because it damages the plausibility of his 
being innocent. Thus, MacCormick offers Smith as an example of how pieces of 
evidence ‘can fit together to form a real and convincing pattern’,68 and an 
illustration of the central role played by universal causation and rational 


























































64 The trial proceedings are recorded in Eric R. Watson (ed), The Trial of George Joseph Smith 
(London: William Hodge and Co., 1922). For an accessible, though perhaps partial, overview of 
Mr Smith’s life and trial, see: Eric R. Watson, ‘Introduction’ in ibid; and, Eric R. Watson, ‘George 
Joseph Smith (1915)’ in Harry Hodge (ed), Famous Trials: Second Series (West Drayton, UK: 
Penguin Books, 1948). 
65 Smith; Rhetoric, 220. 
66 In the course of summing up to the jury, the trial judge, Scrutton J, proposed a theory of how 
M was drowned that had not previously been suggested by counsel. 
67 Rhetoric, 223. 
68 Rhetoric, 219; quoting Lord Justice General Cullen in Megrahi v HM Advocate 2002 JC 99 
(the Lockerbie trial). 
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MacCormick separates the facts of Smith, as outlined above, into the following 
propositions: 
(1) The first Mrs Smith (M) died in her bath, and Smith was nearby at the 
time.69 
(2) The second Mrs Smith (B) died in her bath, and Smith was nearby at 
the time. 
(3) The third Mrs Smith (L) died in her bath, and Smith was nearby at the 
time. 
(4) Before the first Mrs Smith (M) died, Mr Smith checked up on the 
probability of his inheriting her money. 70 
 
According to the principles of universal causation and rational motivation 
outlined above, these propositions must be explained in terms of some cause or 
motivation. Thus, from these propositions, MacCormick generates two potential 
hypotheses that might explain propositions (1) to (4), viz.: 
(5) All the Mrs Smiths died by sheer accident, or 
(6) Mr Smith wilfully killed all the Mrs Smiths in their baths.71 
 
MacCormick observes that propositions (1) to (4) are consistent with both of the 
potential explanations, (5) and (6). Of course, (5) and (6) are contradictory, 
competing explanations; only one of them (if either) can be accepted as the true 
causal explanation of (1) to (4). MacCormick suggests that ‘we have less 
reason to doubt (6) than to doubt (5)’, because it ‘coheres with (1) to (4) in a 
way that (5) does not.’72  
 
The reason for MacCormick’s conclusion can be found in his principles of 
universal causation and rational motivation, ‘coupled with more detailed 

























































69 In fact, the case report makes no reference to Mr Smith’s location at the time of Mrs Smith’s 
death. Though it is reported elsewhere (see: R v Smith (1915) 11 Cr App Rep 229, 80 JP 31) 
that he was in the house at the time the body was found, the report does not suggest that Mr 
Smith was nearby at the time of death, as MacCormick does. 
70 Rhetoric, 223. 
71 Rhetoric, 224. 
72 ibid [emphasis added]. 
73 ibid. 
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Applying these basic explanatory principles alongside common-sense 
generalisations about probability, he infers that three events so similar in nature 
(that is, (1) to (3)) are likely to have a common cause. Since three accidental 
deaths by drowning are unlikely to happen to three subsequent Mrs Smiths, 
MacCormick observes that the common cause is probably an action of the 
unchanging Mr Smith,74 thus “weakly deriving”75 that Mr Smith’s actions are the 
probable cause of the untimely deaths of M, B and L. 
 
But what caused Mr Smith’s actions? Recalling the principle of rational 
motivation, his actions may be explicable in terms of a rational decision or 
motivation. Proposition (4), concerning Mr Smith’s enquiry into the potential 
financial rewards of M’s death, provides evidence of a rational decision or 
motivation that explains Mr Smith’s action to bring about M’s death. Thus, in the 
absence of further evidence or further explanatory hypotheses, the fact-finder is 
justified in accepting proposition (6) (“Mr Smith wilfully killed all the Mrs Smiths 
in their baths”) as true on the basis that ‘[(6) plus (1) to (4)] belongs within a 
single rational scheme of explanation of events; whereas [(5) plus (1) to (4)] 
does not.’76 
 
MacCormick concludes that, ‘[n]arrative coherence so illustrated is our only 
basis for upholding conclusions, opinions, or indeed verdicts about matters of 
past fact.’77 However, he acknowledges that such coherence forms 
a necessary but not sufficient condition of real-world credibility. 
For, as noted, fictional narratives share narrative coherence 
with historical and forensic and other non-fictional ones. Non-
fictional ones have to be somehow ‘anchored’ in reality. The 
essential anchoring point of non-fictional narratives to the real 
world lies in the truisms about perception, memory, record-



























































74 Rhetoric, 223. 
75 Rhetoric, 224. 
76 ibid. 
77 ibid. 
78 Rhetoric, 227. 
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Once we accept the supposition that what we perceive is real79 and the truisms 
that not all memories, records and statements are false, misleading or 
dishonest, nonfictional narratives can be suitably anchored such that,  
a claim to having perceived or remembered or to have referred 
to a record, together with any necessary element of 
interpretation, when honestly made, is a claim to be giving an 
account of the real world. Such an account, if the person who 
makes it is in fact honest and also accurate, is rationally 
acceptable as a probable account of things that have 
happened.80 
 
Thus, narrative coherence, once anchored in reality by observation, provides 
the legal fact-finder with justification to accept a given narrative as a probably 
true account of unperceived past events. 
 
III. The Meaning(s) of Coherence 
As was observed in Chapter 2, one of the major problems for coherence 
theories of justification surrounds the “elusive”, “slippery” nature of the notion of 
coherence. Thus, the success of MacCormick’s solution to the problem of proof 




MacCormick’s initial description of coherence comes negatively through his 
description of incoherence. Despite the differences between his two tests of 
coherence, MacCormick asserts that, 
even from the outset we may allow this as a common feature of 
the two cases: either in normative or narrative contexts, a lack 
of coherence in what is said involves a failure to make sense.81 
 
He continues: 
An incoherent set of norms might be such that each could be 
fulfilled without infringing any other, yet the whole seems to 
make no sense as constituting or mapping out a reasonable 
order of conduct […] Likewise, an incoherent story, though it 


























































79 Rhetoric, 225. 
80 Rhetoric, 227. 
81 Rhetoric, 189. 
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logically entails a contradiction of any other proposition in the 
story, yet in some way fails to make sense.82 
 
This initial explanation reveals two features of MacCormick’s account of 
coherence, in need of further examination. First, MacCormick understands 
coherence as ‘the property of a set of propositions which, taken together, 
“makes sense” in its entirety’,83 while incoherence involves a failure to make 
sense. Second, MacCormick assumes that coherence can be ‘usefully 
distinguished’ from consistency, where consistency is understood as freedom 
from contradiction, and asserts, in contrast with much of the literature, that 
consistency is not a necessary condition for coherence.84 
  
III.1 Coherence: it just makes sense 
MacCormick’s first claim is that coherence is a matter of “making sense”. In 
illustration of incoherence, a failure to make sense, he provides the following 
example of some “crazy house rules”: 
imagine a house within which all inhabitants are to make their 
rooms as untidy as possible on Mondays, Wednesdays, and 
Fridays, then tidy them up to the highest perfection on 
Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, Sundays being strictly 
observed as a day of rest. To have, and to observe, such 
house-rule is possible–but what sense does it make?85 
 
MacCormick suggests that this rule does not “make sense”, or “hang together”, 
and is therefore incoherent. Yet, this understanding of (in-) coherence, coupled 
with MacCormick’s example, is unhelpful. 
 
The problem is that “making sense” has two distinct meanings, neither of which 
is necessarily tied to the notion of coherence. The first is that to make sense is 
to be intelligible or comprehensible.86 This understanding of making sense is, 
however, at odds with MacCormick’s supposedly incoherent rule. Indeed, the 



























































84 Rhetoric, 190. This claim is explored at III.3, below. 
85 Rhetoric, 189. 
86 Similarly, where used as a verb (i.e. “to make sense of”), “making sense” denotes the activity 
of comprehending or understanding. 
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terms that inhabitants are to make their rooms as untidy as possible on certain 
specified days, then to tidy them to the highest perfection on others. 
 
Perhaps, then, MacCormick intends to employ making sense in its second 
sense: to be prudent or advisable. MacCormick’s rule may fail to make sense 
insofar as the continuous tidying and untidying seems to amount to a waste of 
time and effort, but there is little in his illustration to suggest that the rule is in 
some way incoherent. Indeed, many things fail to make sense in just this way: it 
doesn’t make sense, for example, to jump out of a moving vehicle; nor does it 
make sense for a footballer to deliberately miss in the cup final penalty 
shootout. Of course, just like MacCormick’s rule, it is doubtless possible to 
imagine circumstances in which these activities could make sense: it does 
make sense to jump out of the vehicle if you need to escape quickly, and it 
could make sense to miss the penalty if you’re throwing the game – just like it 
could make sense to impose MacCormick’s rule in order to discipline or punish 
the inhabitants in question. Yet, even in the absence of any further 
considerations, none of these examples can be meaningfully described as 
incoherent; just like MacCormick’s rule, they are simply ill-advised. 
 
III.2 Making Sense of Coherence 
The introductory remarks presented at section II, above, reveal a further point 
for confusion in MacCormick’s theory, which perhaps goes some way to 
explaining MacCormick’s conception of coherence as making sense. 
MacCormick begins by presenting normative and narrative coherence as 
distinct sorts of test for coherence. Thus understood, the tests of normative and 
narrative coherence simply provide different methods through which to evaluate 
the coherence of different kinds of objects, in this case norms and narratives. 
Later, however, MacCormick describes narrative coherence as a conception of 
coherence.87  There, he refers to normative coherence as ‘another kind of 


























































87 Rhetoric, 214. 
88 Rhetoric, 229 [emphasis added]. 
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the diachronic character of narratives 89  and the ‘property ascribed to […] 
normative systems viewed synchronically’.90 
 
These observations give rise to the possibility that rather than furnishing 
different tests for the property or relation of coherence, normative and narrative 
coherence themselves represent different properties or relations that may exist 
in or between an object or objects. It appears that each of the two different 
meanings of “making sense” (intelligibility and prudence) describes one of 
MacCormick’s two distinct kinds of coherence. Recalling his explication of 
normative coherence as ‘a desirable ideal feature’ in law, it seems that a ruling, 
decision or set of norms may be said to make sense insofar as it is a prudent 
with regard to pre-existing laws and the law’s values. Similarly, MacCormick’s 
account of narrative coherence as the requirement that a set of propositions 
‘belongs within a single rational scheme of explanation of events’, grounded in 
the basic principles of explanation and understanding, suggests that narratives 
make sense insofar as they are intelligible and/or make events intelligible for us. 
  
However, even if one accepts that different kinds of coherence make sense in 
these different ways, coherence as making sense fails to describe the ordinary 
use of coherence in a number of other contexts. Nonsense poetry, for example, 
is coherent precisely because it doesn’t make sense. The obvious answer to 
this problem is that the conception of coherence as making sense survives only 
in the context of norms and narratives. In other contexts where coherence is 
invoked, other kinds of coherence (defined in some other way) must be in play. 
However, this apparent solution simply gives rise to a bigger problem: the 
conflation between intension and extension, considered in Chapter 2. The 
problem, as Pethick observes, is that, 
where MacCormick opens by identifying normative coherence 
as a discrete kind of coherence, another theorist might push 
analysis further and discover that normative coherence in law 


























































89 Rhetoric, 233. 
90 ibid. 
91 Stephen Pethick, ‘On the Entanglement of Coherence’ in Ratio Juris, Vol. 27, Issue 1 (2014), 
pp. 116-137, 127 [original emphasis]. 
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And so, amidst the sea of different kinds of coherence, coherence itself goes 
missing, to be replaced by some other property or relation that just happens to 
exist in or between some ostensibly coherent objects in some particular context, 
such as “making sense” in legal reasoning. 
 
III.3 Consistency and Coherence Distinguished 
MacCormick’s second claim is that coherence can be ‘usefully distinguished’ 
from consistency. Thus, on the one hand, a set of norms or the parts of a story 
may be consistent with one another, but remain incoherent; on the other, 
inconsistency does not preclude coherence. On MacCormick’s account: 
Complete consistency is not a necessary condition of 
coherence, since unlike consistency coherence can be a matter 
of degree.92 
 
The view that coherence exists as a matter of degree is reflected throughout the 
extensive literature on coherence. Igor Douven and Wouter Meijs, for example, 
observe that ‘one of our most basic intuitions about coherence’ is that it can be 
understood as a matter of degree.93 In Chapter 2, I argued that coherence, 
properly understood as “fitting together”, does not admit of degrees, since 
coherence is an absolute concept. In other words, coherence does not exist on 
a spectrum; some thing or set of things is either coherent simpliciter, or it is not 
coherent. Yet, contrary to his claim, coherence remains an absolute concept 
within MacCormick’s description of narrative coherence as the requirement that 
a set of propositions belongs within a single rational scheme of explanation. 
   
First, a note on degrees: the term “degree” is often used in this context to 
represent two different states, both of which can be seen in the passage above. 
The first sense of degree is plain in MacCormick’s use of “complete 
consistency”, followed by the ostensibly contradictory remark that consistency 
cannot be a matter of degree.94 At first glance, MacCormick’s reference to 

























































92 Rhetoric, 190. 
93 Igor Douven and Wouter Meijs, ‘Measuring Coherence’ in Synthese, Vol. 156, No. 3 (2007), 
pp. 405-425, 406. 
94  Pethick also observes this apparent contradiction. See: Stephen Pethick, ‘Solving the 
Impossible: The Puzzle of Coherence, Consistency and Law’ in Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly, Vol. 59, Issue 4 (2008), pp. 395-409, 401. 
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explanation suggests that consistency is always necessarily complete. Here, 
MacCormick uses “complete consistency” to describe a set in which all of the 
set’s members are consistent with one another. This can be contrasted with a 
set in which only some of the members are consistent with one another. In our 
ordinary language, the first of these sets might be described as completely 
consistent, and the latter as merely partially consistent. Strictly speaking, 
however, the second set is not consistent at all; only those subsets that are 
actually consistent can be meaningfully described as consistent.95 It is important 
to note here that the difference between completely and partially consistent sets 
is not the degree of consistency, but rather the proportion of consistent 
members in each set. 
 
The second use of “degree” suggests that the concept in question is relative in 
that it may be predicated to varying extents among instances. MacCormick’s 
distinction between consistency and coherence observed above, as well as his 
references to the requirement that hypotheses be ‘satisfactorily’ 96  and 
‘adequately coherent’,97 suggest that he believes coherence exists as a matter 
of degree in this second sense of the term. Thus, MacCormick’s distinction 
between the notion of coherence, which allegedly exists as a matter of degree, 
and that of consistency, which does not, rests on the distinction between 
relative and absolute concepts observed above.98 
   
However, belonging within a rational scheme of explanation cannot be 
understood as a matter of a degree, for a set of propositions simply belongs 
within such a scheme or it does not. Recalling the mystery of the missing coffee 
machine explored in Chapter 2, consider the following set S1 of propositions: 
(A) The coffee machine is missing from the common room. 

























































95 Haack makes the same point in relation to “partial truths”, which are partial in the sense that 
‘some conjunct (or conjuncts) of a conjunctive statement is (or are) true, and another (or others) 
false’. A partial truth in this sense ‘is, strictly speaking, just plain false.’ See: Susan Haack, ‘The 
Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth’ in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 32 (2008), pp. 
20-35, 28-29. 
96 Rhetoric, 226 fn13. 
97 Rhetoric, 228. 
98 See: Chapter 2, section VI.1. 
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(C) Luke has taken the coffee machine. 
 
Set S1 appears to fulfil the requirements of MacCormick’s narrative coherence, 
belonging within a single rational scheme of explanation. Now consider a fourth 
proposition, added to the original three to form set S2: 
(D) Luke is known to be a thief. 
 
The addition of (D) to the original set does nothing to disrupt or enhance its 
narrative coherence. Indeed, the propositions in set S2 belong within a single 
rational scheme of explanation just like those in S1. It cannot be said that the 
members of set S1 belong within a single rational scheme of explanation 
more/less than those of set S2 – plainly, they does not. And so, the only relevant 
difference between these two sets is that of size, not coherence. 
 
This does not, however, lead to the conclusion that coherence cannot be 
usefully distinguished from consistency. Indeed, the distinction remains on the 
basis that coherence and consistency are different things. Nor does it mean that 
consistency forms a necessary condition for coherence, simply because 
consistency is not a necessary condition for coherence. After all, coherent 
paradoxes, disputes and courtroom dramas depend on inconsistency for their 
coherence.99 
 
IV. Truth, Justification and Narrative Coherence 
To recapitulate the story so far: MacCormick presents a theory of law and legal 
reasoning with coherence (“making sense”) at its core, suggesting, among other 
things, that a certain kind of coherence, “narrative coherence”, is the only basis 
on which to form justified beliefs about unperceived past events. The argument 
presented above has been conceptual, suggesting that MacCormick’s division 
of coherence into “kinds” arises from a methodological oversight, that his 
description of coherence as making sense is unhelpful, and that his reliance on 
degrees of coherence is misguided. Notwithstanding these conceptual 

























































99 Pethick, (n 94), 403. 
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what justificatory force narrative coherence exhibits. These questions, rooted in 
epistemology, form the subject matter of this section. 
 
IV.1 Truth and Justification 
As explained at II.2, MacCormick presents narrative coherence as ‘a test as to 
the truth or probable truth of propositions about unperceived things and 
events’,100 which ‘justifies beliefs, and thus justifies decisions about matters of 
past fact’,101  forming ‘a necessary but not sufficient condition of real-world 
credibility’ in relation to accounts of a past event or events.102 However, as 
Pethick observes, ‘there is an important distinction to be made between a test 
that justifies beliefs and a test of truth.’103 MacCormick appears to use both 
interchangeably, presenting narrative coherence as a test of truth and, 
therefore, justification, or vice versa; however, it is noteworthy that a proposition 
can be justified without being true, just as a proposition can be unjustified and 
remain true. To adopt Pethick’s example,  
someone who reasons that it is raining outside (it sounds like 
rain; it was looking very overcast earlier) may go outside to 
check and find that it is not raining.104 
 
In the example, the belief may be justified, despite being false. Equally, that 
same person may toss a coin to determine whether to believe it is raining or 
not, deciding that if it lands on heads he will believe that it is raining, but if it 
lands on tails he will believe it is not. If the coin should land on tails and it is, in 
fact, not raining, the belief is unlikely to be justified, despite being true. 
Furthermore, as Pethick observes, 
a test that ‘justifies beliefs’ is normative, whereas ‘a test of truth’ 
is not, on the face of it, normative at all. That is, there is nothing 
in ‘a test of truth’ itself that indicates what we ought to do or 



























































100 Rhetoric, 226. 
101 ibid. 
102 Rhetoric, 227. 
103 Stephen Pethick, ‘MacCormick: Coherence in Legal Justification’ in An Investigation of 
Coherence and Coherence Theory in Relation to Law and Legal Reasoning (DPhil Thesis, 
University of Oxford, 2000), 130. 
104 ibid, 125. 
105 ibid, 130. 
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Despite his confusing, interchanging use of truth and justification, MacCormick’s 
account of narrative coherence, as presented in Rhetoric and the Rule of Law, 
appears to be a theory of justified belief, rather than a test of truth. Indeed, in 
the introduction to ‘Legal Narratives’, MacCormick explains that the ‘issue 
mainly concerned [in the chapter] is how it is possible to establish true or at 
least acceptable accounts of past events.’106 
 
Thus, it seems that MacCormick presents narrative coherence as a theory of 
justified belief about past events. A belief is justified where the acceptance of 
that belief as true is permissible under the circumstances. Such permissibility is 
therefore normative, in that it establishes whether a proposition ought to be 
accepted as true. The question, then, is on what basis MacCormick founds his 
claim that fact-finders ought to build their beliefs on his account of narrative 
coherence. 
 
IV.2 Narrative Coherence as “Weak” Inferential Reasoning 
In his analysis of Smith, MacCormick’s derivation of (6) from the combination of 
(1) to (4) suggests that narrative coherence presents a method of inferential 
reasoning, where inference can be defined as the method of reasoning through 
which one passes from a proposition or set of propositions to a proposition 
which appears to be true if the former proposition or set of propositions is 
true.107 He continues, however: 
This is not a deductive derivation of (6) from the other set. 
Rather it is the case that [(6) plus (1) to (4)] belongs within a 
single rational scheme of explanation of events; whereas [(5) 
plus (1) to (4)] does not.108 
 
In light of MacCormick’s elimination of the possibility that such an inference is 

























































106 Rhetoric, 214 [emphasis added]. 
107 As in the example presented at Chapter 2, section I, where A believes P on the basis that Q. 
It should be noted, however, that the nature of inference is ‘a hard and by no means nearly 
solved philosophical problem’; see: Robert S. Tragesser, ‘Inference’ in Jonathan Dancy, Ernest 
Sosa and Matthias Steup (eds), A Companion to Epistemology (Chichester, UK: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2nd edn, 2010), 444. 
108 Rhetoric, 224. 
109 Deduction involves the derivation of a conclusion that is necessarily true if the premises from 
which it is inferred are true. For example: 
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coherence may be understood as an instance of inductive inference. 110 
Induction is a method of reasoning by which one passes from one proposition 
or set of propositions to another proposition that does not follow necessarily 
from the former, in contrast with deduction, but is probably true if the former is. 
As Jonathan Dancy explains: 
A successful inductive argument is one which makes its 
conclusion probable, or more probable than any equally 
detailed alternative.111 
 
Thus, induction is a “weak”, non-demonstrative inference, in that it remains 
possible for the accepted proposition to be false even if the premises are true. 
 
Gilbert Harman suggests that induction consists of two distinct kinds: 
enumerative induction, and hypothetical induction.112  The first, enumerative 
induction, involves the inference of a generalisation from evidence about 
observed instances. For example, having examined a number of peaches to 
find that all of those peaches contain pips and that none are without pips, one 
might infer that all peaches have pips.113  On the other hand, hypothetical 
induction, or “inference to the best explanation”, involves the inference of the 
hypothesis that “best explains” the evidence. For example, having seen ‘the tips 
of a man’s shoes peeping out from under the curtain’, one might infer that a 
man is hiding behind the curtain.114 Both of these forms of induction appear to 
be of central importance in MacCormick’s narrative coherence. 
 
First, MacCormick utilises enumerative inductive reasoning, relying on a 
number of “common-sense” generalisations. For example, examining Smith, 
MacCormick observes that similar events or effects are often the result of 



































































































































































All men are mortal; 
Socrates is a man; 
Therefore, Socrates is mortal. 
If the first two premises are true, the third must also be true. 
110 Pethick, (n 103), 132-140. 
111 Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 297. 
112 Gilbert Harman, ‘Induction: Enumerative and Hypothetical’ in Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa 
and Matthias Steup (eds), A Companion to Epistemology (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2nd 
edn, 2010), 438-439. 
113 This example is Harman’s. See: ibid, 438. 
114 ibid, 439. 
Chapter 3: MacCormick on Narrative Coherence 
	
   58 
generalisation which leads MacCormick to infer that the similar events 
surrounding the deaths of all three Mrs Smiths were probably caused by the 
same thing. Second, when presented with two contradictory hypotheses that 
might explain the evidence, MacCormick employs hypothetical inductive 
reasoning to determine which of the competing hypotheses “best explains” the 
evidence on his account of narrative coherence. 
 
Notwithstanding the question surrounding the validity of induction as a form of 
reasoning,115 Pethick observes that a problem for theories of inductive inference 
concerns the formulation of the principles of induction. 116  If MacCormick’s 
account can be understood as an instance of inductive reasoning, it seems that 
the central principle of induction is that belief in a set of propositions is justified 
where those propositions belong to a single rational scheme of explanation of 
events. However, this principle provides a devastatingly weak test for 
justification. Consider, for instance, Pethick’s example, based on the case of 
Smith considered above: 
(1) Mrs Brown died in the bath. 







According to narrative coherence, the conclusion that (2) “Mr Jones murdered 
Mrs Brown by drowning her in the bath” is justified on the basis that [(1) plus (2)] 

























































115 The validity of inductive inference is called into question by the Humean problem of induction 
(‘often referred simply to as the problem of induction’; Laurence BonJour, ‘Problems of 
Induction’ in Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup (eds), A Companion to 
Epistemology (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2nd edn, 2010), 639 [original emphasis]). In 
short, Hume suggests that, since inductive reasoning is not demonstrative, the only basis on 
which to accept inductive reasoning as valid is to rely on inductive reasoning itself, i.e. (1) 
Inductive reasoning has proved reliable in the past; (2) Therefore inductive reasoning is 
(generally) reliable (Dancy, (n 111), 202). Thus, Hume concludes that ‘inductive inferences are 
not rationally justified, but are instead the result of an essentially a-rational process, custom or 
habit’ (BonJour, ‘Problems of Induction’, 639). See: David Hume, Enquiries concerning Human 
Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals (first published 1777, L. A. Selby-Bigge 
and P. H. Nidditch (eds), 3rd edn, Oxford: Clarendon-Oxford University Press), 32-39 [An 
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, section IV, part II]. 
The problem of induction has been met with a number of responses (some of which are briefly 
outlined in BonJour, ‘Problems of Induction’, 640-642); however, MacCormick completely 
overlooks both the problem and its potential solutions in Rhetoric. MacCormick’s failure to 
engage with the philosophical questions and literature that underpin his legal theory is a theme 
that seems to persist throughout his Rhetoric. 
116 Pethick, (n 103), 136. 
117 ibid. 
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fits the idea that people sometimes murder other people, and it also fits the idea 
that it is possible to commit murder by drowning someone in the bath.’118 Yet, 
one might easily imagine countless other sets of propositions that “cohere” in 
the same way, with little or no reason to suggest that those propositions can be 
justifiably accepted as true. 119  Pethick argues, then, that MacCormick’s 
narrative coherence fails to represent an adequate standard of justification, 
because, 
no general account has been given of what reasons are 
sufficient for justification, and no account has been given about 
what reasons are relevant to justification. The formulation as it 
stands presents (as MacCormick himself attests) certain 
‘conditions of intelligibility’, but intelligibility is not justification, as 
the example illustrates.120 
 
The gravity of this problem can be seen in revisiting the case of Smith, which 
will by now be familiar to the reader. As has been explained, MacCormick sets 
out the evidence in Smith as a set of propositions (1) to (4), suggesting that the 
proposition “Mr Smith wilfully killed all the Mrs Smiths in their baths” is more 
justified than the proposition “All the Mrs Smiths died by sheer accident”, on the 
basis that the former exists alongside (1) to (4) within a single rational scheme 
of explanation, while the latter does not.  
 
MacCormick offers just two, directly opposed, simplistic explanations of how 
these deaths were caused, with one clear winner on his account. Yet, it is easy 
to generate a number of further hypotheses which do, in fact, belong to a single 
rational scheme of explanation alongside (1) to (4). Consider, for example: 
(7) Mr Smith wilfully killed one (or two) Mrs Smiths, but the other(s) died by 
sheer accident. 
(8) The first Mrs Smith died by sheer accident in her bath, giving Mr Smith 
the idea to wilfully kill the other Mrs Smiths in their baths. 
(9) There was a fourth Mrs Smith, to whom Mr Smith was married all 
along, who killed one, two or all three of his other wives. 

























































118 ibid, 137. 
119 ibid. 
120 Ibid [original emphasis]. 
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Smiths through insanity, automatism or intoxication. 
 
And so, MacCormick’s narrative coherence faces a fundamental problem which 
echoes that posed against BonJour’s epistemic coherentism, in Chapter 2 (at 
section V). This problem, which Harman calls, ‘the basic riddle’ of induction,121 
asks: how are people to decide which hypothesis, among competing 
hypotheses that are compatible with the evidence, to accept? More specifically 
for MacCormick: how are legal fact-finders to choose one hypothesis to accept 
as true from any number of hypotheses that fulfil his standard of narrative 
coherence? MacCormick fails to provide an answer.122 
 
IV.3 The Scope of Justification 
The view that MacCormick’s primary focus is that of mere justification, rather 
than truth, is confirmed as he remarks, summing up on narrative coherence: 
So the propositions which satisfy truth conditions set within our 
schemes of explanation could be true about the reality of things. 
But we could never be sure that they are.123 
  
However, the basis of this permissibility may take a variety of forms, which may 
be incompatible in any given case. For example, it may be morally permissible 
to believe that a dear and loyal friend is innocent of a crime that he denies 
committing, despite the lack of any epistemic reason to do so.124 Similarly, 
though it may be epistemically impermissible to believe that lobsters do not feel 

























































121 Harman, (n 113), 439. 
122 Pethick considers two potential tiebreakers that emerge in MacCormick’s account (Rhetoric, 
226). First, he suggests that MacCormick invokes a “principle of simplicity” meaning that where 
reasoning by narrative coherence leaves two or more plausible explanatory hypotheses, that 
which is the simplest is to be accepted as the best explanation (see: Pethick, (n 103), 140-145). 
However, his examination of MacCormick’s use of the Sherlock Holmes story ‘Silver Blaze’ as 
providing ‘ample illustration of the force of “narrative coherence”’ (Rhetoric, 225 fn12) 
demonstrates that, in fact, MacCormick’s application of narrative coherence seems to lead to 
his inferring the least simple of the hypotheses presented. Second, Pethick considers the 
possibility that MacCormick takes probability to be the deciding factor, inferring the most 
probably of those hypotheses deducible by narrative coherence (see: Pethick, (n 103), 146-
151). Pethick argues, however, that by “probability” here MacCormick describes epistemic, 
rather than physical, probability, that is, MacCormick uses probability to mean no more than 
“degree of justification” (ibid, 150); cf section V, below. 
123 Rhetoric, 226. 
124  Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press), 6. 
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permissible on the basis that ‘otherwise one would deprive oneself of the 
gustatory delight of eating boiled lobsters.’125 
 
The first, and perhaps most obvious, possibility is that MacCormick’s theory of 
narrative coherence furnishes a theory of epistemic justification, which is 
characterised by its essential relation to the goal of truth. This interpretation of 
MacCormick finds support in the continual references to truth throughout his 
‘Legal Narratives’, where MacCormick repeatedly describes narrative 
coherence as “a test of truth or probable truth”.  
  
However, MacCormick offers no justification for the suggestion that narrative 
coherence increases the likelihood of truth, and the requirement that an 
explanatory hypothesis belongs with the evidence it explains in a “single 
rational scheme of explanation” appears too weak a test to allow epistemic 
justification, permitting a number of beliefs that are otherwise wholly 
implausible, as the examples above show. A further problem comes from the 
possibility of coherence-ties. It is easy to imagine any number of contradictory 
hypotheses that meet MacCormick’s minimal requirement in a given case, but 
‘since the world does not, as do most puzzle-magazines and detective stories, 
have a last page to check the solution by’,126 there must be some measure by 
which to choose between two or more possible conclusions. MacCormick’s 
theory provides no measure (epistemic or otherwise) to choose which one 
should be accepted as true. 
   
A final problem for narrative coherence as a theory of epistemic justification 
concerns the incompleteness of the set of propositions under evaluation.127 This 
gives rise to a certain tentativeness, whereby the acceptance of any hypothesis 


























































125 John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2nd edn, 1999), 11. 
126 Letizia Gianformaggio, ‘Legal Certainty, Coherence and Consensus: Variations on a Theme 
by MacCormick’ in Patrick Nerhot (ed), Law, Interpretation and Reality: Essays in Epistemology, 
Hermeneutics and Jurisprudence (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), 425 [original 
emphasis]. 
127 See: Pethick, (n 103), 144-145. 
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under consideration is complete. 128  This tentativeness is not, in itself, a 
problem. The problem, as Pethick observes, is that, in the absence of 
completeness, MacCormick fails to establish any clear account of the point at 
which a proposition becomes justified.129 In other words, it is unclear how many 
possible explanations must be considered before the acceptance of one as true 
is justified.130 
 
It seems, then, that narrative coherence is insufficient to carry epistemic 
justificatory force. Yet, 
the possibility also exists that ‘narrative coherence’ is not 
epistemic (concerning knowledge and justified belief per se), 
but is (merely) a normative or judgmental heuristic or device, 
whose use MacCormick considers justified in legal 
proceedings.131 
 
This second possibility is that MacCormick’s theory of narrative coherence may 
be intended to provide (and may fare better as) prudential justification. Unlike 
epistemic justification, prudential justification makes no appeal to the goal of 
truth. Rather, prudential justification is pragmatic, accepting a belief as true, or 
as if it were true, on the basis that it is useful to do so. For example, it may be 
prudentially justified to believe that one will win a sports tournament, even 
where that belief is not epistemically permissible, on the basis that such self-
confidence is likely to improve one’s performance in each match. 132  The 

























































128  Such tentativeness can be seen in R v Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 1, to which 
MacCormick refers in a footnote (Rhetoric, 224 fn11). The facts of Cannings are ostensibly 
similar to those of Smith. The defendant, Mrs Cannings, was treated with ‘Smith-like suspicion’ 
following the death of three of her children in like circumstances and was convicted of their 
murder – as it stood, the proposition “Mrs Cannings killed all three children” was coherent in a 
way that the proposition “All three children died by accident” was not. The conviction was later 
quashed following the discovery of further evidence suggesting that the deaths came as a result 
of a genetic defect in the Cannings family. This new evidence was incoherent with the original 
hypothesis, giving rise to a new, coherent hypothesis: “All three children died as the result of a 
genetic defect”. Cannings plays an important role in Amalia Amaya’s theory of “optimal 
coherence”, discussed in Chapter 4, below. 
129 Pethick, (n 103), 145. 
130 Pethick suggests that in the context of MacCormick’s Sherlock Holmes example, we might 
imagine a “super-detective” whose investigation is even wider than Holmes’, adding further 
evidence and explanatory hypotheses to the set under consideration. See: ibid, 144. 
131 ibid, 117. 
132 Matthias Steup uses a similar example; see his ‘Epistemology in the Twentieth Century’ in 
Dermot Moran (ed), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy (Abingdon, 
UK: Routledge, 2008), 475. 
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narrative coherence as a form of prudential justification in law, whereby 
propositions are treated as if they are true in law because it is pragmatically 
advantageous to do so. 
 
The interpretation of narrative coherence as a means of prudential justification 
has been scarcely considered throughout the literature. Quickly dismissing the 
possibility, Pethick argues that ‘MacCormick’s claims for narrative coherence do 
not accord with this limited application’, since narrative coherence is ‘clearly 
intended to be used in the justification of matters beyond the adversarial 
courtroom’.133 However, a wider look at MacCormick’s Rhetoric and the Rule of 
Law suggests that MacCormick may, in fact, intend narrative coherence to form 
a theory of legal justification, rather than more general epistemic justification. In 
chapter 4, ‘Defending Deductivism’, MacCormick draws on Zenon Bankowski’s 
suggestion that the process of legal fact-finding can be understood as a “truth 
certifying procedure”, where ‘that which an authorized fact-determiner 
determines to be true, or certifies as true, has to be deemed true or accepted as 
the conclusive truth of the matter.’134 This, he suggests, is the case in law as 
well as in other disciplines (science, for example) where finality of decision 
requires this kind of conclusive “truth”. 
 
MacCormick’s explanation of the implications of this view provides strong 
support for the possibility under consideration, and is worth quoting at length: 
In effect, legal fact-finding processes transform brute facts into 
institutional facts. Whatever may have happened in the world, a 
jury’s determination that a hit b on the head and caused b’s 
death makes that count as a legal truth, a proposition counted 
as true in a certain legal process. It is true given certain legal 
conventions of truth-ascription. That does not, of course, make 
it true for all purposes. Indeed one way of justifying or criticizing 
legal procedures is to try to form an estimate of the degree to 


























































133 Pethick, (n 103), 152. 
134 Rhetoric, 72; referring to Zenon Bankowski, ‘The Value of Truth: Fact Scepticism Revisited’ 
in Legal Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1981), pp. 257-266. See also: Zenon Bankowski, ‘The Jury and 
Reality’ in Patrick Nerhot (ed), Law, Interpretation and Reality: Essays in Epistemology, 
Hermeneutics and Jurisprudence (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), esp. 234-
238. 
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world as it really is, however one thinks it appropriate to judge 
that.135 
 
This, I suggest, provides reason to believe that MacCormick may actually be 
concerned with prudential, not epistemic, justification. To emphasise the point: 
for MacCormick, the process of legal fact-finding establishes “legal truth”, 
whereby a proposition is counted as true in a certain legal process. Legal truth, 
however, may not be true for all purposes; in other words, a legal truth may not 
actually be true, in that it may not ‘actually match the world as it really is’. 
Though this interpretation appears to contradict MacCormick’s comments as to 
the justificatory force of narrative coherence as a test of truth about unperceived 
past facts in general, it may be compatible with MacCormick’s description of 
legal truths, as well his introductory remarks as to the issue of establishing ‘truth 
or at least acceptable accounts of past events.’ 136  And so, it seems 
MacCormick’s narrative coherence may, in fact, be intended to perform a limited 
role in the finding of legal truth. 
  
However, Giuseppe Zaccaria argues that a number of further limitations must 
be placed on MacCormick’s coherence-based legal theory. Of those, two are of 
particular importance in the analysis of narrative coherence presented here. 
Zaccaria argues, first, that narrative coherence must be confined to common-
law legal systems, suggesting that, 
[i]t is much more applicable to a legal system like the English 
one, based on the concept of proof as argumentum and on the 
primacy of testimony (the memories and perceptions even of 
honest witnesses may very well be erroneous or untrustworthy), 
that to legal systems like the Continental ones based on the 
primacy of the written document and on subordination of the 
interpreter to the text.137 
 
He continues: 
narrative coherence is too bound up with the techniques of trial 
in English-speaking countries and the principles, characteristic 

























































135 Rhetoric, 72. 
136 Rhetoric, 214 [emphasis added]. 
137 Giuseppe Zaccaria, ‘Hermeneutics and Narrative Comprehension’ in Patrick Nerhot (ed), 
Law, Interpretation and Reality: Essays in Epistemology, Hermeneutics and Jurisprudence 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), 268. 
Chapter 3: MacCormick on Narrative Coherence 
	
   65 
the witness (opinion rule) and of subjecting it, as a check on 
veracity, to cross-examination.138 
 
Yet, Zaccaria’s claim is wholly unfounded. Indeed, though MacCormick’s 
primary example is an English trial, there is little in his formulation of narrative 
coherence to suggest that the same test of belonging within a single rational 
scheme of explanation, built upon the principles of universal causation and 
motivation, could not be applied to fact-finding in any legal system 
(notwithstanding the general criticisms presented in this chapter). 
 
Second, Zaccaria suggests that the notion of narrative coherence is ‘better and 
more specifically applicable to one field of law only, criminal law.’139 Once 
again, however, his reasoning is unclear. He suggests that ‘the problem of 
deriving empirical inferences from evidential facts is undoubtedly more acute’ in 
criminal law, and that the “specificity” of MacCormick’s notion means that ‘a 
view that treats the law as a whole on the model of criminal law alone’ remains 
unconvincing.140 This criticism is plainly problematic. Again, it remains unclear 
why Zaccaria takes MacCormick’s approach to be specifically applicable to 
criminal law, particularly in light of MacCormick’s decision to “put aside” the 
issue of standard of proof in Smith, while his suggestion that the problem of 
proof is of little significance outside of criminal law is tenuous at best. 
 
Conversely, Pethick presents the opposing view that the limited role of narrative 
coherence may be best-suited to civil litigation. Presenting a constructive 
interpretation of narrative coherence, Pethick suggests that narrative coherence 
may maintain justificatory force where ‘the only objective in employing narrative 
coherence is to determine which is the better justified of two rival 
propositions’. 141  Though such an objective cannot pertain in civil-law 
adjudication or common-law criminal trials, where proof must be made to a 

























































138 ibid, 269. 
139 ibid. 
140 ibid. 
141 Pethick, (n 103), 152 [original emphasis]. 
142 In contrast to the common-law tradition, in civil-law jurisdictions, the standard of proof in civil 
litigation is the same as in criminal trials: beyond reasonable doubt. For a review and 
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civil adjudication, where the opposing factual hypotheses are measured “on a 
balance of probabilities”. 
 
Though unlikely to fulfil MacCormick’s intentions, the idea that narrative 
coherence may represent a theory of legal justification is at once appealing, 
avoiding many of the obstacles faced by the epistemic interpretation considered 
above. As a theory of prudential, legal justification narrative coherence is not 
problematised by the appeal to truth, thereby allowing a lower standard of 
justification (particularly in the context of civil litigation) and, thus understood, 
the problems surrounding completeness are avoided, as the legal fact-finder 
need only consider the hypotheses presented, which form a complete set for 
the purposes of the legal process. However, a number of problems remain. 
 
At a basic level, MacCormick offers no explanation as to why narrative 
coherence, rather than some other test or method of reasoning, is of particular 
value in the pursuit of acceptable legal truths. More problematically, the 
problem of coherence-ties remains unanswered. That is, even in this limited 
role, MacCormick’s account fails to provide any method through which to 
distinguish between explanatory hypotheses in the (not unlikely) event that two 
or more narratively coherent accounts exist. Perhaps most troublingly for 
MacCormick, narrative coherence as legal prudential justification inevitably 
leads to the “cynical” view he so forcefully rejects: that ‘the law has nothing 
really to do with truth, only with a competitive system of technical proof.’143 
 
V. Narrative Coherence in the Process of Discovery 
In the preceding sections, I have shown that narrative coherence, understood 
as a method of reasoning, is neither deductive nor inductive, failing to overcome 
Harman’s “basic riddle” regardless of whether it is taken to hold epistemic or 
prudential justificatory force. As it stands, narrative coherence appears a 
hopeless endeavor. Yet, a further possibility remains, not yet considered here 



































































































































































explanation of the stark differences in standards of proof between common-law and civil-law 
jurisdictions, see: Kevin M. Clermont and Emily Sherwin, ‘A Comparative View of Standards of 
Proof’ in The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 50 (2002), pp. 243-275. 
143 Rhetoric, 221. Observed at n 56, above. 
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It may be that MacCormick presents in narrative coherence an instance of 
abductive reasoning, understood in the Peircean sense.144 Thus understood, 
abductive inference is ‘the first step’145 of reasoning whereby one ‘seeks a 
theory’146 that explains a set of unexplained facts. Thus, abductive inference 
takes something like the following form: 
The surprising fact, C, is observed; 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. 147 
 
Plainly, abduction in this sense is insufficient in itself to justify beliefs in many 
circumstances. Rather, abductive inference provides a process of discovery, 
through which initially plausible hypotheses are found before being tested 
through the operation of induction. 148  Though MacCormick acknowledges 
elsewhere that the process of discovery ‘is not obscure to us’ and can be 
understood in terms of ‘reasonable procedures’,149  this interpretation of his 
theory of narrative coherence remains unlikely. After all, MacCormick presents 
narrative coherence as ‘a test as to the truth or probable truth of propositions 
about unperceived things and events’, 150  which ‘justifies beliefs, and thus 
justifies decisions about matters of past fact’. 151  Indeed, it is clear that 
MacCormick intends narrative coherence to present a theory that justifies 
conclusions, rather than an account of preliminary discovery. Yet, a revisit to 
MacCormick’s application of narrative coherence in Smith soon increases the 



























































144  Also known as “retroduction”. The name “abduction” or “abductive reasoning” is also 
commonly ascribed to “inference to the best explanation” (or “hypothetical induction”), but I use 
it here to describe the process of discovery outlined below. On “abduction” as “inference to the 
best explanation”, see, for example: Gilbert H. Harman, ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’ 
in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 74, No. 1 (1965), pp. 88-95, 88. 
145 Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘Scientific Method’ in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce 
Vol. VII (Arthur W. Burks (ed), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 136. 
146 ibid, 137. 
147  Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘Pragmatism and Abduction’ in Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce Vol. V and VI (Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds), (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap-Harvard University Press, 1960), 117. 
148 See, for example: Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘Hume on Miracles’ in ibid, 358. 
149 For MacCormick’s discussion of discovery and justification (in relation to analogies), see: 
Rhetoric, 208-209. 
150 Rhetoric, 226 [emphasis added]. 
151 ibid [emphasis added]. 
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As the reader will recall, MacCormick suggests that having considered 
propositions (1) to (4), the legal fact-finder is justified in concluding (at least for 
now) that proposition (6), “Mr Smith wilfully killed all the Mrs Smiths in their 
baths”, is probably true. MacCormick explains: 
As things stand, we are able to hold that the story [(1) to (4) 
plus (6)] is coherent in a way that [(1) to (4) plus (5)] is not. Why 
is this so, and how can that justify concluding that (6) is the 
probable truth of the matter? 
 The principles of universal causation and of rational 
motivation as outlined above supply the basic answer to this, 
coupled with more detailed scientific theories and common-
sense generalizations about probability.152 
 
He continues: 
The probability of the conjoint occurrence of the necessary 
causal conditions for any person’s drowning in a bath is low. 
Even lower is the probability of these conditions occurring three 
times in the case of three persons successively enjoying the 
same relationship with a given fourth party. But the probability 
that a human agent can intentionally bring about the realization 
of these necessary conditions is so high as to approach 
certainty. And the probability that someone who has a strong 
motive would do this intentionally is much greater than the 
probability of the ‘sheer coincidence’ hypothesis.153 
 
On this basis, MacCormick “weakly derives” that Mr Smith (probably) wilfully 
killed all the Mrs Smiths in their baths. In the first passage, MacCormick 
suggests that his conclusion is justified by coherence, which rests upon the 
combination of the causal explanatory principles, scientific theories and 
common-sense generalisations about probability. The inclusion of probability is 
noteworthy here. It is striking that the second passage, in which MacCormick 
carefully outlines his reasoning process, deals entirely with probability and 
coherence (be it narrative or otherwise) is dropped completely. In short, his 
inference that (6) is more justified than (5) is based entirely on the relative 
probability of those propositions, built upon MacCormick’s causal explanatory 
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observes, MacCormick’s method provides ‘no more than one or more coherent 
theories’ which ‘we must hand over to the analyst of probabilities’.154 
  
Put briefly, I suggest that MacCormick’s inferential method takes the form: 
The unexplained facts (1) to (4) are observed; 
But if either (5) or (6) were true, (1) to (4) would be explicable, 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that either (5) or (6) is true. 
(6) is more probable than (5), 
Therefore, (6) is probably true. 
 
Thus understood, narrative coherence plays a limited role in the process of 
legal proof. Rather than providing a justificatory test as to the probable truth of a 
given explanatory hypothesis, MacCormick’s narrative coherence sets out the 
minimal level of plausibility required for a hypothesis to be entertained in the 
process of discovery. This interpretation plainly cuts against MacCormick’s 
intentions for narrative coherence in the process of legal proof; but, in this more 
limited role, there may be hope for narrative coherence yet. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In his Rhetoric and the Rule of Law and elsewhere, Neil MacCormick suggests 
that coherence, that is, “making sense”, plays a fundamental role in legal 
argument and legal fact-finding, as well as forming a desirable ideal within a 
legal system as a whole.  
  
However, the close examination of MacCormick’s theory afforded here has 
revealed a number of conceptual problems surrounding his use of coherence. I 
have argued that MacCormick’s conception of coherence as making sense 
proves inadequate and, building on the argument made in Chapter 2, that 
narrative coherence does not exist as a matter of degree, but rather as an 
absolute concept, whereby a narrative is simply coherent or not.  
 
This chapter has also highlighted a number of epistemological problems 

























































154 Bernard S. Jackson, Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence (Roby, UK: Deborah Charles, 
1988), 19 [original emphasis]. cf n 123. 
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unperceived past facts. Taking narrative coherence as an instance of inferential 
reasoning, I have suggested that MacCormick’s presentation of narrative 
coherence proves incapable of overcoming Gilbert Harman’s basic riddle of 
induction, failing to provide any basis on which to distinguish between two or 
more narratively coherent hypotheses. I have further argued that narrative 
coherence provides too weak a test to afford epistemic justification, lacking the 
truth-conduciveness that such justification requires, and that an interpretation of 
narrative coherence as prudential justification remains problematic, falling victim 
once again to Harman’s basic riddle, as well as leading to the “cynical” 
conclusion that law has nothing to do with truth after all. 
 
Departing from the literature, I have suggested that narrative coherence may 
perhaps be better understood as an instance of abductive inference in the 
process of discovery, providing a method by which initially plausible hypotheses 
can be shortlisted before being tested through the operation of induction. 
Though this interpretation is at odds with MacCormick’s intentions for narrative 
coherence, I have shown that, in fact, it seems to be consistent with its 
application in his account. In this more limited role, narrative coherence (or 
something like it) may remain a useful tool in the process of legal fact-finding. 
However, this leaves us without a sufficient account of how beliefs about 









Despite extensive use in contemporary thought, the analysis presented thus far 
shows that coherence theories of justification face a number of serious 
problems. Mirroring much of the foregoing discussion, legal theorist Amalia 
Amaya suggests that these problems stem from a number of factors, including 
the vagueness surrounding what coherence is, the lack of any clear account of 
the inference patterns decision-makers may use, and the need for a detailed 
account of why coherence ought to be pursued in law.1 
 
In a number of recent publications,2 Amaya presents a coherentist theory of 
legal reasoning which she contends is able to overcome, or at least 
‘significantly diminish the import of’, 3  these challenges. In sum, Amaya 
proposes that, 
a belief about the law and the facts under dispute is justified if it 
is “optimally coherent,” that is, if it is such that an epistemically 
responsible legal decision-maker might accept it as justified by 
virtue of its coherence in like circumstances.4 
  
In her most recent publication, ‘Coherence, Evidence, and Legal Proof’,5 Amaya 

























































1 Amalia Amaya, ‘Legal Justification by Optimal Coherence’ in Ratio Juris, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2011), 
pp. 304-329 (“Justification” hereinafter), 311-313. 
2 See, for example: Amalia Amaya, ‘Formal Models of Coherence in Legal Epistemology’ in 
Artificial Intelligence and Law, Vol. 15 (2007), pp. 429-447; ‘Justification, Coherence, and 
Epistemic Responsibility in Legal Fact-Finding’ in Episteme, Vol. 5, Issue 3 (2008), pp. 306-319; 
Justification, (n 1); and, ‘Ten Theses on Coherence in Law’ in Michał Araszkiewicz and Jaromír 
Šavelka (eds), Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2013) (“Ten Theses” hereinafter). Amaya’s theory is due to be defended 
in her forthcoming book, expected December 2014: The Tapestry of Reason: An Inquiry into the 
Nature of Coherence and its Role in Legal Argument (Oxford: Hart Publishing). 
3 Justification, 325. 
4 Justification, 306. 
5 Amalia Amaya, ‘Coherence, Evidence, and Legal Proof’ in Legal Theory, Vol. 19 (2013), pp. 1-
43 (“Proof” hereinafter). 
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beliefs about past facts in the process of legal proof.6 Modifying Paul Thagard’s 
conception of coherence as constraint satisfaction, she contends that a legal 
fact-finder is justified in his belief if and only if he infers the most “factually 
coherent” explanation of the evidence, fulfilling the epistemic duties and 
displaying the intellectual virtues required by the context in which he finds 
himself. This coherence-based theory of legal fact-finding is the subject of the 
present chapter. 
 
In contrast to MacCormick’s classical account of coherence in legal fact-finding, 
Amaya’s approach characterises a recent change in contemporary legal 
coherentism that has capitalised on the developments made by researchers in 
a number of disciplines, including psychology and formal epistemology. Yet, the 
critical examination presented here reveals that, despite its differences, 
Amaya’s theory of optimal coherence falls victim to variations of the same 
conceptual and epistemological problems that emerged in BonJour’s coherence 
theory of epistemic justification and recurred in MacCormick’s account of 
narrative coherence in law.  
 
These criticisms, once again, can be understood under two heads. First, I argue 
that Amaya errs in her elucidation of the concept of coherence, leading to the 
proliferation of infinite kinds of coherence in which the central notion itself is 
lost, and mistakenly suggesting that coherence exists as a matter of degree. 
The effects of the latter argument can be felt under my second strand of 
criticism, for the observation that coherence is an absolute concept leaves 
Amaya’s account of inference to the best explanation incapable of solving the 
basic riddle of induction, while her responsibility-supplement is too inexact and 
underdeveloped to offer any justificatory support. 
 
I. Coherence as Constraint Satisfaction 
Amaya observes that a common problem for coherence theories, with which the 

























































6 Amaya presents a similar, albeit less detailed, account in the earlier ‘Justification, Coherence, 
and Epistemic Responsibility in Legal Fact-Finding’, (n 2). The key difference in Proof lies in 
Amaya’s adoption of the irenic, rather than aretaic, approach to epistemic responsibility. See: 
Section III, below. 
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what coherence amounts to.7 In an attempt to avoid this problem, Amaya 
presents a detailed account of coherence ‘modeled upon’8 Paul Thagard’s 
conception of coherence as “constraint satisfaction”. 9  Modifying Thagard’s 
account for the legal context, Amaya constructs “factual coherence”, the kind of 
coherence relevant to judgments about questions of legal fact. I, therefore, 
begin in this section with an outline of Thagard’s position, before considering 
Amaya’s development of it within the legal context and the implications this has 
for coherence in legal fact-finding. 
 
In his Coherence in Thought and Action and elsewhere, Thagard develops a 
theory of coherence in human understanding. Seeking to provide a ‘general and 
precise account of coherence’,10 Thagard presents a conception of coherence 
as constraint satisfaction,11 where ‘[c]oherence can be understood in terms of 
maximal satisfaction of multiple [positive and negative] constraints’.12 
 
He sets out six distinct “kinds” of coherence: explanatory, analogical, deductive, 
perceptual, conceptual and deliberative,13 each made up of a set of principles or 
constraints which set out the conditions for coherence. For example, 
explanatory coherence (that is, the kind of coherence present in explanation) 
can be understood in terms of the following principles: 
Principle E1: Symmetry Explanatory coherence is a symmetric relation, 
unlike, say, conditional probability. That is, two propositions p and q 
cohere with each other equally. 
Principle E2: Explanation (a) A hypothesis coheres with what it explains, 
which can be either evidence or another hypothesis. (b) Hypotheses that 
together explain some other proposition cohere with each other. (c) The 
more hypotheses it takes to explain something, the lower the degree of 
coherence. 


























































7 Justification, 311. 
8 Justification, 313. 
9  See, for example: Paul Thagard and Karsten Verbeurgt, ‘Coherence as Constraint 
Satisfaction’ in Cognitive Science, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1998), pp. 1-24; and, Paul Thagard, 
Coherence in Thought and Action (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000) (“Coherence” 
hereinafter). 
10 Coherence, xii. 
11 See: Coherence, ch 2. 
12 Coherence, 17. 
13 Coherence, 63. 
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Principle E4: Data Priority Propositions that describe the results of 
observation have a degree of acceptability on their own. 
Principle E5: Contradiction Contradictory propositions are incoherent 
with each other. 
Principle E6: Competition If p and q both explain a proposition and if p 
and q are not explanatorily connected, then p and q are incoherent with 
each other (p and q are explanatorily connected if one explains the other 
or if together they explain something). 
Principle E7: Acceptance The acceptability of a proposition in a system 
of propositions depends on its coherence with them.14 
 
Meanwhile, deductive coherence (that is, the kind of coherence used in 
deductive reasoning) can be understood as follows: 
Principle D1: Symmetry Deductive coherence is a symmetric relation 
among propositions, unlike, say, deductive entailment. 
Principle D2: Deduction (a) An axiom or other proposition coheres with 
propositions that are deducible from it. (b) Propositions that together are 
used to deduce some other proposition cohere with each other. (c) The 
more hypotheses it takes to deduce something, the less the degree of 
coherence. 
Principle D3: Intuitive Priority Propositions that are intuitively obvious 
have a degree of acceptability on their own. Propositions that are 
obviously false have a degree of rejectability on their own. 
Principle D4: Contradiction Contradictory propositions are incoherent 
with each other. 
Principle D5: Acceptance The acceptability of a proposition in a system 
of propositions depends on its coherence with them.15 
 
Thagard explains that there is a positive constraint or constraints between two 
elements where those elements cohere, while there is a negative constraint or 
constraints between those elements where they incohere.16 For example, if one 
axiom is deducible from another, there is a positive constraint between those 
axioms, while, on the other hand, there exists a negative constraint between 
contradictory propositions. 
 
He then explains that in order to ‘make [a set E of elements] as coherent a 
whole as possible’ we must divide E into two subsets, a subset A of accepted 


























































14 Coherence, 43. 
15 Coherence, 53. 
16 Coherence, 17. 
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incoherence relations’.17 Thus, where two elements e1 and e2 cohere (e.g. 
where e2 is deducible from e1), the positive constraint can be satisfied by either 
accepting or rejecting both elements. In contrast, where e1 is, for example, 
inconsistent with e3, the negative constraint can be satisfied by accepting one 
and rejecting the other.18 Coherence is then maximised through a connectionist 
algorithm,19 where the weight W of the partition (‘that is, the sum of the weights 
of the satisfied constraints’) of E into A and R is the greatest it can be.20 
 
Having established these six kinds of coherence, where coherence is 
understood in terms of constraint satisfaction and computable through a 
connectionist algorithm, Thagard proceeds to consider the role of coherence in 
relation to philosophical and psychological problems in knowledge and reality, 
ethics and politics, emotional judgments, consensus and probability theory.  
 
Most significant for present purposes is Thagard’s contribution to knowledge 
and ethics. He presents coherentist theories of epistemic and ethical 
justification, arguing that, 
[k]nowledge involves at least five different kinds of coherence—
explanatory, analogical, deductive, perceptual, and 




[l]ike epistemic justification, […] ethical justification involves the 
interaction of several kinds of coherence, with the major 
addition being the role of deliberative coherence in decision 
making.22 
 
Thagard’s account of coherence, as outlined here, has become ‘the object of 


























































17 Coherence, 18. 
18 Coherence, 17-18. 
19 Coherence, 32. 
20 Coherence, 19. 
21 Coherence, 41. 
22 Coherence, 125. 
23 Michał Araszkiewicz, ‘Limits of Coherence Satisfaction Theory of Coherence as a Theory of 
(Legal) Reasoning’ in Michał Araszkiewicz and Jaromír Šavelka (eds), Coherence: Insights from 
Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 217. 
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reasoning.24 The most notable development of Thagard’s position in the context 
of legal proof comes from Amaya’s recent research, to which I now turn. 
 
I.1 Coherence in Law 
Amaya suggests that there exists ‘a symbiotic relationship between formal and 
informal approaches to legal coherentism’, asserting that formal coherentist 
theories, like Thagard’s conception of coherence as constraint satisfaction, ‘can 
help us make coherentism a solid theory of justification for law.’25 
 
Using Thagard’s account as the starting point, Amaya sets out two further kinds 
of coherence, viz. “factual coherence” (‘that is, the kind of coherence that is 
relevant to the justification of evidentiary judgments in law’)26 and “normative 
coherence” (‘the kind of coherence that is relevant to the justification of 
conclusions about disputed questions of law’). 27  These two new kinds of 
coherence are ‘modeled upon Thagard’s theory of the justification of epistemic 
and moral beliefs, respectively’,28 which Amaya suggests must be modified in 
order to be applicable to the process of legal justification. 
 
First, she suggests: 
Normative coherence requires the integrated assessment of the 
same kinds of coherence that are involved in moral justification 
(i.e., conceptual, perceptual, explanatory, deliberative, 
analogical, and deductive coherence) with one major addition, 
namely, “interpretative coherence.”29 
 
Interpretative coherence, Amaya argues, is the most important contributor to 

























































24 As well as the work of Amaya discussed here, see, for example: Michał Araszkiewicz, 
‘Balancing of Legal Principles and Constraint Satisfaction’ in Radboud G. F. Winkels (ed), Legal 
Knowledge and Information Systems (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2010); Sindhu Joseph and Henry 
Prakken, ‘Coherence-Driven Argumentation to Norm Consensus’ in Proceedings of the 12th 
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (New York: ACM Press, 2009); Jaap 
Hage, ‘Three Kinds of Coherentism’ in Michał Araszkiewicz and Jaromír Šavelka (eds), 
Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2013); and, Jaromír Šavelka, ‘Coherence as Constraint Satisfaction: Judicial 
Reasoning Support Mechanism’ in the same volume. 
25 Amaya, ‘Formal Models of Coherence in Legal Epistemology’, (n 2), 445. 
26 Proof, 9 [emphasis added]. 
27 Justification, 313. 
28 ibid. 
29 Justification, 314. 
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suggests, ‘structurally analogous to those of explanatory coherence, with 
positive and negative constraints holding between interpretative (rather than 
factual) hypotheses and “normative elements”.’30 
 
Second, and more pertinently for the present endeavor, she contends that, in 
order to appreciate the practical (i.e. non-truth) goals of the legal trial, 
Thagard’s sixth kind of coherence, “deliberative coherence” (‘the kind of 
coherence that is relevant to practical inference’),31 must also be added to 
the original five kinds of coherence involved in Thagard’s theory of epistemic 
justification. Thus, 
[f]actual coherence involves the integrated assessment of 
explanatory coherence (fit between hypotheses and the 
evidence at trial); analogical coherence (fit between mapping 
hypotheses); conceptual coherence (fit between concepts); 
perceptual coherence (fit of visual interpretations and nonverbal 
representations); deductive coherence (fit between general 
principles and particular judgments); and deliberative 
coherence (fit between deliberative factors and the goals of 
adjudication).32 
 
Amaya also argues that a coherentist theory of legal proof must be tailored to 
fit the institutionalised nature of legal reasoning. Thus, Thagard’s principles 
of explanatory coherence must be modified, taking account of the required 
standard of proof in legal trials and the institutional constraints surrounding 
the forms of evidence that can be considered at trial (i.e. admissible 
evidence);33 and so, principles E4 and E7 become: 
Principle E4’: Data Priority a) Propositions that describe admissible 
evidence at trial have a degree of acceptability on their own; b) factual 
hypotheses that are compatible with innocence have a degree of 
acceptability on their own. 
Principle E7’: Acceptance The acceptability of a proposition in a system 
of propositions (i.e., a theory of the case) depends on its coherence with 
them; b) the guilt hypothesis may be accepted only if it is justified to a 




























































31 Proof, 11; see also: Coherence, 127-132. 
32 Proof, 12. 
33 Proof, 11. 
34 Proof, 13. 
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I.2 Disentangling Coherence 
In Chapter 2, I introduced Pethick’s recent argument that the apparent difficulty 
surrounding what coherence is does not arise from (or, at least, is not entirely 
caused by) the concept of coherence itself, but rather comes as a result of the 
erroneous conflation of the concept’s intension and extension. 35  Pethick 
contends that in their attempts to articulate the notion of coherence, those 
writing on coherence in legal theory, philosophy and elsewhere have mistakenly 
identified characteristics of some coherent object or objects as characteristics of 
coherence. He suggests that this universal mistake explains why those writing 
on coherence typically draw the conclusion that there must be a number of 
distinct kinds or types of coherence.36 
 
Thagard’s conception of coherence provides one of the clearest examples of 
this mistake. Suggesting that there are six distinct kinds of coherence, viz. 
explanatory, analogical, deductive, perceptual, conceptual and deliberative, 
each of which can be understand in terms of a number of principles or 
constraints and are ‘distinguished from each other by the different kinds of 
elements and constraints they involve’,37 Thagard appropriately observes: 
the reader might now be worried about the proliferation of kinds 
of coherence: just how many are there?38 
 
Indeed, one might easily imagine other, more specific, kinds of coherence. 
However, Thagard asserts that, as far as he knows,39 there are only six kinds of 
coherence, suggesting that other potential kinds of coherence, like coherence in 
emotional matters,40 are not further kinds of coherence, but merely provide ‘an 
expanded way of considering the six basic kinds of coherence’.41 Yet, this 
argument may have implications in the opposite direction, too, for it seems that 
these basic kinds of coherence are not different kinds of coherence at all, but 

























































35 See: Stephen Pethick, ‘On the Entanglement of Coherence’ in Ratio Juris, Vol. 27, Issue 1 
(2014), pp. 116-137. 
36 ibid, 119. 
37 Coherence, 60. 
38 ibid. 
39 Coherence, 66. 
40 That is, “emotional coherence”; see: ch 6 in Coherence. 
41 Coherence, 66. 
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gives rise to a more fundamental issue that subsists throughout Thagard’s 
approach: what does it mean to have different kinds of coherence, or kinds of 
anything? 
 
A reflection on Thagard’s earlier work on scientific knowledge provides the 
opportunity to better understand his use of “kinds”. In his Conceptual 
Revolutions,42 Thagard suggests that concepts are “complex structures” which 
can be understood within the following frame-like structure: 
CONCEPT: 
A kind of: 
Subkinds: 







And so, the concept of a whale, for example, can be understood as follows: 
WHALE: 
A kind of: cetacean, mammal, sea-creature. 
Subkinds: humpback, blue, killer, sperm, white, beluga, etc. 
Parts: fins, blubber, bone, blowhole, tail.44 
 
These concepts can then be understood within ‘conceptual systems’, in which 
they are organised into “kind-” and “part-hierarchies” and linked to one another 
by “rules”.45 Thagard illustrates how this conceptual system might look with a 


























































42 Paul Thagard, Conceptual Revolutions (Chichester, West Sussex: Princeton University Press, 
1992). 
43 ibid, 29-30. 
44 ibid. 
45 ibid. 
46 See: ibid, 31. 
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He explains that ‘this network uses five kinds of links’: 
1. ‘Kind links, […] labeled “K.” These links indicate that one concept is a 
kind of another: for example, canary is a kind of bird and bird is a kind of 
animal. 
2. Instance links, […] labeled “I.” These indicate that some particular object 
[…] is an instance of a concept: Tweety is a canary. The chain of links in 
the network shows that Tweety is also an animal. 
3. Rule links, […] labeled “R.” These express general (but not always 
universal) relations among concepts, for example that canaries have the 
color yellow. 
4. Property links, […] labeled “H” for “has property” […] such as: Tweety is 
yellow. 
5. Part links, […] marked “P.” These indicate that a whole has a given part: 
a beak is a part of a bird.’47 
 
But despite this talk of kind-links and kinds of links, Thagard provides no 
indication as to what “kinds” are. Indeed, despite widespread (and often casual) 
use of kinds, the discussion of what kinds are has been largely neglected 
throughout the philosophical literature. Even within the extensive literature on 
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significance of their being kinds appears to go unnoticed. Commenting on the 
nature of kinds, though limiting himself to matters directly relevant to his 
discussion of art works and kinds (suggesting that there may be different kinds 
of kinds), Nicholas Wolterstorff observes: 
No doubt what comes first to mind when we think of kinds is 
natural kinds—the species, the genera, the phylla, of the 
botanical and zoological taxonomist. But I see no reason for 
denying that there is also the kind (type, sort): Chair In This 
Room.48 
 
There is, in fact, good reason for denying the kind: Chair In This Room, for it 
rests on the proposition that instances of Chair In This Room have ‘[t]he 
property of being a chair in this room’.49 Yet, the “property” (and/or relation) of 
being a chair in this room is extrinsic; that a chair might happen to be in this 
room or that an object in this room might happen to be a chair says nothing of 
Chair In This Room’s intension or of a given object’s intrinsic properties. The 
“kind” Chair In This Room can be better understood as a set, grouping objects 
that happen to be chairs and happen to be in this room. 
 
Continuing with Wolterstorff’s example of the chairs in the room,50 it is easy to 
understand the concept “chair” as a complex structure within a conceptual 
system, where chair is a kind of furniture and kinds of chair include armchairs 
(with subkinds such as club chair, wingback, etc.), deckchairs, stools, and so 
on. These different kinds of chair are distinguished by their intrinsic properties, 
for example armchairs necessarily have the property “arms”, while deckchairs 
necessarily have the property “being foldable”. Indeed, one might consider 
many other examples of concrete concepts (whose instantiation is tangible) that 
can be understood in this way. Consider, for example, the concepts: car (kinds 
include 3-door, 5-door, hatchback, saloon, etc.), shoe (formal, informal, boot, 


























































48 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Works and Worlds of Art (Oxford: Clarendon-Oxford University Press, 
1980), 47. 
49 ibid. 
50  After all: ‘If anything can be pursued in an armchair, philosophy can.’ See: Timothy 
Williamson, ‘Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking’ in 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 105 (2005), pp. 1-23, 1. 
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Abstract concepts, on the other hand, are more problematic. There are not 
kinds of truth, happiness, consistency, completeness, and so on. For example, 
Susan Haack observes that, 
though there are many truths, many theories of truth, and many 
conceptions, and misconceptions, of truth, there is just one 
truth: that what it is for a claim to be true is the same, 
regardless of what the claim is about.51 
 
Similarly, there are not different kinds of symmetry; it is only the object in which 
symmetry is instantiated that may vary. Thus, there are not different groups of 
symmetry whose members are made up of distinct properties of symmetry or 
symmetric relations. Though the relation of symmetry may exist in or between52 
a number of different things, there is only one kind of symmetry, and what it is 
to be symmetrical is the same regardless of what thing or things are 
symmetrical. Concepts of this nature (including symmetry) are rife throughout 
Thagard’s coherence constraints. Like symmetry, there are not different kinds of 
contradiction, just as there are not different kinds of acceptability. Different 
objects may contradict one another in different ways, and acceptability may be 
built on a number of different reasons, but these concepts exist in only one kind, 
for any apparent variation is that of the object(s) in which the concept is 
instantiated (e.g. the propositions that contradict one another, or the proposition 
that is acceptable), not of the concept itself. 
 
Pethick argues that this is the case for the concept of coherence, too. Thus, he 
suggests that Thagard’s different kinds of coherence are not kinds at all; they 
are just different cohering objects.53 Though Thagard accepts that there are 
similarities between some kinds of coherence, he “prefers” to keep distinct kinds 
of coherence because of ‘important differences between their fundamental 
coherence relations and the associated principles.’54 Of the important difference 

























































51 Susan Haack, ‘The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth’ in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 
Vol. 32 (2008), pp. 20-35, 24 [original emphasis]. 
52 Symmetry may exist as a one- or two-place predicate, for example: “the circle is symmetric 
about the diameter” (one-place), or “points (x, y) and (-x, -y) are symmetric about the origin” 
(two-place). 
53 Pethick, (n 35), 122. 
54 Coherence, 65. 
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Deductive coherence is based on purely deductive relations 
between propositions, as for example when “All cities have 
roads” implies “Toronto has roads.” In contrast, although 
explanation may sometimes involve deduction […] it is 
fundamentally a matter of there being a causal relation between 
what is explained and the representations that do the explaining 
[…].55 
 
Yet, Pethick suggests that this passage exemplifies the methodological mistake 
that he picks out. He argues that Thagard’s commentary supports this view, 
since, 
his assessment of “deductive coherence” seems to be an 
assessment just of deduction (to italicise the point, “Deductive 
coherence is based on purely deductive relations between 
propositions”), and […] his subsequent and contrasting view of 
“explanation” drops attention to coherence altogether.56 
 
Indeed, the existence of a purely deductive relation between a set of 
propositions says nothing of any coherence relation. As in the case of the 
Wolterstorff’s supposed kind: Chair In This Room, the “property” of deduction is 
extrinsic to the notion of coherence; that coherence might happen to be 
instantiated by a set of deductively related propositions says nothing of the 
intrinsic nature of coherence. And so, these supposedly distinct “kinds” of 
coherence are better understood as distinct sets, grouping instances of 
coherence that just happen to hold deductive relations, explanatory relations, 
and so on. 
 
This mistake is intensified in the work of Amaya, who appears to adopt a 
conception of kinds that is yet broader still, adding three additional kinds to 
Thagard’s original six: interpretative, normative and factual coherence. Amaya 
suggests, for example, that “interpretative coherence”, the seventh kind of 
coherence, is much like explanatory coherence, but ‘with positive and negative 
constraints holding between interpretative (rather than factual) hypotheses and 
“normative elements”.’ 57  In other words, the only difference between 


























































56 Pethick, (n 35), 122. 
57 Justification, 314. 
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It is notable that in setting out his theories of ethical and epistemic justification, 
Thagard does not suggest that ethical and epistemic coherence form two 
additional kinds of coherence, for they involve the mere integration of the 
existing kinds. Yet, Amaya suggests that normative and factual coherence (that 
is, ethical and epistemic justification in the legal context) form new kinds of 
coherence. Unlike that of Thagard, it seems that Amaya’s account of the many 
kinds of coherence is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, Amaya appears to 
allow for the further proliferation of kinds of coherence.  
 
Indeed, it is initially unclear whether Amaya presents normative and factual 
coherence as exclusively legal kinds of coherence (i.e. to be used in and only in 
the legal context). Her original description of normative and factual coherence 
as “the kind of coherence that is relevant in law” does not preclude its being 
relevant to other, non-legal contexts too. But it soon becomes clear that Amaya 
intends factual coherence to be used solely in the legal context, leaving open 
the possibility that one might establish further kinds of factual coherence that 
would be relevant in other, non-legal, contexts (e.g. the kind of coherence 
relevant to the justification of evidentiary matters in science, or in history, and so 
on). 
 
Yet, the problem worsens as Amaya proceeds to limit the scope of factual 
coherence further still. In tailoring Thagard’s principles of explanatory 
coherence to fit the context of evidentiary judgments in law (though it seems 
that the other five kinds of coherence need no adjustment), Amaya drastically 
limits the scope of her factual coherence, as the modified Principles E4’ and 
E7’ demonstrate: 
Principle E4’: Data Priority a) Propositions that describe admissible 
evidence at trial have a degree of acceptability on their own; b) factual 
hypotheses that are compatible with innocence have a degree of 
acceptability on their own. 
Principle E7’: Acceptance The acceptability of a proposition in a system 
of propositions (i.e., a theory of the case) depends on its coherence with 
them; b) the guilt hypothesis may be accepted only if it is justified to a 


























































58 Proof, 13 [emphasis added]. 
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Factual coherence, in light of Amaya’s modification of principles E4 and E7, 
now appears solely concerned with criminal matters, as the italicised sections 
show. Indeed, her references to “innocence”, “guilt” and the “reasonable doubt 
standard” preclude any meaningful application in the context of civil legal 
adjudication, for example, where innocence plays no part and (in common-law 
systems) the standard of proof is much lower than that of reasonable doubt.  
 
Thus, Amaya’s factual coherence seems purpose-built solely for the criminal 
legal context, rather than the legal context more generally. Factual coherence, 
then, is not “the kind of coherence that is relevant to the justification of 
evidentiary judgments in law”; rather it is merely “the kind of coherence that is 
relevant to the justification of evidentiary judgments in the criminal trial”, which 
seems to be a subkind of the “the kind of coherence that is relevant to the 
justification of evidentiary judgments in law” alongside, perhaps, the kind that is 
relevant in civil adjudication. One might then imagine new, more specific 
subkinds of normative and factual coherence: “common law adversarial 
criminal-trial coherence”, “criminal appellate court due-process coherence”, and 
so on.59 
 
Pethick further contends that the conflation of the intension and extension of 
coherence, which he argues exists throughout the literature, ‘has led legal 
theorists to make substantive claims for coherence in which coherence itself is 
either superfluous in part or redundant in its entirety.’60 Addressing Amaya 
specifically, he argues that, 
the varying qualities imputed by Amaya to various kinds of 
[coherence] are (and are demonstrably) simply qualities of the 
various objects […] that are actually and expressly under 
inspection. Scattered this far out from the concept or nature of 
coherence at the beginning, the significance of coherence 
becomes increasingly difficult to perceive, particularly as, 
imperceptibly, attention to analogical coherence, perceptual 


























































59  See: Stephen Pethick, ‘Coherence: The Phantom Presence’, presented at the Artificial 
Intelligence, Coherence and Judicial Reasoning workshop at The Fourteenth International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (Rome, 10 June 2013), 11. 
60 Pethick, (n 35), 134. 
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attention to analogy, perception, […] and so on, without any 
apparent loss.61 
 
Indeed, the mistake that Pethick picks out is particularly clear in Amaya’s 
modified principles (E4’ and E7’), which, on closer inspection, are not 
concerned with coherence at all. The first, Data Priority, is concerned with 
acceptability, not coherence. Second, the principle of Acceptability describes 
the result of coherence, rather than coherence itself. The institutional 
constraints that Amaya adds are, therefore, extra-coherence considerations, to 
be had before or after (but, crucially, not during) any evaluation of the 
coherence of a proposition or set of propositions. 
 
I remarked at the outset that coherence theories are often criticised for their 
apparent inability to determine what coherence amounts to. Amaya calls this 
the “problem of vagueness” and contends that the conception of coherence as 
constraint satisfaction overcomes this problem, presenting ‘a set of clear criteria 
against which the coherence of different decision alternatives may be compared 
and evaluated.’62 
 
I have shown, however, that Amaya’s theory of optimal coherence fails to 
provide such criteria. Though Amaya’s use of constraint satisfaction may be 
said to set out clear criteria against which different explanations, analogies, etc., 
may be compared and evaluated, the relevance and significance of coherence 
in these evaluations remains unclear. In her attempts to more clearly elucidate 
the meaning of coherence, Amaya’s resort to distinct kinds of coherence, 
themselves made up of still further kinds of coherence, leads us further away 
from any clear conception of the central notion of coherence itself. In short, 
despite, or rather as a result of, its painstaking detail and specificity, Amaya’s 
conception of coherence is guilty of the very fault she claims to address: it 



























































61 ibid, 135. 
62 Justification, 318. 
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I.3 Limits of Coherence as Constraint Satisfaction 
Though generally well-received, Thagard’s conception of coherence as 
constraint satisfaction is not without its critics, the most notable of which is Jaap 
Hage. Comparing Amaya’s Thagardian coherence theory of legal justification to 
his own abstract theory of “integrated coherentism”, Hage considers a set E 
containing the following elements: 
(a) John is a thief. 
(b) John is a minor. 
(c) John is punishable. 
(d) John is not punishable.63 
 
‘There is’, Hage says, ‘a positive constraint between the elements a and c’,64 
such that grouping a and c in subset A or R provides a positive value. He takes 
this value to be 2.65 There is also, according to Hage, a negative constraint 
between elements b and c, so that the acceptance of one and rejection of the 
other provides a value of 4. Finally, he suggests that there is a negative 
constraint between a and d (with a value of 1), a positive constraint between b 
and d (valued at 2), and a ‘very strong’ negative constraint between the 
inconsistent elements c and d (valued at 1,000).66 (Hage appears to overlook 
the value of any constraints between a and b, which are presumably valued at 
0.) Therefore, the maximum weight of coherence (1,007) can be achieved by 
accepting b and d, and rejecting a and c. 
 
Hage argues that this example illustrates the drawbacks of coherence as 
constraint satisfaction. One such drawback, according to Hage, is that 
constraints are bidirectional: ‘If a supports c then c supports a (to the same 
degree)’. 67  He suggests that this is problematic because one direction of 
reasoning (“John is a thief, so he is punishable”) is more plausible than the 
other (“John is punishable, so he is a thief”). This criticism, however, is not of 

























































63 Jaap Hage, ‘Three Kinds of Coherentism’, (n 24), 26. 
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symmetrical relation. The same “problem” arises in many instances of 
coherence. Consider, for example, a coherent explanation where x, “John is 
fast”, explains y, “John won the race”. Here, just as before, one direction of 
reasoning, “John won the race because he is fast”, is more plausible than the 
other, “John is fast because he won the race”. However, the apparent problem 
that Hage identifies is mistaken, arising simply because of his failure to properly 
distinguish between coherence in one- and two-place use. The point here is 
that [x therefore y] forms an internally coherent explanation, but the internal (i.e. 
one-place) coherence found in the set [x therefore y] says nothing of the 
external (two-place) coherence between x and y more generally. That is to say, 
that [x therefore y] is a coherent explanation does not mean that the explanation 
[y therefore x] is also coherent, or that x and y cohere in all circumstances, 
though this may happen to be the case in some instances. 
 
Although Hage’s criticism of Thagard and Amaya is not in itself damaging, it 
illustrates a number of fundamental problems in Thagard’s conception of 
coherence as constraint satisfaction that have been largely overlooked. Hage’s 
example shows that (on Thagard’s account) computing coherence requires the 
allocation of a numerical value to a given constraint, allowing the mathematical 
calculation of the set’s overall coherence in order to settle upon the most 
coherent formulation of its subsets A and R; but no indication as to the basis on 
which these numerical values are determined is provided by Thagard or Hage. 
Hage’s ascription of values to constraints (and his ignorance of any potential 
constraints between a and b) seems wholly arbitrary. Indeed, as Michał 
Araszkiewicz briefly remarks: 
[…] the procedure of assignment of these weights is not 
encompassed in constraint networks: it must be at least to 
some extent predetermined (at least, the algorithm of assigning 




























































68 Araszkiewicz, (n 23), 228. Araszkiewicz comments only briefly on what he calls the “weight 
assignment problem” because he considers it to have been ‘convincingly addressed’ by Hage. 
Yet, despite unintentionally illustrating the weight assignment problem, Hage does not address 
this problem, nor does he acknowledge that this is, in fact, a problem. 
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This reveals a major problem in Thagard’s theory, for he fails to determine any 
such algorithm or measure through which to assign weights or values. This 
criticism detracts little from Amaya’s theory, who proposes an informal theory of 
coherence as constraint satisfaction, centred on “inference to the best 
explanation” rather than computational algorithms. However, Amaya’s theory is 
not immune from a second, more basic problem that Hage’s example 
(accidentally) highlights. 
 
Both Thagard and Amaya suggest, as I have explained, that epistemic and 
ethical justification or factual and normative coherence “involve” the 
“integration” of different kinds of coherence. However, Hage does not explain 
which kind or kinds of coherence are involved in his example, or how he 
integrates them to determine the value of the constraints between the different 
pairs of elements. Yet these mistakes come not (entirely) as a result of some 
oversight in Hage’s explanation, but rather from a significant problem within the 
conception of coherence as constraint satisfaction, viz. the failure by both 
Thagard and Amaya to provide any indication as to how each kind of coherence 
is involved and how the integration of those kinds takes place. 
 
This problem is deepened by the suggestion, made by both Thagard and 
Amaya, that explanatory coherence is the most important kind of coherence in 
epistemic justification and factual coherence.69 Neither Thagard nor Amaya 
offer any explanation as to how important explanatory coherence is, how this 
importance is reflected in the process of integration, or whether there exists a 
more general hierarchy of kinds. 
 
The gravity of this problem can be seen in a simple hypothetical situation. In the 
context of epistemic justification or factual coherence, if the principles of 
analogical coherence suggest that one set of propositions is more coherent 
than another, but perceptual coherence suggests the opposite, how do we 


























































69 See: Coherence, 48; Proof, 6. 
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Indeed, Amaya acknowledges that the problem of integrating the different kinds 
of coherence is a shortcoming of her theory, 70  but makes no attempt 
whatsoever to provide a solution. This is striking, for, as Amaya herself notes 
(discussing Alexy and Peczenik’s criteria of coherence71 in a footnote): 
without an account of how the different criteria may be balanced 
against each other, the theory remains in an important sense 
incomplete.72 
 
And so, in the absence of any guidance regarding the significance of different 
kinds of coherence, how they can be integrated and, therefore, how one can 
determine the coherence of a set, the conception of coherence as constraint 
satisfaction advocated by both Thagard and Amaya remains gravely unclear 
and, in an important sense, incomplete. 
 
II. Maximising Coherence 
Amaya seeks to fill a supposed gap in the literature by providing a clear account 
of the inference patterns that fact-finders may use, explaining why coherence is 
a value worth pursuing and suggesting that legal fact-finding can be understood 
in terms of “inference to the best explanation”73 (or “hypothetical induction”). As 
was explained in Chapter 3, induction is a method of reasoning by which one 
passes from one proposition or set of propositions to another proposition that is 
probably true if the former is. Inference to the best explanation is one form of 
inductive reasoning, 74  whereby ‘one infers, from the premise that a given 
hypothesis would provide a "better" explanation for the evidence than would any 




























































70 Justification, 325. 
71 See: Robert Alexy and Aleksander Peczenik, ‘The Concept of Coherence and its Significance 
for Discursive Rationality’ in Ratio Juris, Vol. 3 (1990), pp. 130-147. 
72 Justification, 311 fn8. 
73 Proof, 16. 
74 The other, enumerative induction, involves the inference of a generalisation from evidence 
about instances of that generalisation. For example, I might infer that since all the dogs I’ve 
observed bark at strangers, all dogs probably bark at strangers. 
75 Gilbert H. Harman, ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’ in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 
74, No. 1 (1965), pp. 88-95, 89. 
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II.1 Inference to the Most Coherent Explanation 
Amaya explains that the process of inference to the best explanation consists of 
three main stages: generation, where a shortlist of hypotheses is presented; a 
context of pursuit, in which the shortlist ‘is subjected to a preliminary 
assessment and developed in further detail’; and selection, where the “best” 
hypothesis is ‘accepted as justified’.76 She suggests that coherence is crucial in 
all three stages of this process. First, Amaya argues that ‘coherence with 
background knowledge helps legal fact-finders narrow down the range of 
plausible candidates’ when generating the shortlist of hypotheses.77 Second, 
each candidate is preliminarily assessed and developed (through the 
subtraction, addition or reinterpretation of beliefs) to enhance its coherence.78 
Third, fact-finders select the candidate that is ‘best on a test of coherence’.79 
 
Yet, in ‘Coherence, Evidence, and Legal Proof’, Amaya offers no explanation as 
to why coherence is important in any, let alone all, of these stages. Indeed, she 
does not explain why fact-finders ought to limit the range of plausible 
candidates to those that cohere with background beliefs rather than, say, those 
that are merely consistent with background beliefs, or those that are internally 
coherent, or simple, and so on. Moreover, the preliminary assessment and 
development of each candidate’s coherence seems to exist only because the 
third stage involves the selection of the most coherent explanation; but, again, 
Amaya provides no argument (beyond some brief introductory remarks) as to 
why fact-finders ought to seek coherence rather than, say, consistency, 
simplicity, probability or comedic value. In her earlier work,80 Amaya provides a 
number of arguments to suggest that coherence is worth pursuing in legal 
reasoning. However, these arguments, which I will now examine, provide little 




























































76 Proof, 15. 
77 ibid. 
78 ibid. 
79 Proof, 16. 
80 See: Justification; and, Ten Theses. 
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II.2 Why Coherence? 
Amaya has described her defence of the value of coherence in legal reasoning 
in terms of ‘three kinds of reasons’:81 constitutive, practical and epistemic, 
though arguments falling under the first two headings can be quickly 
disregarded for present purposes. 
 
First, Amaya suggests that ‘[c]oherence is constitutive of individual and political 
identity.’82 She argues that a degree of coherence is necessary in individual and 
collective deliberation about the ‘values and objectives’ relevant to a particular 
case in order to be a ‘unified agent and part of a distinctive political 
community.’ 83  Yet, this argument concerns the role of coherence in the 
justification of decisions about questions of law, not fact. 
 
Second, Amaya suggests that coherence is of practical value to legal 
reasoning. Drawing on the work of a number of legal theorists, she argues that 
coherence facilitates coordination and promotes effectiveness, legal certainty 
and social stability, ‘which are surely fundamental values in the legal context.’84 
Notwithstanding potential arguments as to the ability of coherence to promote 
these values and whether they really are fundamental values in law, Amaya’s 
arguments here are, once again, directed to the value of coherence when 
making decisions about law, not findings of fact. 
 
Third, Amaya presents two epistemic arguments for the value of coherence in 
law. These arguments are pertinent to the present investigation. Amaya 
observes that coherence theories across a number of domains have been 
unable to present a conclusive argument that coherence is truth-conducive. 
However, she argues that this does not render the prospects of such an 
argument ‘doomed to failure’,85 for, indeed, there exist a number of strategies 


























































81 Ten Theses, 257. 
82 Ten Theses, 259; Justification, 322. 
83 Ten Theses, 259. 
84 Justification, 322. See also: Ten Theses, 259. 
85 Ten Theses, 258. See also: Justification, 321. 
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correspondence. 86  ‘These strategies’, Amaya suggests, ‘provide a useful 
starting point for mounting an argument to the effect that accepting factual 
propositions in law by virtue of their coherence is likely to advance the goal of 
truth.’87 
 
However, Amaya mounts no such argument beyond the bare assertion that 
‘there are good reasons for supporting the desirability of coherence methods 
from the perspective of advancing the goal of truth in law.’88 Despite these 
“good reasons”, whatever they may be, Amaya accepts that the argument that 
coherence is truth-conducive is not compelling. She contends that this does not, 
however, significantly undermine the value of coherence in the process of legal 
proof, for, 
although truth-conduciveness is, to be sure, a crucial standard 
for assessing the adequacy of a theory of justification, other 
criteria are also relevant.89 
 
These criteria, she suggests, include fairness, the protection of family relations, 
privacy, due process and conflict resolution.90 However, Amaya appears to 
unreasonably downplay the importance of truth in her theory of epistemic 
justification. Indeed, as she notes earlier in the same paper: 
the constraint-satisfaction approach to coherence aims to be a 
theory of “epistemic” justification. The distinctive feature of 
epistemic justification, as opposed to other kinds of justification, 
is its essential connection with truth. […] Thus the constraint-
satisfaction approach to the epistemic justification of evidentiary 
judgments in law is meant to provide an account of truth-
conducive criteria […].91 
 
As Amaya observes, a theory of epistemic justification must be truth-conducive; 
yet, she presents a theory of epistemic justification in which truth-


























































86 As well as BonJour’s coherentism considered in Chapter 2, see, for example: Keith Lehrer, 
Theory of Knowledge (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2nd edn, 2000). 
87 Justification, 321. 
88 ibid. 
89 Proof, 38. 
90 Proof, 39. 
91 Proof, 13 fn29 [emphasis added]. 
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Nonetheless, Amaya highlights that coherentist theories of justification, to their 
credit, encounter fewer difficulties than their main competitor, foundationalism:92 
After all, foundationalism […] has not succeeded either in 
conclusively refuting the skeptical hypotheses.93 
 
Thus, Amaya’s first epistemic argument is that coherence ought to be sought 
because it is at least as truth-conducive as (that is, it isn’t any worse than) the 
main alternative – foundationalism. In other words, Amaya contends that 
coherence is the best of the lot, albeit a pretty bad lot. 
 
Amaya’s second epistemic argument comes from her view that legal philosophy 
must be “naturalised”.94 Methodological naturalism, broadly speaking, is the 
doctrine derived from the view of Willard Van Orman Quine that philosophy is 
not prior to science, but rather that philosophy must be continuous with the 
empirical sciences, acting as ‘a wing of science where aspects of method are 
examined more deeply or in a wider perspective than elsewhere’ and ‘where the 
objectives of a science receive more than average scrutiny’.95 And so, Quine 
suggests, for example, that ‘[e]pistemology, or something like it, simply falls into 
place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science.’ 96  Few 
contemporary philosophers have gone so far as to fully adopt Quine’s stance, 
but his influence has been widespread,97 leading Brian Leiter to suggest that 
the so-called “naturalistic turn” has been ‘the distinctive development in 
philosophy’ since the late twentieth century.98 Many, including Amaya, promote 

























































92 Justification, 320; Ten Theses, 258. 
93 Ten Theses, 258. 
94 ibid, 263. 
95 W.V. Quine, ‘Philosophical Progress in Language Theory’ in Metaphilosophy, Vol. 1, No. 1 
(1970), pp. 2-19, 2. See, for example: W.V. Quine, ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’ in his 
Theories and Things (Cambridge, MA: Belknap-Harvard University Press, 1981). 
96 W.V. Quine, ‘Epistemology Naturalized’ in his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New 
York: Colombia University Press, 1969), 82. 
97 For an overview of the post-Quine naturalistic approach, see, for example: Philip Kitcher, ‘The 
Naturalists Return’ in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 1 (1992), pp. 53-114; and, Hilary 
Kornblith, ‘Naturalized Epistemology’ in Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup 
(eds), A Companion to Epistemology (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2nd edn, 2010). For the 
argument that jurisprudence ought to be naturalised, see: Brian Leiter, Naturalizing 
Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). 
98 Brian Leiter, ‘Naturalism and Naturalized Jurisprudence’ in Brian Bix (ed), Analyzing Law: 
New Essays in Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon-Oxford University Press, 1998), 79 [original 
emphasis]. 
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or justified by the result of the sciences’.99 And so, on the basis that a number of 
empirical studies suggest that coherence already plays a central role decision-
making, Amaya argues that, 
a coherentist theory of justification, insofar as it builds upon 
ordinary reasoning processes, is well placed to advance the 
project of ameliorating the legal practice, which is [...] a central 
one in legal theory.100 
 
Indeed, psychological research by Dan Simon and others shows that jurors 
appear to utilise coherence-based reasoning,101 while experiments by Nancy 
Pennington and Reid Hastie suggest that jurors determine which story of the 
case is best by reference to coverage, coherence and, to a lesser extent, 
uniqueness.102 However, what “coherence” amounts is unclear in the work of 
Simon, while Pennington and Hastie take “coherence” to express three 
components: consistency (i.e. freedom from internal contradiction), plausibility 
(correspondence to background knowledge) and completeness. 103  Such a 
conception of coherence bears little resemblance to Amaya’s account of factual 
coherence, as outlined above. How, then, can it be said that Amaya’s account 
‘builds upon ordinary reasoning processes’? The psychological studies do not 
suggest that jurors’ reasoning involves the integration of six kinds of coherence 
understood as constraint satisfaction. Moreover, Pennington and Hastie’s study, 
for example, shows that jurors also make decisions based on completeness 
and uniqueness,104 but Amaya does not suggest that fact-finders ought to seek 
completeness and uniqueness, too. 
 
Yet, the problems for Amaya’s argument are more basic still. A common 

























































99  ibid, 82. For examples of this strain of naturalism in epistemology and ethics, see 
(respectively): Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1986); Michael Slote, ‘Ethics Naturalized’ in Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 6, Ethics 
(1992), pp. 355-376. 
100 Ten Theses, 263. See also: Justification, 321-322. 
101 Dan Simon, ‘A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making’ 
in The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 71 (2004), pp. 511-586 
102 Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, ‘The Story Model for Juror Decision Making’ in Reid 
Hastie (ed), Inside the Juror: The Psychology of Decision Making (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 198. 
103 ibid, 198-199. 
104 ibid, 217. Completeness seems to feature as both a part of coherence and a factor in its own 
right. 
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leads to the provision of merely descriptive accounts of what people do, failing 
to account for philosophy’s normative role. This criticism is particularly pertinent 
in the context of epistemology, for, as Henri Lauener observes, 
the epistemological task is not to explain (psychologically) our 
confidence in particular scientific methods, but to evaluate or to 
assess them, which is a typically normative activity not captured 
within natural science.105 
 
In the present case, the observation that coherence does play a role in legal 
decision-making provides no reason to suggest that it ought to play a role in 
legal decision-making and, therefore, that a normative theory of legal reasoning 
should give an account of that role. Though Amaya anticipates that she may be 
accused of committing this “naturalistic fallacy”, 106  she fails to provide a 
convincing response, arguing that there is a particularly strong case for 
naturalism in the context of legal theory, for the following reason: 
The main objective of theories of legal reasoning is to 
ameliorate the legal practice. […] Now, if this is so, then, even 
though the theory of legal reasoning should involve a great deal 
of idealization, given its normative character, it is important that 
it does not idealize away of our cognitive capacities so much as 
to make it ill-suited to guide and regulate legal practice. The 
naturalist principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ constrains the kinds 
of theories of legal reasoning that one should aim at 
developing.107 
 
Yet, Amaya fails to observe a clear distinction between what fact-finders can do 
and what they actually do. The strength of Amaya’s argument here lies in her 
claim that legal theorists must avoid the over-idealisation of normative theories. 
After all, we are all limited by our cognitive capacities, and so a normative 
theory that expects any (human) fact-finder, for example, to work beyond her 
cognitive capacity will be, as Amaya observes, ill-suited to guide practice. This 

























































105 Henri Lauener, ‘Holism and Naturalized Epistemology Confronted with the Problem of Truth’ 
in Robert B. Barrett and Roger F. Gibson (eds), Perspectives on Quine (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1990), 215 [original emphasis]. Quine responds that ‘[t]he normative is naturalized, not 
dropped.’ He argues that the normative principle of naturalised epistemology is empiricism, for 
natural science tells us that all of our information about the world is sensory, advising us to 
‘mistrust soothsayers and telepathists’; see: W.V. Quine, ‘Comment on Lauener’ in the same 
volume, 229. 
106 Ten Theses, 262. 
107 ibid, 263. 
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what people can do; to do otherwise would remove any practical usefulness 
from those theories. It does not mean, however, that a normative theory must 
follow from what people actually do. “Ought” implies “can”, not “does”. Though 
there is good reason to limit normative theory to that which people can do, there 
is no reason to limit it to what people already do. And so, in the absence of any 
conclusive arguments as to its epistemic value, we are left with little reason to 
consider the “best” explanation that which is most coherent. 
 
II.3 The Process of Coherence Maximisation 
Notwithstanding the above, having established the three stages of coherence 
maximisation (generation, a context of pursuit and selection) outlined above, 
Amaya explains that the process of coherence maximisation in legal fact-finding 
consists of the following five stages: 
(i) The specification of a base of coherence, that is, the set of factual 
hypotheses and relevant evidence over which the coherence calculation 
proceeds; 
(ii) The construction of a contrast set that contains a number of alternative 
theories of the case from which the most coherent one is to be selected; 
(iii) The pursuit of the alternative theories of the case by means of a number 
of coherence-making mechanisms; 
(iv) The evaluation [of] the coherence of the alternative theories of the case 
against the criteria of coherence that have been stated above; 
(v) The selection as justified of the most coherent of the alternative theories 
of the case, that is, the theory of the case that best satisfies the criteria of 
factual coherence.108 
 
Applying these five stages, Amaya uses the well-known criminal case of R v 
Cannings109 to illustrate how this process can be used in legal fact-finding.110 It 


























































108 Proof, 16. 
109 R v Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 1 (“Cannings” hereinafter). The facts are set out in the 
judgment of Judge LJ, [1]-[5]. 
110 Proof, 7-9. Amaya’s use of a criminal case provides further support for the view expressed 
above that her theory is intended primarily, if not exclusively, for use within the context of the 
criminal trial. 
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Mrs Angela Cannings had four children, three of which died in infancy while in 
the sole care of their mother. At least two of the children, including the fourth 
child, who survived, suffered an "Acute/Apparent Life Threatening Event" 
(ALTE)111 while in the sole care of Mrs Cannings. In 2002, she was tried on two 
counts of murder at Winchester Crown Court (the third did not proceed). The 
prosecution argued that Mrs Cannings had smothered her children, intending to 
kill or cause serious bodily harm, suggesting that the three deaths formed a 
pattern;112  the defence contended that these incidents were natural, to be 
classed as “cot death” (Sudden Infant Death Syndrome). Though Mrs Cannings 
was considered a loving mother and there was no evidence of her having any 
personality or psychiatric disorder, it was observed that apparently loving 
parents do sometimes kill their children.113  
 
Mrs Cannings was found guilty of murder on both counts. However, her 
convictions were quashed on appeal, in light of new evidence regarding Mrs 
Cannings’ unknown half-sister. Evidence was presented that two of her half-
sister’s three children also suffered ALTEs,114 giving rise to the possibility that 
the deaths of Mrs Cannings’ children were caused by a genetic defect, not her 
actions. 
 
Thus, according to Amaya, the legal fact-finder must begin the process of 
coherence maximisation in Cannings by specifying a base of coherence. They 
might consider, for example, the following theories and evidence:  
H1 Angela Cannings killed her babies. 
H2 The babies’ deaths were natural. 
H3 Someone else killed the babies. 
H4 Angela Cannings was a loving mother. 


























































111 Cannings, [2]. 
112 This “pattern” of deaths is closely analogous to the case of R v Smith used in MacCormick’s 
account of narrative coherence, discussed in Chapter 3, above. See: Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric 
and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 224 fn 11; 
and, Chapter 3, n 128. 
113 Cannings, [25]. 
114 ibid, [34]. 
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And so on.115 
 
As Amaya explains, the fact-finder must then construct a contrast set of theories 
of the case,116 determining the relations of coherence and incoherence between 
the evidence and hypotheses.117 In the absence of any evidence that someone 
other than Mrs Cannings killed the children, the fact-finder might establish the 
following hypotheses: 
H6 Angela Cannings killed her babies (the “Cannings did it” or “guilt” theory). 
H7 The babies’ deaths were natural (the “natural deaths” theory).118 
 
The “Cannings did it” theory ‘coheres with expert evidence as to the rarity of 
three infant deaths in one family’,119 while the “natural deaths” theory coheres 
with the hypothesis that there is a genetic defect in the Cannings family.120 
 
Then, after developing the hypotheses and “ironing out” possible 
inconsistencies by adding to, subtracting from or reinterpreting the theories,121 
the fact-finder ‘assesses the coherence of the alternative theories of the case 
by examining the extent to which they satisfy the coherence constraints.’122 
Amaya explains, first, that the fact-finder will ‘consider whether the guilt theory 
explains the evidence at trial or whether, to the contrary, the natural-deaths 
theory better explains the evidence available.’123 Second, she explains that the 
fact-finder ‘will also consider which of the theories is simpler and examine 
whether they fit with background knowledge about analogous cases.’124 Amaya 
concludes: ‘The outcome of this evaluation is to arrive at comparative 


























































115 Proof, 16. 
116 Proof, 16-17. 
117 Proof, 17. 




122 Proof, 18. 
123 ibid. It is noteworthy that ‘the guilt theory explains the evidence’ and ‘the natural-deaths 
theory better explains the evidence’ are not, as Amaya suggests, contradictory statements. 
124 ibid. 
125 ibid. 
Chapter 4: Amaya’s Theory of Optimal Coherence 
   
	
   100 
Thus, despite insisting on the inclusion of all six kinds of coherence in “factual 
coherence”, Amaya focuses solely on (her altered version of) explanatory 
coherence. In particular, she focuses on simplicity and analogy, found in 
principles E2 and E3: 
Principle E2: Explanation (a) A hypothesis coheres with what it explains, 
which can be either evidence or another hypothesis. (b) Hypotheses that 
together explain some other proposition cohere with each other. (c) the 
more hypotheses it takes to explain something, the lower the degree of 
coherence. 
Principle E3: Analogy Similar hypotheses that explain similar pieces of 
evidence cohere [emphasis added]. 
 
This observation supports the view, expressed above, that “factual coherence”, 
far from being a discrete kind of coherence, is no more than the application of 
explanatory coherence in the legal context, and illustrates the vagueness 
surrounding how different kinds of coherence are involved and integrated in the 
process of justification.126 
 
At the final stage, Amaya explains, ‘the most coherent theory of the case is 
selected, provided that its degree of justification (on this account, its degree of 
coherence) is high enough to satisfy the applicable standard of proof.’127 Thus, 
Amaya contends that the “Cannings did it” theory is not justified because ‘there 
was a reasonable possibility that the deaths were natural’, the evidence that 
Mrs Cannings was a loving mother is best explained by the “natural-deaths” 
theory, and the introduction of new evidence regarding Mrs Cannings’ half-
sister increased the overall factual coherence of the “natural-deaths” theory.128 
Yet, this conclusion runs contrary to any assessment of coherence on Amaya’s 
own account. Though there was a possibility that the deaths were natural, the 
overwhelming majority of analogous cases supports the “Cannings did it” 
theory, or at least stand against the “natural-deaths” theory; while the “natural-
deaths” theory is plainly less simple than the “Cannings did it” theory, relying on 


























































126 See: Section I. 
127 Proof, 18. 
128 ibid. 
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fact, the “Cannings did it” theory is the most coherent explanation, and its 
rejection rests squarely on extra-coherent institutional constraints. 
 
II.4 Choosing the Most Coherent Explanation 
In Chapter 3, I suggested that the non-demonstrative nature of inductive 
reasoning is potentially problematic, since it may be possible in some cases to 
draw a number of different inferences from a proposition or set of propositions. 
If it is to be an adequate theory of evidentiary justification, Amaya’s account 
must offer a solution to this problem, which Harman calls the basic riddle of 
induction, by explaining how fact-finders ought to choose which explanatory 
hypothesis should be accepted as true where two or more coherent 
explanations are available. Relying on the intuitive assumption that coherence 
is a matter of degree, her account of inference to the best explanation responds 
by suggesting that one ought to choose the explanation which is the most 
coherent. However, where coherence is understood in terms of constraint 
satisfaction, Amaya’s resort to the extent to which a hypothesis is coherent can 
be interpreted in two quite different ways, both of which prove untenable. 
 
On the first interpretation, Amaya may mean that a hypothesis is more coherent 
where more of the coherence constraints are satisfied. For example, one might 
say that a set of propositions A is more coherent than another set B because A 
fulfils a wide range of constraints making it explanatorily, analogically and 
deductively coherent, while B is only explanatorily coherent. However, Amaya’s 
approach, thus understood, is problematic, for if coherence is to be determined 
by the number of constraints fulfilled, one must first determine which constraints 
are necessary and sufficient for coherence. Indeed, a set of propositions that 
merely satisfies one criterion of factual coherence (say, non-contradiction (E5)) 
cannot surely be considered coherent (it is merely non-contradictory). 
 
A further problem arises where some kinds of coherence are considered more 
important than others, as both Thagard and Amaya suggest. 129  Thus 

























































129 Both describe explanatory coherence as the most important kind of coherence in epistemic 
justification or factual coherence. See: Coherence, 48; and, Proof, 6. 
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constraints, demonstrating the importance afforded to each kind. Indeed, if this 
is the case, it may mean that a set of propositions B may be more coherent than 
A because it fulfils more important constraints than A, despite fulfilling fewer 
constraints. Amaya provides no indication as to how many constraints must be 
satisfied to allow coherence or the extent to which some constraints are more 
important than others. 
 
A second reading is that coherence and its constituent constraints can be 
satisfied to a degree, that is, that coherence is a relative concept.130 It may be 
that the set of propositions A is more explanatorily coherent than another set B 
because A fulfils the relevant constraints to a higher degree than B does. This 
second interpretation appears the most plausible, as Amaya speaks explicitly of 
the most coherent theory being that which ‘best satisfies the criteria for factual 
coherence’,131 rather than that which satisfies most of the criteria. In contrast to 
my argument in Chapter 2, this approach assumes that coherence exists as a 
matter of degree. Yet, a reassessment of Thagard’s coherence constraints 
reveals that the concepts “involved” in his conception of coherence (rather than 
acceptability), such as symmetry and consistency, are absolute concepts, that 
is, they simply are or are not. Thus, even on Thagard’s account, coherence 
remains an absolute concept. 
 
Amaya attempts to shrug off the claim that coherence theories of justification 
are incapable of adjudicating between two or more equally coherent systems, 
explanations, etc.132 She contends that this objection is ‘not a major one’,133 
since the possibility of there existing two, equally coherent, contradictory 
hypotheses is too remote to pose a serious problem.134  However, if, as I 
suggest, coherence cannot exist as a matter of degree, the problem of 



























































130 See: Chapter 2, section VI.1. 
131 Proof, 17 [emphasis added]. 
132 Proof, 37. 
133 ibid. 
134 ibid. 
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Amaya asserts that, where coherence-ties do exist, legal institutional 
constraints (e.g. the presumption of innocence in criminal trials) act as a 
tiebreaker.135 Thus, outside of the legal context, it seems that coherentism 
offers no response. Within the legal context, Amaya’s retort hugely reduces the 
role of coherence in criminal trials, where a fact-finder that considers two or 
more coherent hypotheses must rely solely on institutional constraints to 
choose which one to accept as true. Indeed, in such cases coherence appears 
to provide little more than a preliminary test, dramatically reducing the role of 
coherence in Amaya’s coherentist theory of justification. More problematically, 
on Amaya’s account, fact-finders may have no grounds to make a decision in 
common-law civil cases, where institutional constraints (e.g. the balance of 
probabilities standard of proof and the absence of a presumption of innocence) 
are unlikely to lean in favour of either party. 
 
III. Epistemic Responsibility in Like Circumstances 
Amaya observes two further problems that may exist in the process of 
coherence maximisation that I have not yet explored. The first problem 
concerns the “base” of coherence, that is, ‘the set of factual hypotheses and 
relevant evidence over which the coherence calculation proceeds.’ 136 Amaya 
explains that the base of coherence may be problematised where, 
the input to coherence-based reasoning, that is the set of 
relevant evidence and hypotheses over which the calculation of 
coherence proceeds, is the result of defective inquiry.137 
 
Understandably, if the base of coherence is defective, the process of coherence 
maximisation is flawed from the outset. Amaya explains that if fact-finders fail to 
properly determine the set of hypotheses and evidence where, for example, 
they ignore relevant evidence, are biased, lack imagination, etc., their eventual 
selection of the best theory as justified will be unjustified, for it will be no more 
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137 Proof, 19. 
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Second, problems may arise where the fact-finder performs the coherence 
calculation defectively.139 The coherence calculation is the penultimate stage in 
the process of coherence maximisation, in which fact-finders evaluate the 
coherence of the competing theories within the base before, finally, accepting 
that which is most coherent as justified. Where this calculation is defective, it 
may be the case that a theory appears to satisfy the criteria of coherence, but 
only because the quality of its evaluation is deficient. Using the Cannings case 
in illustration, Amaya explains that this may occur where, for example, a biased 
fact-finder manipulates, restructures or misrepresents the evidence to support 
his own preferred view,140 making his eventual decision unjustified. 
 
Amaya claims that to overcome these problems, a coherence theory of 
justification ‘needs to be supplemented with a responsibility constraint’,141 such 
that ‘the justification of evidentiary judgments in law is a matter of coherence 
provided that the standards of epistemic responsibility are properly 
respected.’142 
 
Amaya proposes an “irenic” approach that combines both the deontic and 
aretaic accounts of epistemic responsibility, requiring both the fulfilment of 
epistemic duties and the exercise of intellectual virtues.143 She explains that 
legal fact-finders have a number of duties, including, but not limited to: a duty to 
believe only that which is supported by evidence; to gather additional evidence 
where the existing evidence is insufficient; to actively search for alternative 
theories of the case; and, more generally, to increase their chances of finding 
truth. 144  Moreover, the responsible legal fact-finding displays a number of 
intellectual virtues, such as: thoroughness; sensitivity to detail; an ability to 

























































139 Proof, 20. 
140 ibid. My examination of Amaya’s analysis of Cannings (at II.3, above) suggests that she may 
have made this very mistake. 
141 Proof, 22. 
142 Proof, 24. 
143 ibid. For a brief overview of virtue epistemology, see: John Greco, ‘Virtues in Epistemology’ 
in Paul K. Moser (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002); and, Jonathan L. Kvanvig, ‘Virtue Epistemology’ in Sven Bernecker and Duncan 
Pritchard (eds), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (Oxford: Routledge, 2011). 
144 Proof, 26. 
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held beliefs; an ability to recognise reliable authorities; open-mindedness; 
impartiality; self-criticism; sobriety; and, intellectual autonomy and humility.145 
 
This illustrative, though not exhaustive,146 list of epistemic duties and virtues 
demonstrates that reaching an epistemically responsible decision in legal fact-
finding is certainly a tall order; it seems ‘[c]oherence (and, therefore, 
justification) does not come for free, it is something that has to be earned.’147 
 
At first glance, Amaya’s responsibility-supplement appears capable of 
overcoming the potential problems she identifies. Intellectual virtues such as 
perseverance, diligence, open-mindedness and impartiality alongside the duty 
to believe only that which is supported by evidence encourage fact-finders to 
move beyond prejudices, to be imaginative, and so on, so that they might avoid 
constructing a “bad lot”. Meanwhile virtues like impartiality and self-criticism 
work alongside duties, like that to base beliefs on sufficient evidence, in order to 
prevent the improper manipulation of the coherence calculation. If this 
responsibility-supplement is to meet its potential, however, Amaya’s account 
must first answer a number of questions. 
 
First, Amaya must be able to show that the duties and virtues she identifies are, 
in fact, worth pursuing in the context of legal fact-finding. Second, if her 
responsibility-supplement is to provide a useful response to problems with the 
base of coherence, it must specify the point at which a “bad lot” becomes a 
“good lot”. That is, the fact-finder must be able to determine the point at which 
he has done enough to continue on the path to justification. Third, if Amaya’s 
supplement is to prevent the miscalculation of coherence, responsibilities such 
as the duty to gather additional evidence where the existing evidence is 
insufficient require much greater clarification. Indeed, without some guidance as 
to how much evidence is sufficient to justify a belief, the duty imposed on the 
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At present, Amaya fails to answer the first of these questions, providing no 
justification for the selection of these values, nor any indication as to how long 
the full list of duties and virtues might be. With regard to the second and third 
questions for her responsibilist approach, Amaya suggests the answer can be 
found in the final component of her “optimal coherence”: context. 
 
III.1 Contextualising Coherentism 
Amaya suggests that ‘the severity of the standards of justification […] shifts with 
context’,148 avoiding appeal to the psychologically implausible holism which, she 
suggests, troubles much of the coherentist literature.149 She contends that the 
degree of coherence, number of alternatives and domain of coherence150 
required for justification vary according to a number of contextual factors, such 
as: the stakes (i.e. the cost of being wrong); the role of the decision-maker (e.g. 
police, trial judge, juror, etc.); the goals of enquiry (truth, natural justice, etc.); 
and the resources available.151 
 
Thus, Amaya contends that the number of alternative theories required, in 
forming the base of coherence, for a “bad lot” to become a “good lot” is 
determined by contextual factors. For example, in a criminal trial, the stakes are 
typically higher than in civil proceedings. A wrong decision in criminal 
proceedings may mean fining, imprisoning or even, in some jurisdictions, 
executing an innocent person; or, on the contrary, that a criminal goes 
unpunished. The stakes are high and, therefore, so too are the standards of 
justification – the fact-finders beliefs must strongly cohere, and few alternative 
explanations can be left unexplored.152 Indeed, the standard of justification will 
become clearer still once we consider further contextual factors, such as time 
constraints and any limitations on resources. 
 
Similarly, when calculating coherence, fact-finders can determine just how 

























































148 Proof, 28. 
149 Justification, 311. 
150 That is, the breadth of the domain within which coherence ought to be sought. 
151 See: Proof, 28-31. 
152 Proof, 29. 
Chapter 4: Amaya’s Theory of Optimal Coherence 
   
	
   107 
which that belief formed. Where, for example, the stakes are higher, the 
resources are better and/or the fact-finder’s role is more senior, the necessary 
amount of evidence increases accordingly. 
 
Yet, these brief and sketchy remarks provide little support to specific legal fact-
finders in specific cases. Indeed, though it is plain that Amaya expects legal 
fact-finders to perform to a higher level in, say, criminal trials than in civil 
proceedings, this comparative tool is only useful where one begins from a clear 
starting-point and understands the impact that certain changes in context will 
have on the standards of justification required. However, Amaya’s provides no 
such guidance. Fact-finders are told that the standards of justification are higher 
in criminal proceedings than in civil proceedings, but they are given no 
indication as to what standards are required in either criminal or civil 
proceedings in the first place. For this reason, Amaya’s responsibility-
supplement is simply too vague to fulfil its purpose and, in the end, fact-finders 
are left to determine for themselves what the stakes are, what their goal is, what 
resources they are to make use of and how these factors affect what is 
expected of them. 
 
More troubling for Amaya, her account of epistemic responsibility is at odds with 
her naturalistic defence of the value of coherence, discussed above. There, 
Amaya warned against the over-idealisation of normative theory; yet, here, 
Amaya ‘assumes a more active view of jurors than the one that is currently in 
place in most jury systems’,153 requiring that legal fact-finders fulfil a seemingly 
unreachable number of duties and display an immeasurable number of 
exceptional intellectual virtues. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
In an attempt to overcome or at least diminish a number of problems facing 
coherence theory in law, Amalia Amaya presents a theory of “optimal 
coherence”, adopting Paul Thagard’s conception of coherence as constraint 
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is justified in making an inference to the most factually coherent explanation, 
acting in accordance with the duties and intellectual virtues dictated by the 
context, where factual coherence is understood as involving the integrated 
assessment of six distinct kinds of coherence. However, the analysis presented 
here shows that her account of legal fact-finding fails to overcome many of the 
problems she identifies for a number of reasons. 
 
First, I have argued that Amaya’s Thagardian conception of coherence as 
constraint satisfaction is problematic, leading to an infinite proliferation of “kinds” 
of coherence without providing any indication as to what coherence itself 
amounts to or how the different kinds and constraints it contains can be 
integrated. Second, the examination presented here has also shown that 
Amaya’s account of legal fact-finding as inference to the most coherent is also 
inadequate, failing to overcome Gilbert Harman’s basic riddle of induction and 
providing no convincing argument to the effect that coherence ought to play a 
role in legal fact-finding. Finally, I have suggested that while Amaya’s 
responsibilist approach could go some way to diminishing potential problems in 
the process of inference, she fails to provide a clear and detailed account of 
what is expected of fact-finders in real-life cases. 
 
Interestingly, Amaya has acknowledged that her theory of “optimal coherence” 
faces many of these difficulties.154 Yet, far from presenting minor hurdles to the 
success of “optimal coherence” or mere avenues for further research, these 
difficulties present major problems in Amaya’s theory, undermining its 
usefulness in the process of legal proof. For in the absence of any sufficient 
reason as to why coherence ought to be pursued in legal fact-finding, and 
without any clear account of how coherence ought to be invoked, Amaya’s 



































































In this thesis I have examined the concept of coherence and its role in the 
process of legal proof. The concept of coherence plays a particularly significant 
role in contemporary thought and, together with its popularity in some of the 
central areas of philosophy, a number of legal philosophers have found 
themselves drawn towards this concept that often seems to promise so much, 
but proves so difficult to truly grasp. Among the many claims that have been 
made for the desirability, or even requirement, of coherence in law and legal 
reasoning, some have argued that coherence provides the solution to a 
longstanding theoretical problem in legal evidence: the problem of proof. This 
problem concerns the difficulty in establishing a justifiable basis on which legal 
fact-finders might come to select one theory of a case, among competing 
theories, as the true (or most probably true) account of unperceived past 
events. 
 
I. The Current State of the Coherence Theory 
 in the Process of Legal Proof 
Despite its focus in law, my investigation began in epistemology, where the 
notion of coherence is widely believed to provide the answer to the problem of 
justified belief in the ongoing race to establish an adequate theory of 
knowledge. In Chapter 2, I considered Laurence BonJour’s The Structure of 
Empirical Knowledge, one of the most significant works in contemporary 
epistemology, in which he sets out the plan for a coherence theory of epistemic 
justification. 
 
The analysis presented in that chapter highlighted a number of conceptual and 
epistemological problems for BonJour’s theory which are common among 
coherence theories of justification. Drawing on recent research by Stephen 
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Pethick, I argued, first, that BonJour’s conception of coherence commits a basic 
conceptual error by conflating the intension of coherence with its extension, 
leading to the mistaken belief that “coherence” is somehow tied to belief 
systems.1 Second, I suggested that BonJour’s account proves incapable of 
providing a suitable method by which one might choose non-arbitrarily between 
alternative coherent sets of beliefs about unobservable facts. 2  Third, I 
demonstrated that BonJour fails to show the connection between coherence 
and truth that epistemic justification demands and that, fourth, his attempt to do 
so reveals a further mistake in his claim that coherence exists as a matter of 
degree.3 
 
In so doing, I have presented a number of conceptual claims which have 
ramifications far beyond the context of the present investigation, contributing to 
current discussions about the nature and usefulness of coherence more 
generally. Most significantly, I have asserted that the “elusive” notion of 
coherence is best understood as simply “fitting together”4 and argued, contrary 
to much of the extensive literature, that coherence does not exist as a matter of 
degree, but rather that some thing or set of things is either coherent simpliciter, 
or it is not coherent.5 
 
In Chapters 3 and 4 I turned from epistemology to legal proof and the writings of 
Neil MacCormick and Amalia Amaya, respectively, which exemplify much of the 
coherentist literature in law, ranging from its origins through to the present day. 
The in-depth analysis undertaken in these chapters reveals that the theories of 
both MacCormick and Amaya fall victim to variants of the very same problems 
highlighted in Chapter 2. 
 
In Chapter 3, I have shown that MacCormick’s requirement of narrative 
coherence, that is, of belonging within a single rational scheme of explanation, 

























































1 See: Chapter 2, section II. 
2 See: Chapter 2, section V. 
3 See: Chapter 2, section VI. 
4 See: Chapter 2, section II.3. 
5 See: Chapter 2, section VI.1.	
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committing the conceptual mistakes outlined above, MacCormick’s theory of 
narrative coherence proves too weak a test to provide the epistemic justification 
he appears to intend it to, failing to provide adequate evidence that adherence 
to its standards leads to the acceptance of true propositions. Understood as a 
means of prudential justification, MacCormick’s narrative coherence remains 
problematic, failing to provide any basis on which to distinguish between 
competing narratively coherent hypotheses and leading to the “cynical” view 
that law has nothing to with truth. 
 
In Chapter 4, I have demonstrated that Amaya’s theory of optimal coherence, 
built on a Thagardian conception of coherence as constraint satisfaction, is 
equally problematic. Her unsupported reliance on detailed “kinds” of coherence 
(made up of further kinds of coherence) leads Amaya to describe some of the 
many circumstances in which coherence can be found, whilst failing to establish 
a clear account of the notion itself or, indeed, how these many kinds of 
coherence are intended to come together. Most notably, the argument that 
coherence is an absolute concept dramatically reduces the tenability of 
Amaya’s theory, as her suggestion that legal fact-finders ought to responsibly 
infer the most coherent explanation available comes undone, leaving legal fact-
finders without clear guidance as to the duties and virtues they must display, 
and little more than epistemically arbitrary institutional norms to guide their 
selection of a single hypothesis as a true account of unperceived past events. 
 
These criticisms lead to the tentative conclusion that, as it stands, the role of 
coherence in the process of legal proof appears to have been overestimated. 
The coherence-based theories examined here show that claims that coherence 
holds the key to solving the problem of proof are unfounded, for coherence and 
coherentism prove too weak to justify beliefs about unperceived past facts, 
while failing to provide a sufficient basis on which to distinguish between 
competing theories of a case. 
 
II. Prospects for Coherence in the Process of Legal Proof 
This conclusion does not mean, however, that coherence has no role to play in 
the process of legal proof whatsoever. As well as presenting a number of 
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opportunities to develop a clearer, more accurate conception of coherence, the 
arguments presented here give rise to a potential avenue for further research 
into the essential process of reasoning that precedes justification in legal proof: 
the process of discovery. 
 
In Chapter 3, I suggested that the role of narrative coherence is overstated 
throughout MacCormick’s analysis of legal fact-finding, in which it appears that 
the true driving force is probability, not coherence. Drawing on Charles Sanders 
Peirce’s discussion of “abductive reasoning”, I presented a constructive 
interpretation of MacCormick’s narrative coherence, suggesting that the role of 
narrative coherence in his analysis can be seen more clearly in the context of 
discovery, rather than justification.6 For MacCormick, I have argued, narrative 
coherence merely supplies a number of initially plausible hypotheses that could 
explain the events in question, which must then be subjected to the test of 
probability, thus taking the following inferential method: 
The unexplained facts F are observed; 
But if either P or Q were true, F would be explicable, 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that either P or Q is true. 
Q is more probable than P, 
Therefore, Q is probably true. 
 
This observation leads me to conjecture that, perhaps, coherence, properly 
understood as simply fitting together, may serve as a preliminary test in legal 
fact-finding, establishing the minimal level of plausibility that each theory of a 
case must meet in order to be worthy of closer consideration in the process of 
justification. In this role, many of the problems facing coherence-based theories 
of justification are avoided, since the context of discovery requires a far lower 
standard of evidence and does not seek to settle upon one hypothesis. 
 
Of course, this does little to solve the problem of proof, and MacCormick’s 
implicit suggestion that probability affords justification is likely to face a number 
of epistemological problems, including, perhaps, some of those encountered 

























































6 See: Chapter 3, section V. 
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coherence-based theory of discovery may go some way to determining the best 
role for coherence in legal proof, as well as prompting research into an area of 
reasoning that is largely overlooked in current legal thought. 
 
To sum up: I have demonstrated that attempts to resolve the problem of proof 
with coherence-based theories of justification have failed on a number of 
conceptual and epistemological grounds, but that coherence, properly 
understood as the absolute notion of “fitting together”, may serve as a 
preliminary test of plausibility in the context of discovery and theory-formulation. 
A full investigation into the merits and limitations of this proposal is a matter for 
another occasion, but it appears that, in this capacity, coherence may have a 
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